Section B. Introduction: Why Do We Need Global Survival Rank (GSR)?: Survival in Short Wars versus Long Wars, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Written By Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/b/introduction

Published Date: 12 October 2025

COPYRIGHT ©2022-2025 ZIVA ROZEN-BAKHER ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb/2025

Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher: Yearly Rank to Compare the Global Political Power among Countries, Alliances and Coalitions to Survive Long Wars at the Military, Economic, and Political Levels

Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

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Section B. Introduction: Why do we need a Global Survival Rank (GSR)?: Survival in Short Wars versus Long Wars, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

 

Section B - List of Contents

Section B. Introduction: Why do we need a Global Survival Rank (GSR)?: Survival in Short Wars versus Long Wars, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

  • Section B1. Why do we need a Global Survival Rank (GSR)?: Survival in Short Wars versus Long Wars

  • Section B2. Determination of Survival in Long Wars: Critical Survival Factors

    • Section B2.1 Critical Survival Factors: Area Size (R1)

    • Section B2.2 Critical Survival Factors: Population and the Army Size that is derived from the Population (R2)

    • Section B2.3 Critical Survival Factors: Domestic Economic Activity (GDP) and the Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars that is derived from the GDP (R3)

    • Section B2.4 Critical Survival Factors: Technology Level (R4a)

    • Section B2.5 Critical Survival Factors: Distance Risk from Colony to Sovereign State (R4b)

    • Section B2.6 Critical Survival Factors: Limited International Recognition of Disputed Countries (R4c)

    • Section B2.7 Critical Survival Factors: Energy Security - Gas-Proved Reserves (R5) and Oil-Proved Reserves (R6)

    • Section B2.8 Critical Survival Factors: Food Security (R7)

 

Section B1. Why do we need a Global Survival Rank (GSR)?: Survival in Short Wars versus Long Wars

There is a BIG difference in terms of Survival between a Short War that can last for a few weeks to a few months and a Long War that can last for many months to a few years, as happened in World Wars. In a Short War, success depends on the Intelligence ability to predict surprise attacks or to be ready for ‘get-up-and-go’ for a War alongside the readiness of the army in terms of the Active Forces. Moreover, the success in a Short War depends on the ability to make a fast call for the Reserve Forces, as well as on the availability of the right weapons and the right munitions that fit the battlefield conditions, as well as on the availability of the right defence weaponry to minimise the destruction and casualties. The 12-Days War between Israel and Iran is a good example for a Short War, namely despite the Israeli surprise attack against the nuclear sites of Iran, including the assassination of the Iranian military leadership, Iran was able to replace quickly the military leadership that was able to make a counter-offensive against Israel with the Iranian military capabilities that even surprise the Israeli defence, resulting in a situation that the war between Israel and Iran lasted only 12-Days comparead to many months and even years as happned in other Israeli fronts against the State of Palestine (Gaza and West Bank), Lebanon, Syria, and even North Yemen (Sanaa)-Houthis. In other words, if Iran had not have the military capabilities to make a fast counter-offensive in an effective way, then likely that the war between Israel and Iran was not last for 12-Days but for many months or even years, because Israel like Iran, had the interest to end the war, which is contarary to the Israeli interest to keep the flames of the wars against the State of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria due their lack of military capabilities to deal with a war against Israel like Iran (Cite 1).

However, in Long Wars, success depends on the ability to survive daily attacks for many months and even years, so the readiness mentioned above may be a good start, but it will not help if the war drags on for years, especially in the cases of Regional War or World War when the transportation and movement of armies, weapons, energy, goods, and even food between countries are very limited and even not possible. Thereby, in Long Wars the survival depends on the domestic power to handle long wars without relying on outside support in any aspect, including domestic military capabilities, domestic production, economic strength, domestic technological capabilities, and even energy security and food security. The Russia-Ukraine war is a good example for the lack of a country to handle Long War without relying on outside support, namely Ukraine does not have the ability to survive a Long War against Russia without getting various support from the USA and the EU. In other words, if the USA and the EU cut the military support to Ukraine, then Russia would have a swift victory over Ukraine (Cite 2). Considering the above, under the conditions of Long Wars, we need to take into account additional critical factors that impact the Survival of a country in Long Wars, regardless of the ‘regular’ military capabilities that can be satisfied in Short Wars. Hence, the next section presents several critical survival factors that impact the ability of a country to win Long Wars, or at least to survive Long Wars without defeat. 

