OP261, Blocking Dr. Rozen-Bakher’s Blog on FDI and International Trade: Sabotage Requests for Removal From Getting the Blog to Shutdown the Blog based on False Argument that Removal Requests did not Handle - Blocking Requests, Delay in Getting Requests (2 Weeks), Fabricated Requests (Recipients Not Exist), Manipulated Requests (Empty Form), Requests From Different Location (e.g. Requests from Germany to Remove Recipients From Togo, Iran & Turkey), Sabotage Requests via Cyber-Excel Find-Tool, and Even Cyber-Attack against White Laptop with Hardware & Software Damage when Hard Proof Printed about Sabotage Removal Operation
https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg/op261
Latest Update: 10 November 2023
OP261, Blocking Dr. Rozen-Bakher’s Blog on FDI and International Trade: Sabotage Requests for Removal From Getting the Blog to Shutdown the Blog based on False Argument that Removal Requests did not Handle - Blocking Requests, Delay in Getting Requests (2 Weeks), Fabricated Requests (Recipients Not Exist), Manipulated Requests (Empty Form), Requests From Different Location (e.g. Requests from Germany to Remove Recipients From Togo, Iran & Turkey), Sabotage Requests via Cyber-Excel Find-Tool, and Even Cyber-Attack against White Laptop with Hardware & Software Damage when Hard Proof Printed about Sabotage Removal Operation, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg/op261, Residence Location, Netherlands, Main Entity, E004, KPN (Internet, Mailbox-Outlook, Mobile, Fax, Landline), , Netherlands, Sub-Entity I, E043, WordPress (Website), USA, Sub-Entity II, E055, Microsoft (Office-Excel), USA
Highlights
As part of Blocking Dr. Rozen-Bakher’s Blog on FDI and International Trade by ICCG, at some point, ICCG started to manipulate requests for removal from getting the blog via emails in trying to shutdown the blog based false argument that removal requests did not handle by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher. Hence, ICCG tried to accomplish this manipulated objective via several manipulated ways, as follows:
Blocking Incoming Emails with Requests for Removal from the Blog. Blocking incoming emails with requests for removal from the blog to create sabotage to the blog namely, ICCG tried in many manipulation ways to lead to a situation that Dr. Rozen-Bakher won’t remove recipients from getting the blog, as follows:
Blocking incoming requests for removal. Recipients argued that they already sent a request despite that it didn’t appear in the inbox of Dr. Rozen-Bakher.
Intentional Delay in Getting Requests for Removal. Intentional delay in getting requests for removal, such as the case of an Israeli recipient who threatened to sue Dr. Rozen-Bakher for sending the blog after the request for removal, but the request gets into the KPN inbox of Dr. Rozen-Bakher around two weeks after the date of sending the email from Israel.
Manipulation with Requests for Removal from the Blog.
Fabricated Requests for Removal. ICCG sent Fabricated Requests for Removal from recipients that were not included in Dr. Rozen-Bakher’s contact list. In some cases, Dr. Rozen-Bakher got repeated harassment emails with a request for removal from recipients who weren’t included in her contact list. See the Not Exist Sheet in the Excel File of the Blog’s contact list.
Getting ‘Communication-Form’ from WordPress Website without Mentioning the Purpose of the Message. In some cases, Dr. Rozen-Bakher got ‘Communication-Form’ via the website from recipients who didn’t mention the purpose of the message, yet the request for removal was clarified after Dr. Rozen-Bakher asked for clarification about the Purpose of the Message. See Unclear Sheet in the Excel File of the Blog’s contact list.
Getting a Request for Removal from a Different Location of the Recipient. In some cases, the request for removal was different from the location of the recipient, such as the 3 requests for removal that were sent from Frankfurt, Germany to remove emails from Togo, Iran and Turkey, while a request for removal was sent from Japan to remove an email from Hong Kong.
Cyber-Excel Find-Tool to sabotage Requests for Removal via WordPress’s Communication Form. At some point when all the previous ways didn’t succeed in shutting down the blog, ICCG invented the Cyber-Find in the Excel file. More specifically, the Excel file includes thousands of recipients, so when Dr. Rozen-Bakher used the Find Tool in the Excel File to find a specific recipient following a request via WordPress’s Communication Form, the Excel File showed that the recipient did not exist despite that it was on the Excel File. Importantly, the Find-Tool in the Excel File worked perfectly as usual when she tried to find a recipient that sent a request for removal via regular email or when she used the Find-Tool randomly. Hence, this Cyber Find-Tool led to a situation that in the beginning, a few requests for removal didn’t handle immediately, but when the cyber was revealed, the sort was done manually by a-b, still, it slowed the process of finding a certain recipient without the Find-Tool in the Excel File, so eventually, it was an Harassment-Cyber. Important note, at some point, Dr. Rozen-Bakher started working offline with most of her files including the Excel file of the contact list, but despite it, the Cyber Find-Tool was done even under offline, which signals that ICCG has internet access to computers of Dr. Rozen-Bakher in Netherlands that were not connected to the internet. This Cyber-Offline was done also in Israel and Portugal, as mentioned in other ICCG Operations.
Cyber-Attack against White Laptop with Hardware & Software Damage when Hard Proof Printed about Sabotage Removal Operation. On 26 May 2021, a cyber-attack was done against the White laptop of Dr. Rozen-Bakher that led to significant damage without the ability to continue working with this laptop, resulting in buying a new laptop instead (see OP226). Cyber-attacks against the computers and laptops of Dr. Rozen-Bakher that include system damage and hardware damage occurred too many times in the past in Israel and in the EU.

