OP058, Mastercard of Viseca Operation: Mishmash of Two Credit Cards Operation - Real 1583 and Fabricated 1587 - to Manipulate and Control the Activity of the Credit Card:

Written By Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Only a Single Credit Card was Ordered, yet Significant Manipulation occurred over 2 months via Regular Post and Registered Post of Royal Mail until Receiving the Credit Card and the Password of 1583, still, after Activision of 1583, Real Transactions by Dr. Rozen-Bakher were written on the Fabricated Card of 1587, despite that she Performed these Transactions via 1583, which explained how ICCG Blocked many Transactions of Mastercard of Viseca

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op058

ICCG Announcement: 08 May 2023. Latest Update: 31 December 2023

OP058,  Mastercard of Viseca Operation: Mishmash of Two Credit Cards Operation - Real 1583 and Fabricated 1587 - to Manipulate and Control the Activity of the Credit Card: Only a Single Credit Card was Ordered, yet Significant Manipulation occurred over 2 months via Regular Post and Registered Post of Royal Mail until Receiving the Credit Card and the Password of 1583, still, after Activision of 1583, Real Transactions by Dr. Rozen-Bakher were written on the Fabricated Card of 1587, despite that she Performed these Transactions via 1583, which explained how ICCG Blocked many Transactions of Mastercard of Viseca,  https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op058, Residence Location,  UK,  Main Entity,  E021,  Viseca,  Switzerland,  Sub-Entity I,  E022,  Mastercard,  USA,  Sub-Entity II,  E025,  Zürcher Kantonalbank (ZKB),  Switzerland,  Sub-Entity III,  E023,  Home Telecom (Internet,  FAX and Landline),  UK,  Sub-Entity IV, E020,  Royal Mail (UK Post),  UK

This Operation was mentioned in sections 2.4.21 and 2.4.7 in the Following Complaints (see below):

  • CM060, Complaint II to Portuguese Police (Polícia Judiciária) and PM of Portugal, 09 January 2020, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg/cm060, E101, Portuguese Police (Polícia Judiciária), Portugal

Highlights

  • On 16 January 2019, Dr. Rozen-Bakher opened a Swiss investment bank account in Zürcher Kantonalbank (ZKB) in the currency of EURO, and she had the privilege to order a premium credit card via Zürcher Kantonalbank. Hence, on 05 February 2019, Dr. Rozen-Bakher ordered from Zürcher Kantonalbank a credit card of Viseca with a limit of 10,000 Euro.

  • Due to the ‘Viseca Operation: Blocking Getting the Credit Card’ that was carried out by Blocking three letters from Viseca: i) A letter with the Credit Card. ii) A Letter with the Password of the Credit Card. iii) A Letter with the password to ONE-Website of Viseca. Thus, instead of getting the three letters within two weeks, then Dr. Rozen-Bakher got the last of them only in 04/2019, yet after many emails, Faxs, and phone calls to Zürcher Kantonalbank and Viseca.

  • On 08 April 2019 at 19:49, Dr. Rozen-Bakher log-in for the first time to ONE-Website of Viseca, only to reveal about the ‘Two Credit Cards Operation’:

    • Credit Card 1583 - A contradiction was revealed regarding the credit limit, and currency between the formal letter of Viseca and Viseca website-ONE:

      • Formal Letter from Viseca - Credit Card 1583: Limit of 10,000 EURO, Currency-Euro. The card 1583 with Euro currency that Dr. Rozen-Bakher ordered did not appear on Viseca website-ONE.

      • Viseca Website-ONE - Credit Card 1583: Limit of 18,000 CHF, Currency-CHF, Active with Transactions. Dr. Rozen-Bakher ordered did not order a card with CHF currency nor a card with a limit of 18,000 CHF.

    • Two Credit Cards were active with transactions, despite that Dr. Rozen-Bakher ordered only one Credit Card and got only one Credit Card:

      • Credit Card 1575 - Limit of 10,000 Euro - NOT got it: Active with Transactions of 1,887 Euro in 03/2019, despite that Dr. Rozen-Bakher did not get this credit card, still, this credit card fits the order of Credit Card with a limit of 10,000 Euro.

      • Credit Card 1583 - Limit of 18,000 CHF - Got it: Active with Transactions, despite that Dr. Rozen-Bakher did not order a card with CHF currency nor with a limit of 18,000 CHF.

    • A Fabricated Activity was revealed regarding Credit Card 1575. Dr. Rozen-Bakher NEVER got this Credit Card.