 

Section B2. Determination of Survival in Long Wars: Critical Survival Factors

In light of the above, this section lays down the reasoning for including nine critical survival factors in the Global Survival Rank (GSR), which impact the survival of a country or a colony or even a disputed country, as follows: Area Size (R1), Population and Army Size (R2), Domestic Production Level (GDP) and Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars (R3), Technology Level (R4a), Distance Risk from Colony to Sovereign State (R4b), International Recognition (R4c), Energy Security - Gas-Proved Reserves (R5) and Oil-Proved Reserves (R6), and Food Security (R7).

 

Section B2.1 Critical Survival Factors: Area Size (R1)

The most important factor for Survival in long wars is the Area Size of the country because when an invasion occurs, it is more difficult to takeover on Big countries compared to Small ones, such as what happened in WWII when Denmark was conquered by the Nazi Army in a few hours (see the video mapper below) and the Netherlands in a few days, which are both small countries. However, South France was kept liberated despite that North-Central France, including Paris, being conquered by the Nazis, which eventually allowed France to carry out the Resistance from South France against the Nazis that eventually liberated France from the Nazis. Moreover, the Big Area Size of Russia prevented Hitler from reaching Moscow, which allowed Russia to keep fighting against the Nazi army and, eventually, to win the war against Hitler from North-East Berlin, together with the Allies that liberated the occupied territories from South-West Berlin following the D-Day from South France that remains liberated. Nevertheless, the Area Size in the reality of the 21st century is even more crucial compared to the WWII era because of the Missiles and Drones, namely it is easier to wipe out and neutralize Small Countries compared to Big ones with the weapons of the 21st century. Importantly, under the current reality in which too many countries have Nuclear weapons, formally or informally, the Area Size even becomes more crucial for survival in the case of a Nuclear War in terms of ‘To be or Not to be’, because a Small Country unlikely survives one Nuclear strike, while a Big Country has the chance to survive even a few Nuclear Strikes.

Map 4. Video Mapper of German Invasion of Denmark in WWII

 

Section B2.2 Critical Survival Factors: Population and the Army Size that is derived from the Population (R2)

The second important factor for Survival in long wars is the Population and the Army Size that is derived directly from the Population Size, namely Small Army has difficulty in surviving Long Wars because it lacks sufficient Reserve Forces compared to a country with a Big Population, such as what happened in the Winter War between Russia and Finland (Cite 3). To remind, in WWI and WWII any healthy man was conscripted to the army due to the unprecedented Casualties, and many armies even reduced the Conscription Age to conscript younger ones alongside increasing the Conscription Age to conscript older ones. Even Ukraine, after two years of war against Russia, imposed a strict new law in trying to conscript more men to the Ukrainian Army because the Ukrainian Army is smaller compared to the Russian Army (Cite 4). Importantly, even Big Area Size can not shield from the problematic of small army size. Denmark and its colony Greenland is a good example of a combination of Small Population/Army Size with a Big Area Size. As shown in the table below, Greenland has a Big Area Size, yet with a very Small population and, worse, with a Distance of more than 3,500 km from its Sovereign State, Denmark, which also has a relatively Small Army, so Denmark depends heavily on the defence of NATO, still, Greenland as a colony is not formally covered by NATO, so Denmark is supposed to protect Greenland by its means. Paradoxically, the threat against Greenland recently comes from a NATO member, the USA (Cite 5-7), which highlights the importance of the army size for survival even if the country has a defence treaty.

