OP080, Beauty Square Operation: Suspected Sabotage of Shipment of Two Cosmetic Products via 'Twice Error in Shipment' - Getting the Products after one Month instead of in a few days

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op080

ICCG Announcement: 28 December 2022. Latest Update: 28 November 2023

OP080, Beauty Square Operation: Suspected Sabotage of Shipment of Two Cosmetic Products via 'Twice Error in Shipment' - Getting the Products after one Month instead of in a few days, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/iccg-announcements/op080,Residence Location, Portugal, Main Entity, E127, Beauty Square, Spain, Sub-Entity I, E156, MRW, Spain, Sub-Entity II, E157, Worten, Portugal, Sub-Entity III, E054, NETIM (Mailbox), France, Sub-Entity IV, E054, NETIM (Mailbox), France


Highlights

On 13/12/2022, Dr. Rozen-Bakher made an online order for two cosmetic products from Worten-Provider Beauty Square. The delivery was supposed to take a few days, but twice happened an ‘Error in the Shipment’ that led to the situation that Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher got the Cosmetic Products after one month instead of after a few days, yet it was required many emails and chats to make it happen, still, during this process, it seems that emails to Worten were blocked by ICCG. More specifically, on 21/12/2022, Dr. Rozen-Bakher sent an email to Worten (cliente@worten.pt) about the delay, but Worten did not answer this email and Dr. Rozen-Bakher even did not get an automatic reply. On 24/12/2022, Dr. Rozen-Bakher sent a second email to Worten (cliente@worten.pt) about the delay, but again Worten did not answer the email and again Dr. Rozen-Bakher did not get an automatic reply. However, on 28/12/2022, Dr. Rozen-Bakher sent a reminder to Worten (cliente@worten.pt), but this time, she got an automatic reply that mentioned that the email address (cliente@worten.pt) is not available, so based on that, she was supposed to get also automatic reply for the first two emails, unless if they blocked by ICCG.

In general, ICCG used to sabotage online orders based on two objectives: i) Sabotage online orders in case of ‘good deal’ (e.g. the case of Buying TV in England), as mentioned in section 2.4.10 and 2.4.21 in the Complaint to UK Police/Portuguese Police (see CM063/CM060). ii) creating intentional delay or sabotage in shipment allows ICCG to manipulate the products (e.g. Spy Manipulation or Material Manipulation), as mentioned in other ICCG Operations (Please see OP073 and OP089).


 
Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher - A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/
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