OP086, Blocking Portuguese SIM of MEO (+351-962371466) in Netherlands: Total Blocking of Data, Calls and SMSs as part of Holding Dr. Rozen-Bakher as a Virtual Political Prisoner

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op086

Published 22 May 2022. Latest Update: 30 November 2023

OP086,  Blocking Portuguese SIM of MEO (+351-962371466) in Netherlands: Total Blocking of Data, Calls and SMSs as part of Holding Dr. Rozen-Bakher as a Virtual Political Prisoner,  https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op086, Residence Location,  Netherlands,  Main Entity,  E006,  MEO (Mobile) - Altice Portugal,  Portugal,  Sub-Entity I, E211, Dutch Internet Provider that made the roaming of MEO in 05/2022,  Netherlands


Highlights

  • On 08 May 2022, Dr. Rozen-Bakher arrived in Lisbon to deal with the renewal of her Portuguese passport and Citizen Card. However, amid the Blocking Mobile Data of Lebara in Lisbon (see OP085) alongside the Blocking of Open Free WiFi in Lisbon (see OP081), on 11 May 2022, Dr. Rozen-Bakher bought in Lisbon a Portuguese SIM of MEO (+351-962371466) to bypass the blocking Data of her Dutch mobile and the cyber that was carried out against her when she tried to connect to Open Free WiFi in Lisbon. The Portuguese SIM of MEO included data of 5G, calls and SMSs. This Portuguese SIM should work properly not only in Portugal but also in other EU countries. After operating the Portuguese SIM by one of the representatives of MEO at a MEO store, Dr. Rozen-Bakher had no problem with the Portuguese SIM of MEO in Portugal during the days of 11 May and12 May 2022.

  • On 13 May 2022, when Dr. Rozen-Bakher landed in the Netherlands, the Portuguese SIM did not work excluding emergency calls and she even did not get an SMS from MEO which is usually sent to customers when they arrived in another country. Besides, in Q2/2017-Q4/2018, Dr. Rozen-Bakher had a mobile of MEO that work properly in the EU and even outside the EU, so the SIM of MEO should work properly in Netherlands. Importantly, not only the SIM of MEO was blocked in Netherlands but also the mobile Data of Lebara was continued to be Block after on her return to Netherlands (see OP085). More specifically, the data of Lebara was worked properly in Netherlands before the travelling to Lisbon, but when Dr. Rozen-Bakher arrived Lisbon, the data of Lebara was blocked, and even after her return to Netherlands. To summarize, the Mobile Data of Lebara and the SIM of MEO were blocked in Netherlands until June 2022 when Dr. Rozen-Bakher fled from Netherlands to Portugal, so from 13 May 2022 until 05 June 2022, she had no access to the internet in Netherlands via her Smartphone, neither via Lebara nor via MEO.



Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher - A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/
Previous
Previous

OP081, Virtual Political Prisoner Operation via Local Spy Agents in Portugal:

Next
Next

OP085, Controlling Internet Access Operation - Blocking Data on Smartphone and via Open Free WiFi, while Allowing Access only via ICCG-Internet (WiFi with Password):