Table 8. An Example of Small Population/Army Size with a Big Area Size: Denmark and its Colony Greenland

 

Section B2.3 Critical Survival Factors: Domestic Economic Activity (GDP) and the Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars that is derived from the GDP (R3)

The economic strength of a country is also a critical factor for survival in long wars, namely if the country is a poor one, then it lacks the ability to run a country in general and, in a long war, in particular, due to the higher costs during a long war that harm the income of the country, such as the army costs, arms costs, devastation costs, casualties costs, and loss of working days in the labour market due to the mass mobilisation, as well as due to a reduction in business activity, tourism, exports, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), especially if there is a restriction on the movements of goods. The latest report about the decline in the economic growth of Israel due to the higher costs of the long war on several fronts is a good example of the negative implications of long wars on economic activity, especially when a restriction exists on the movements of goods, as in the case of Israel due to the blockade by North Yemen (Sanaa)-Houthis (Cite 8-11). 

However, from the economic strength perspective, there is a significant difference between the GDP-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the GNI-Gross National Income (GNI) (see Presentation below), especially in relation to Long Wars. The GDP refers to the domestic activity by national firms and Foreign Firms, namely to the domestic production and services by national firms and foreign firms in the domestic Market, including Foreign Investment in the Domestic Market via Inwards Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). On the contrary, the GNI refers to the domestic and foreign activity by national firms, namely to the domestic production and services by national firms in foreign markets, including investment in foreign markets Via Outwards Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Hence, paradoxically, the GNI measures the national wealth but not necessarily the economic strength in Long Wars, because Long wars hinder the FDI activity, so relying on domestic production and services increases the survival in long wars compared to relying on imports of products and services. In other words, a country with significant domestic products and services has a 'Products and Services Security' compared to a country that relies on imports of products and services. Importantly, the availability of production sites also gives a safeguard to a country in long wars because of the ability to temporarily transform production sites into 'production-arms sites', as happened in WWII.  

Considering the above, Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes the critical survival factor (R3) – the Domestic Production Level (GDP) and its related factor that is derived from it, namely the Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars. However, it is important to distinguish between 'Real Military Expenditure' and the 'Ability of Military Expenditure' in relation to Long Wars. First, the 'Real Military Expenditure' in peaceful times is always significantly lower compared to war times, even if a country increases it a bit, such as the recent decision of NATO to increase the Military Expenditure to 5% of the GDP (Cite 12), yet the Military Expenditure and 'War-Costs' can even reach up to 25% of the GDP and even more in long wars. Second, in some cases, the 'War-Costs' are covered by Military Aid, such as in the case of Ukraine, which “has received more than €309 billion from at least 41 countries, either in military, humanitarian, or financial aid” (Cite 13), so it is important to distinguish between a Military Expenditure based on Aid and a Military Expenditure based on Self-Reliance (GDP), because according to the latest statement by Trump, the USA has no intention of giving more aid to Ukraine (Cite 14-15), which raises a doubt about the ability of Ukraine to keep fighting against Russia. Therefore, Military Aid is given by Foreign Allies, either under a Military Support Treaty or Ad-Hoc, yet there is no commitment for the scope of the aid even under a Military Support Treaty. However, a Military Expenditure is based on Self-Reliance, namely on money that the country has based on its GDP. Hence, the availability of weapons on 'Day One' of the war may help to cope with the war in the start phase, but if the country is poor in terms of GDP, then it will be harder for the country to cover the 'War-Cost' during a long war, while a rich country with a high GDP will likely succeed in covering the high costs of the war, including buying weapons even at high prices in the global market. In other words, ‘Real Military Expenditure’ is good for a ‘Short War’ or for the 'Day One' of a Long War, while the 'Ability of Military Expenditure' may help to survive long wars without the need to get Aid from other countries, such as Russia that has handled the war against Ukraine under Western sanctions and without getting Aid from any country (Cite 16).