      • Limit of 10,000 Euro

      • Spent-0 Euro

      • Available-5,087 Euro

      • Next Payment-1,887 Euro

  • Due to the ‘Two Credit Cards Operation’, on 08 April 2019, Dr. Rozen-Bakher sent a request to Zürcher Kantonalbank to open an investigation about the fabricated card. Four days later, ICCG started the Blocking Food Operation via Mastercard of Viseca (see OP027)

  • Despite the hard facts for the manipulation, Zürcher Kantonalbank ignored the request for investigation based on the ground that the second card was removed from the Viseca website. Importantly, ignoring hard facts about serious manipulation became the norm in Zürcher Kantonalbank and in Viseca. Worse, after Blocking Food Operation and Two Credit Cards Operation, Zürcher Kantonalbank refused to continue to deal with problems related to Viseca by asking Dr. Rozen-Bakher to approach directly Viseca, despite that she informed Zürcher Kantonalbank about the communication problems with Viseca, as mentioned in section 2.4.7 in the Complaint to Zurich Police, Switzerland (See section 2.4.7 below)

  • Dr. Rozen-Bakher NEVER got a response from Viseca about the Two Credit Cards Operation nor regarding any other complaint about Blocking of the credit card, still, a few months after the Blocking Food Operation, Dr. Rozen-Bakher eventually succeeded to speak with the System Assistance of Viseca. They argued that at that time related to ‘‘Blocking Food Operation’, any Blocking does not appear on the system of Viseca, as well as any other blocking related to ‘Shopping Blocking’, so the blocking was done by ICCG via cyber and conspirators.

ICCG manipulated the activity of Viseca Credit Card of Dr. Rozen-Bakher via Two Credit Cards

After Reaveling of this manipulation, then one credit card appeared on the website of Viseca, yet based on the countless manipulation all over the period when Dr. Rozen-Bakher had the credit card of Viseca, then likely that ICCG was still used in a ‘darkness’ the second fabricated card to manipulate the activity.

Full Proofs of ‘Two Credit Cards Operation’

 

This Operation was mentioned in sections 2.4.21 and 2.4.7 in the Following Complaints:

  • CM060, Complaint II to Portuguese Police (Polícia Judiciária) and PM of Portugal, 09 January 2020, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg/cm060, E101, Portuguese Police (Polícia Judiciária), Portugal

2.4.21 ‘Manipulation and Blocking Mastercard-Viseca Operation’, Switzerland, Q1/2019-Current

Since the opening of the management investment bank account in Switzerland, then have started irregular occurrences, especially related to the credit card Mastercard of Viseca. This operation based on the concept that ‘tomorrow will never come’ and bills and account activity that has been manipulated can ‘vanish’ from financial records, but obviously that not. In the beginning, a ‘Via Dolorosa’ occurred over 2.5 months until Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher had both, the credit card and the password. It included various ‘games’ with the post via Royal Mail until ALL the RIGHT envelops arrived, still, it was only the beginning of this operation. Secondly, after that Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher got the Mastercard, then the real problems have started. Something very ‘unusual’ happened. ‘Someone' produced two Mastercard for Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher, a real and a fabricated. Therefore, when she tried to make online transactions, then she got a notice that there is a problem with the card. The ‘problem’ occurred because the system of Viseca didn’t recognize the number of the Mastercard that she Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher due to another Mastercard with a different number that was existed in Viseca’s system. Therefore, she couldn’t make online transactions (de-facto Blocking). Under the 'mystery problem', she held a Mastercard with the ability to make only regular transactions without the ability to make online transactions. Worse than that, all the transactions and bills were written on the fabricated second Mastercard that she never got. More importantly, to hide this manipulation from Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher, then unprecedented problems have occurred with the registration and log-in to Viseca. Eventually, Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher succeeded to log-in to Viseca only to get a shock because she found out that the online transaction problems occurred because of the two Mastercard, the real and the fabricated one. Still, the ‘Via Dolorosa’ didn’t end but intensified. From that point, Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher has the ability to conduct online transactions, still, without sight for ending the problems. Hence, from that point, the operation has focused on sabotaging online transactions via cyber-warfare or by Blocking ATMs transactions via the help of UK counterparts of the ‘Israeli cover-up group’ that gave access via UK formal channels in order to Block ATMs. More importantly, to intensify the suffering of the Blocking, then when Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher called to Viseca to report about the problems, then the calls CUT, again and again, with highly likely manipulation of mobile (see section 2.4.8). Nevertheless, in one occasion, she succeeded to speak a long conversation with the technical support of Viseca, and according to the system of Viseca, only one time occurred Blocking, but only for less than an hour when the system of Viseca tried to figure out if it’s a real transaction. Regardless of this short Blocking, the system didn’t show any additional Blockings. Thereby, all the other blocking highly likely occurred not because of a problem with the card, but due to intentionally operation, via cyber-warfare or non-cyber act.

