United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC): Rubber Stamp
https://www.rozen-bakher.com/forum/2023/02/25/un
Published Date: 25 February 2023; Latest Update of Scientific Literature: 14 March 2026
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Rozen-Bakher, Z., United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC): Rubber Stamp, Global Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 25 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/forum/2023/02/25/un
Global Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
Global Risks Aims to Stimulate Thinking ‘Out of the Box’ about Ongoing Global Problems that Have No Clear Solutions.
Rozen-Bakher, Z. Global Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-risks
Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
Researcher in International Relations and Foreign Policy with a Focus on International Security alongside Military, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade
UN Security Council (UNSC)
Is the UNSC a Rubber Stamp under the Veto Right of Superpowers?
Do the Permanent Members of the UNSC reflect the current Global Political Power?
The Veto Right became a farce in the UNSC (see Charts 1-4 below). Again and again, one of the superpowers protects one of the ‘Bad Boys’. The USA protects the ‘Bad Boy’, Israel, regarding Palestine. Russia protects the ‘Bad Boy’, Syria, while China protects the ‘Bad Boy’, North Korea, yet the UK and France keep a low profile in the hope that no one will complain that they are no longer superpowers. Under this farce, it's no surprise that most of the significant votes in the UNSC ended in Veto, while the insignificant votes ended with something that, in most cases, nobody really pays attention to them. Thus, under this reality, is the UNSC a meaningless body? Still, the big question is how we can transform the UNSC into a significant body at the geopolitical level.
First, we need to change the structure of the UNSC. The current framework of permanent members is based on the geopolitical order from the end of WWII without taking into account the current global order. Hence, the USA, Russia, and China should keep their positions as permanent members of the UNSC, while the UK and France should not. Instead, the EU as a bloc should be a permanent member of the UNSC, because the EU bloc is de-facto superpower, yet it may be complicated because, regarding each UNSC vote, the EU bloc may need to get the approval of all EU countries. Perhaps additional Blocs could also be permanent members of the UNSC, such as the African Union.
Nevertheless, the big bumper is the Veto Right that protects the ‘Bad Boys’, and in fact, makes the UNSC a Rubber Stamp. If all superpowers agree that no one is above the Binding of the UNSC, then a "big majority" or at least "two against" can be a good alternative to the Veto Right.
UN General Assembly
Does the UNGA function as a Democratic Body?
Should the Votes in the UNGA be secret like in democratic elections?
Should the Decisions of the UNGA be binding?
However, if we look at the UNGA, then we have a big problem with the ‘Open Vote’ that makes the UNGA a non-democratic body. To illustrate it: Is an Open Vote in Elections can be considered a democratic election? Obviously, not. The ‘Secret Vote’ allows making a vote without the fear of pressure and negative implications. A strong country or a big country or an independent country has no problem revealing its position via an ‘Open Vote’ in the UN votes, while a small country or a weak country or a dependent country chooses too many times to ‘Not Vote’ in significant votes of UNGA (see Table 1 below) or even to vote ‘Abstain’ instead of ‘Against’ or ‘Favour’, because of the concern that their vote may complicate them with one of the superpowers. Hence, the UNGA should avoid ‘Open Vote’ while regularly making ‘Secret Vote’, resulting in democratic decisions of the UNGA that reflect the real position of each country, instead of fear via ‘Not Voted’ or ‘Abstain’ or even worse via ‘Force Vote’, either ‘Favour’ or ‘Against’.
However, the most critical issue is the ‘Not Binding’ of UNGA’s votes. Under this reality, the UNGA is a meaningless body that can not influence anything. A perfect Rubber Stamp. Hence, the votes of the UNGA should be a ‘Binding Decision’, yet the ‘Binding Decision’ must be based on a significant majority, rather than a simple majority, such as a majority of at least 60-70%.
Is it Possible to make the UNSC and the UN a ‘Non-Rubber Stamp’?
To summarise, currently, the UNSC and the UNGA are symbolic important bodies, but de-facto meaningless bodies, namely the UNSC and the UNGA have no ability to influence critical issues, which increases global instability and even the risk to the existence of the UN in the long-run. Only a change in the structure and framework will make the the UN an important body that can stabilise the global arena.
Charts 1-4: Using Veto Rights in UNSC
Table 1. An Example of ‘Not Voted’ in UN votes about Ukraine War
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From the Scientific Literature: Research Papers and Research Books
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Action or inaction: United Nations Security Council activity, 1994–2013 Allen, S. H., & Yuen, A. T. (2020). Action or inaction: United Nations Security Council activity, 1994–2013. Journal of peace research, 57(5), 658-665.
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Precedent and doctrine in organisational decision-making: the power of informal institutional rules in the United Nations Security Council’s activities on terrorism Gehring, T., Dorsch, C., & Dörfler, T. (2019). Precedent and doctrine in organisational decision-making: the power of informal institutional rules in the United Nations Security Council’s activities on terrorism. Journal of International Relations and Development, 22(1), 107-135.
Decision-Making in the United Nations General Assembly: A Comprehensive Database of Resolutions, Decisions, and Votes Fjelstul, J., Hug, S., & Kilby, C. (2022). Decision-making in the United Nations General Assembly: A comprehensive database of resolutions, decisions, and votes (No. 56). Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
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