Presentation 1. GDP versus GNI

Cite 8. Israel's economy slumps 3.5%, as Iran war squeezes consumer spending, Times of Israel, 17 Aug 2025

Cite 9. Eilat Port declares bankruptcy: What awaits the Occupying state, Middle East Monitor, 19 July 2024

Cite 10. Israel's Eilat port to shut down over unpaid debts triggered by Houthis, Middle East Eye, 17 July 2025

Cite 11. Is Israel can Afford the Occupation of Palestine?: ‘Soft Extinction’ versus ‘Hard Extinction’, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 17 April 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/17/04/2024/0634

Cite 12. NATO Allies Agree To Raise Defence Spending To 5% Of GDP, Forbes, 25 june 2025

Cite 13. Europe leads in military aid to Ukraine — but can it cover for a wavering US? MSN, 22 August 2025

Cite 14. Trump halts military aid to Ukraine, Bloomberg reports, Yahoo, 4 March 2025

Cite 15. Trump's Pause on Ukraine Aid Hurt Its Readiness, Watchdog Finds, Bloomberg, 15 August 2025

Cite 16. Russia's Economic Growth Projections for 2025: A Moderate Outlook, Devdiscourse News Desk, 27 August 2025

 

Section B2.4 Critical Survival Factors: Technology Level (R4a)

The national Technological Capabilities also play an important role in surviving Long Wars. Firstly, the Technology Level signals if the country can produce advanced weapons and ammunition via the local defence industry without relying on foreign producers. For example, Iran and even North Yemen (Sanaa)-Houthis have succeeded in developing local missiles and drones that change the 'Rules of Game' in the Middle East (Cite 17-19). Secondly, even if a country usually buys weapons from foreign military producers, still, the country needs to have the technical ability to maintain weapons that were not produced by the local industry because of the difficulty of getting maintenance from foreign producers during long wars, especially during World War. Otherwise, without local technological capabilities, the army will not be able to use weapons that suffered even from small damages during a long war. Thirdly, the Local Technological Capabilities need to have the ability to improvise alternative arms spare parts and alternative arms products, including their maintenance, because it is very difficult to get spare parts for weapons during long wars. That applies also for critical spare parts of infrastructure. Fourthly, even if the country has the money to buy weapons and ammunition, then sometimes it is impossible to buy weapons and ammunition during a long war, so the country needs to have Technological Capabilities to transform civil factories into military factories to produce improvised weapons and ammunition, such as what happened in WWII. For example, Ukraine many times mocked Russia for using improvised weapons and ammunition during the Russia-Ukraine War, but this Technological Capability helped Russia to survive the war during the time frame that it had a limited stock of weapons and ammunition until it got new weapons and ammunition, either from Foreign Producers or from Russian Producers (Cite 20).

 

Section B2.5 Critical Survival Factors: Distance Risk from Colony to Sovereign State (R4b)

Colonialism started in the 15th century as part of the Imperialism and Mercantilism Doctrine, and it reached its peak in WWI, but since then, most of the Colonies became Independent Countries, so currently, most of the remaining Colonies are small and vulnerable, with an Average Distance of 6,325 km From the Colonies to the Sovereign States (see table below). Importantly, following the UN resolution on Decolonialism (Granting Independence to Colonies) from 04 December 2024, most of the colonies have aspirations for Self-Determination (Cite 21), which increases the risk for sovereign states in holding colonies, especially in long wars, and in particular, colonies with significant distance from the colony to the sovereign state.

Long distance from a colony to a Sovereign State poses a High Risk during Long Wars because the sovereign state needs to mobilise military forces and weapons to its distant colonies, which can be a complex task during Long Wars because of the ‘Closing Skys’ or due to the fighting between rival Navies. Even taking care for the Food and Energy of isolated colonies, most of them isolated small islands, can be a risky task because most of the Sea Routes are not Safe for Civil Vessels in long wars, while providing food by Civil Air Carriers can be risky and very expensive due to the long distance. To remind, countless small islands were invaded and occupied in WWII, even small islands that are relatively close to their Sovereign State, as in the case of the Channel Islands (Jersey & Guernsey), which were occupied by the Nazis while the UK was under daily air attacks but still remain liberated (Cite 22). Thus, clearly, it is very difficult to protect isolated small islands from invasion when they are located thousands of Km from their Sovereign States. Importantly, most of the Military Defence Treaties (e.g., NATO) do not cover colonies, so the sovereign state needs to defend its colonies by its own means in the case of an attack against them, which makes it harder when the Sovereign State has many colonies with a long distance to them. However, the most risky issue in long wars is the loyalty issue between disputed colonies and Sovereign States, because it's doubtful that distant colonies that have aspirations for Self-Determination preserve loyalty in long wars for their Sovereign States that prevented them from being Independent States. The case of New Caledonia is a good example of a disputed colony that is located 16,000 Km from France, yet with repeated riots that led France to send forces and even to declare State of Emergency in trying to handle the local resistance in the colony against France (Cite 23). Thus, it is doubtful if such a colony preserves loyalty to its sovereign state during a Long War.

Chart 10. Colonies: Distance Risk from Colony to Sovereign State (R4b)

 

Section B2.6 Critical Survival Factors: Limited International Recognition of Disputed Countries (R4c)

International Recognition of Disputed Countries is based on Self-Declaration of an Independent Country, leading to two camps: those countries that recognised the Self-Declaration of the Independent Country and those countries that did not recognise the Self-Declaration, as presented in the Chart below that presents the Limited International Recognition of UN Members and Non-UN Members. These two camps usually signal who are the Allies or the Rivals of the Disputed Country versus the Country that Claims Sovereignty over the territory, which particularly applies in the case of a Conflict or a War. In other words, the scope of the International Recognition indicates if the Disputed Country has the prospect of becoming an independent country by getting the status of UN Member as in the case of the State of Palestine, or vice versa, if the Disputed Country has no real prospect of becoming an Independent Country for long, as in the case of Taiwan, which is recognised by only 13 countries. Hence, International Recognition is the first step for becoming an Independent Country, such as in the case of the State of Palestine, which is currently recognised by more than 150 countries, so it already secures the status of UN Observer State with a prospect of becoming a Full UN Member.

However, Limited International Recognition of Disputed Countries is like ‘To Be or Not to Be’ when a long war erupts, because the disputed country will get assistance only if it has some international recognition from other countries. The case of the Gaza War is a perfect example of the critical factor of International Recognition in wars because the State of Palestine gets any assistance that the international community can provide to end the Israeli Occupation and to allow Palestine to become an Independent country. That’s only because so many countries already recognised the State of Palestine. Thus, it is no surprise that each time when more countries recognise Palestine, then the Israeli regime confronts them because Palestine is becoming closer to becoming an independent country. On the contrary, Western Sahara (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) has international recognition from only 48 countries, so it has not yet secured even the status of UN Observer State like the State of Palestine, so when a military conflict arises between the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Morocco that occupies the Western Sahara, then we barely hear about it in the news, only because limited countries have already recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) as an Independent Country. Even UN Members like Israel, who have limited International Recognition, suffer from backlash from the international community, but the negative implication of the limited International Recognition on those who already secure the status of UN member is less critical in long wars compared to Disputed Countries that have no formal status in the UN. Considering the above, Limited International Recognition is a critical factor in long wars in the case of disputed countries that are not UN members nor UN observer states, while Limited International Recognition among UN members may isolate them in some way, but it has less impact on their survival in long wars because they are already sovereign states with territories and formal armies. 

Chart 11. Limited International Recognition of UN Members and Non-UN Members

 

Section B2.7 Critical Survival Factors: Energy Security - Gas-Proved Reserves (R5) and Oil-Proved Reserves (R6)

The Gas-Proved Reserves worldwide are going to become a rare energy resource unless more significant Gas Reserves will be found in the coming future. Even now the Gas-Proved Reserves become a strategic asset, as shown in the map below. More specifically, currently only about 50 countries have some Gas-Proved Reserves, but most of the Gas-Proved Reserves are held by only several countries, as shown in the chart below. That makes the Gas-Proved Reserves as a critical factor for survival. The Embargo on Oil that was imposed by OPEC against Israel and its allies following the Yom-Kippur War which lasted for about one year, is a good example of why the Oil-Proved Reserves is also critical factor for survival in long wars. Currently only about 50 countries have some Oil-Proved Reserves, but most of the Oil-Proved Reserves are held by several countries, like in the case of the gas, as shown in the chart below. However, the Russia-Ukraine War, along with the ongoing military conflict between the Western Coalition and the North Yemen (Sanaa)-Houthis – have changed the ‘Rules of Game’ in a way that the Gas-Proved Reserves even become more important factor for survival in long wars compared to Oil-Proved Reserves. First, the ‘Anti-Russia Coalition’ has halted the use of Russian Gas due to the ‘Sanctions against Russia’ following the Russia-Ukraine War (Cite 24). Second, the Western coalition against the North Yemen (Sanaa)-Houthis has led to the sea blockade in the Red Sea by the Houthis, which impacts the transportation of LNG carriers and Oil Tankers via the Suez Tunnel. Considering the above, the Russia-Ukraine War has led to a situation in which the Gas has even become more privileged compared to Oil because Russia and its allies have significantly more Gas Reserves compared to what the USA and its allies have, resulting in a situation in which the Gas Reserves is more critical for survival compared to the Oil Reserves, as shown in the Chart below that presents the Top 10 of Gas and Oil Proved Reserves by Coalition. Nevertheless, the problem today is not only which countries have more Gas and Oil and which countries have more privilege to buy them, but also if the LNG carriers and Oil Tankers can be delivered without 'Sea-Attacks' due to the military conflict with the Houthis. That has led to the situation that many LNG carriers and Oil Tankers have been forced to change their sea route from the Suez canal to the long sea route via the Cape route around Africa, which impacts the transportation costs, resulting in a situation in which the gas prices in the EU are much higher compared to the gas prices via Nord Stream 2 as they were before the sanctions against Russia (Cite 25). Although, in World War, there are no ‘Safe’ sea routes, so having Gas-Proved Reserves, or vice versa, not having them, can significantly affect the survival of countries in long wars. All the same, the Energy security can become for some Colonies as ‘To Be or Not to Be’ in Long Wars because many Colonies are isolated islands that are located very far from their Sovereign State without any gas reserves or oil Reserves, so their survival in long wars depends heavily on whether they will succeed to get Oil and Gas during a long war. 

Map 6. Oil-Proved Reserves (R6)

Map 5. Natural Gas-Proved Reserves (R5)

Chart 12. Natural Gas-Proved Reserves (R6), World Share % Chart 13. Oil Gas-Proved Reserves (R5), World Share %

Chart 14. Energy Security: Top 10 of Gas and Oil Proved Reserves by Coalition

Table 9. Top 10 of Gas and Oil Proved Reserves by Coalition

 

Section B2.9 Critical Survival Factors: Food Security (R7)

The last critical survival factor that is included in the Global Survival Rank (GSR) is the Food Security. Urbanisation alongside globalisation has led to a new era in terms of food, namely less and less Agricultural land, while more and more dependency on imported food, which has increased the Food Insecurity worldwide during wars compared to the reality in WWII. However, even in WWII, Food Insecurity was a critical issue because of the lack of labour to work in Agriculture or because the fields became battlefields amid the war. Hence, under the current reality that many countries rely heavily on Imported Food over local Agriculture, the survival in long wars also depends on whether the country still has enough Agricultural land for Food Security in the case that the circumstances will prevent getting imported food during the war. Moreover, Food Security like Energy Security is like ‘To Be or Not to Be’ for Colonies, because most of the remaining Colonies are islands that transformed into Tourism Hubs without keeping Agricultural land, which can increase the Food Insecurity in Colonies during long wars. Importantly, we should also take into account Food Insecurity in long wars by ‘Man-Made’ via blockade, as done by the Israeli regime in Gaza, which has led to Starvation and even Famine in Gaza (Cite 26). Therefore, Food Security is not only a matter of Agriculture Land, but a matter of ‘defence capabilities’ in order to survive a long war even under blockade. Hence, countries should refer to the Food Security as a matter of defence, especially if the country lacks Agriculture Land or if the country can be in a situation of blockade.

Cite 26. Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 06 February 2024, Starvation as a War-Weapon: The Case of Palestine https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/06/02/2024/0751

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher - A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/
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Section A. Highlights, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher 
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Section C. Military Risk in Wars, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher