OP114, International Card Services (ICS) Operation: Blocking Application to get Credit Card and Manipulation with Activisation

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg/op114

Published: 04 January 2022. Latest Update: 28 August 2023

Highlights

Amid Viseca Operation, Dr. Rozen-Bakher cancelled the credit card of Viseca and instead, she ordered the Dutch credit card from International Card Services (ICS), but ICCG took control even on this credit card, as follows:

ICCG Blocked the First Application - ICCG blocked the first application to prevent Dr. Rozen-Bakher to get a visa from International Card Services. The cyber blocking was done via fabricated failure of the authentification of IDEL, despite it being approved, as presented below. In spite of that, International Card Services ignored the contradiction and asked Dr. Rozen-Bakher to give a second application.
ICCG Manipulated the Second Application to take Control of the Credit Card. The second application was given to ICS including payment of 65 Euro for getting the card. The payment was done via IDEL, but Dr. Rozen-Bakher did not get an email confirmation from ICS for the payment nor an email about the transfer via IDEL, which were supposed to be received based on the previous correspondence with ICS. Likely that ICCG blocked these two emails to take control of the credit card, namely ICCG created an intentional delay in receiving the credit card, with the aim of finding conspirators in ICS that will assist with this operation. Based on the screen notice, Dr. Rozen-Bakher should get the new credit card on 7 January 2022, but the Credit Card was received and activated on 12 January 2022.
Manipulation with the Activisation of the Credit Card. First, the log-in to Dr. Rozen-Bakher’s ICS account was blocked via the regular password without giving any notice problem on screen. ICCG for a long time used the method of blocking log-in to manipulate various online activities of Dr. Rozen-Bakher including getting governmental services. However, Dr. Rozen-Bakher bypasses this blocking by log-in via SMS, so eventually, Dr. Rozen-Bakher activated the credit card. However, she did not receive the 3D Secure Code by post or by email from ISC, despite that she was supposed to get it, so she set up the 3D Secure Code via the website of ISC.

See also OP113, International Card Services (ICS) Operation: Intentionally Suspension of Credit Card to Prevent Traveling to Portugal to Renew Passport, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op113, Residence Location, Netherlands, Main Entity, E052, International Card Services (ICS), Netherlands, Sub-Entity I, E048, Ziggo (Internet, Mailbox-Outlook, Fax, Landline), Netherlands