Considering the above, here are a few examples to illustrate the intentionally Blocking of Viseca. In one case, on Friday afternoon, ATM blocked the ability to get money due to a ‘problem with the card’, so, until Monday, Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher and her son were left without money for food until it resolved. Important note, the system of Viseca didn’t show this blocking. Besides, there is no reason for blocking the card of Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher. In another case, an online transaction blocked when Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher tried to buy a TV. The screen on her computer showed that there is a problem with the card, despite that card was OK. Hence, Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher decided to go physically to the store near her house in order to buy the TV. However, she decided first to go to another store, and she made in that store ONLINE TRANSACTION and no problems occurred with the card. After that, she went to the TV store, and even on the screen of the shop (exist a proof and witness), it showed that there is a problem with the card when she tried to make online transaction in the store, despite that 10 minutes before, she made an online transaction in another store without any problem. Obviously, a cyber-warfare was carried out to prevent the online transaction of the TV, perhaps the price of the TV was so good, so they decided to prevent buying a TV with a good deal or it was the FUN of the day, namely the ‘Torture-Attrition’ of the day. Eventually, Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher bought the TV with a regular transaction at the store without any problem with the card. The blocking of specific transactions is part of the holding Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher as Political Prisoner in England. Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher has no ability to buy online what she likes, but only what the ‘Israeli cover-up group’ allows. Numerous additional online Blockings have occurred, despite that, there is no problem with the card. These proofs will provide upon request.  

2.4.7 ‘Blocking Phone Calls Operation’, Q4/2014-Current

This operation has started in Q4/2014 when Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher has become informally refugee in EU. In the beginning, this operation mainly focused on Blocking phone calls via Israeli mobiles related to the sale of the house in Israel, as well as in related to academic positions in the EU. After the asylum, the blocking expanded to various issues, so most of the phone calls have been monitored and have been Blocked by the ‘Israeli cover-up group’, except limited phone calls that they have allowed Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher to receive. Thus, since the Asylum, Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher and Daniel Bakher have become de-facto ‘Political Prisoner’, especially in England.  After the Asylum, Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher has started to use a Portuguese mobile of MEO. Despite that it was a mobile of a Portuguese firm, then phone calls and SMSs were also blocked via a method of disappeared calls from the screen immediately after the calls/SMSs received in the mobile. The disappearing of the calls or SMSs from the mobile screen immediately after the receiving of the calls means that the blocking didn’t take place via MEO facilities, but more likely that the mobile was hacked in some way. In other words, the MEO public telecommunication system was outwarded the calls to Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher’s mobile, but when the calls arrived on the mobile, then immediately after that the mobile was hacked. That’s mean that the ‘Israeli cover-up group’ didn’t have direct access to the MEO public telecommunication system.

However, in related to Israeli mobiles and UK mobiles the story was different in nature. Since the Asylum, the Israeli mobile calls of GOLAN were Blocked all the time. Nonetheless, for the ‘Israeli cover-up group,’ it’s an easy task to get access to the facilities of Israeli telecommunication firms. It’s their backyard. Nevertheless, based on the occurrences, it seems that GOLAN didn’t cooperate with the ‘Israeli cover-up group’, but they were helpless in how to handle this massive blocking.

Even in England, it was clear from the beginning, that the Blocking done via formal channels. When Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher reported to TESCO about the problems with the mobile, then they had no ability to explain how the problems occurred or how to fix them because it was out of the normal range of problems. In England, not only phone calls have Blocked via mobiles, but also incoming calls and faxes via landlines. In related to Faxes, the method of disappearing repeated itself many times, namely it was possible to see incoming fax, but after a few seconds it disappeared. In other cases, fax reporting showed incoming faxes, but faxes weren't received. Even outcoming international calls have been blocked in England, especially to Israel and Switzerland (in Swiss especially to Viseca, see section 2.4.21). In the beginning, all the outcoming calls to Israel were Blocked regarding all the Israeli numbers, and only after that Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher presented the Blocked to one of the representatives, then the Blocking released, still, after that, the Blocking was on/off with manipulation.

In relation to Viseca in Switzerland, a different method of Blocking was implemented. It was possible to make calls to Swiss, but when Viseca’s call centre answered the calls, then after a few minutes when the representative confirmed the details of the customer, then the call was cut without the ability to speak with Viseca about the problem that the call was made from the first place. In one case, it was repeated itself five times in one hour, so de-facto, most of the time, Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher had no ability to speak with Viseca. Worse than that, according to Home Telecom, the calls to Viseca were made to mobiles, despite that Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher called to the landline of Viseca. Despite the repeated requests of Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher to get the Swiss mobiles that calls were made to them from her home landline, then she didn’t get it (for more details, see section 2.4.22). However, the story with the Swiss mobiles may explain the cutting calls to Viseca. There is an option that when a call was made from Dr Ziva Rozen-Bakher’s home landline to a landline of Viseca, then the call forwarded to ‘manipulate mobile’ and after that, the call cut. The manipulation with the mobile confirms that formal channels used in England to carry out the hostile operations. 

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher - A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/
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OP027, Mastercard of Viseca Operation: Intentional Blocking the Mastercard to Sabotage Buying Food over 5 Days: