OP085, Controlling Internet Access Operation - Blocking Data on Smartphone and via Open Free WiFi, while Allowing Access only via ICCG-Internet (WiFi with Password):

Blocking Mobile Data of Lebara in Portugal and Netherlands as part of Holding Dr. Rozen-Bakher as a Virtual Political Prisoner

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op085

Published Date: 19 May 2022. Latest Update: 30 November 2023

OP085, Controlling Internet Access Operation - Blocking Data on Smartphone and via Open Free WiFi, while Allowing Access only via ICCG-Internet (WiFi with Password): Blocking Mobile Data of Lebara in Portugal and Netherlands as part of Holding Dr. Rozen-Bakher as a Virtual Political Prisoner, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op085, Residence Location, Netherlands, Main Entity, E065, Lebara, Netherlands, Sub-Entity I, E210,  Portuguese Internet Provider that made the roaming of Lebara in 05/2022, Portugal


Highlights

  • On 06 February 2022, Dr. Rozen-Bakher and her son started to use SIMs of Lebara based on phone numbers that were forwarded from KPN mobiles. The SIMs of Lebara include calls, SMSs and Data. From 06 February 2022 until 08 May 2022, Dr. Rozen-Bakher and her son used the data of Lebara without any specific problems.

    Blocking in Portugal

  • However, on 08 May 2022, when Dr. Rozen-Bakher arrived in Lisbon to deal with the renewal of her Portuguese passport and Citizen Card, then the data of Lebara have blocked by ICCG, despite that Dr. Rozen-Bakher got an SMS from Lebara that she could use for free the data in Portugal as part of Lebara Roaming in EU countries (Please see Lebara Roaming: https://www.comparedial.com/guide/lebara-roaming-explained-for-international-eu-countries-322) Under this Data Blocking, Dr. Rozen-Bakher has no access to the internet on her Smartphone, unless she had connection via WiFi. Note, the Dutch SIM in Portugal should work via Roaming of Portuguese internet provider. However, ICCG not only Blocked the Data on her mobile, but also Blocked Open Free WiFi as in the case of OP081 in the Coffee Shop in Lisbon (see below). Hence, in this visit in Portugal, Dr. Rozen-Bakher has only access to the internet under the controlling of ICCG, namely under WiFi with Password in Two hotels in Lisbon, while all other access to the internet like via Smartphone or via Open Free WiFi were blocked by ICCG. It is hard to see how ICCG runs this operation and other operations in Portugal without the assistance of the Portuguese Intelligence, either SIS like Israeli Shin Bet (https://www.sis.pt/) or SIED like the Israeli Mossad (https://www.sied.pt/).

    • OP081,  Virtual Political Prisoner Operation via Local Spy Agents in Portugal - Blocking Access of Laptop and Mobile to Open Free WiFi at a Coffee Shop in Lisbon during Dr. Rozen-Bakher Visit in Portugal to Renew her Passport: All Visitors at the Coffee Shop had Access to the WiFi excluded Dr. Rozen-Bakher, while during her Visit in Lisbon she had no problem to Access other WiFi with Password (e.g. hotels) via her Laptop and Mobile - ICCG fears from Free Open WiFi that may break the Virtual Political Prisoner in Portugal,  https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op081, Residence Location,  Portugal,  Main Entity,  E067,  Choupana Café, Lisbon,  Portugal,  Sub-Entity I,  E192,  Israeli Cover-up Conspiracy Group (ICCG),  Portugal,  Sub-Entity II,  E208,  Portuguese Internet Provider at Choupana Café, Lisbon,  Portugal

      Blocking in Netherlands

  • Importantly, when Dr. Rozen-Bakher returned to the Netherlands on 13 May 2022, then the data of Lebara on her mobile was still blocked by ICCG until 06/2022 when she fled with her son from Netherlands to Portugal. Worse, since her arrival to Netherlands, ICCG even blocked the entire new Portuguese SIM of MEO in Netherlands including Calls, SMSs and data ,despite that the Portuguese SIM should work properly in the Netherlands, and despite that the Portuguese SIM of MEO worked properly in Portugal (Please see OP086). Note, the Portuguese SIM in Netherlands should work via Roaming of Dutch internet provider.

  • The escalation of ICCG Operations against Dr. Rozen-Bakher in relation to her travel to Portugal to renew her Portuguese Passport include not only blocking access to the internet, but also the suspension of the Dutch ICS credit card (Please see OP113), which signal that Dutch authorities became desperate with their fear that their involvement in the cover-up crimes and obstruction of justice against Dr. Rozen-Bakher and her son since they moved to the Netherlands, will be revealed to the public, so the Dutch authorities escalate the cover-up crimes in trying to hide the scandal from the public.



Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher - A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/
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OP086, Blocking Portuguese SIM of MEO (+351-962371466) in Netherlands: Total Blocking of Data, Calls and SMSs as part of Holding Dr. Rozen-Bakher as a Virtual Political Prisoner

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OP110, Research Papers-PD2, PD5, PD9, PD10, PD11: Taylor & Francis, New Political Economy - Modifing Journal Account without Permission to Cover-up Manipulated Submissions