Section D. Methodology, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/d/methodology
Published Date: 12 October 2025
COPYRIGHT ©2022-2025 ZIVA ROZEN-BAKHER ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb/2025
Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher: Yearly Rank to Compare the Global Political Power among Countries, Alliances and Coalitions to Survive Long Wars at the Military, Economic, and Political Levels
Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb
2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb/2025
2024 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb/2024
2023 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb/2023
Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade
Section D. Methodology, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
Section D - List of Contents
Section D. Methodology, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
Section D1. Methodology: Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)
Section D1.1 Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For UN Members, UN Observer States, and SARs
Section D1.2 Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For Colonies
Section D1.3 Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For Disputed Countries
Section D2. Methodology: Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR)
Section D3. Methodology: Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7)
Section D3.1 Area Size (R1)
Section D3.2 Population and the Army Size that is derived from the Population (R2)
Section D3.3 Domestic Economic Activity (GDP) and the Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars (25% of GDP) (R3)
Section D3.4 Technology Level Indicator (R4a)
Section D3.5 Distance Risk from Colony to Sovereign State (R4b)
Section D3.6 Limited International Recognition of Disputed Countries (R4c)
Section D3.7 Energy Security: Gas and Oil
Section D3.7.1 Energy Security: Gas-Proved Reserves (R5)
Section D3.7.2 Energy Security: Oil-Proved Reserves (R6)
Section D3.9 Food Security (R7)
Section D4. Methodology: Determination of Geopolitical Position
Section D4.1 Sovereignty Status (M1)
Section D4.2 Region (M2)
Section D4.3 Religion (M3)
Section D4.4 International Recognition (M4)
Section D4.5 Sanctions Against Russia (M5)
Section D4.6 UN Resolution on New International Economic Order (M6)
Section D4.7 UN Resolution on Decolonialism (M7)
Section D4.8 Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' (M8)
Section D4.9 Foreign Military Presence in Host Countries (M9)
Section D4.10 Bilateral Military Defence Treaties (BMDT)(M10)
Section D4.11 Multilateral Alliances and Multilateral Military Defence Treaties (MMDT) (M11)
Section D4.12. Coalitions (M12)
Section D5. Methodology: GSR Serial Number
Section D5.1 Global Survival Rank (GSR) sorted by GSR Serial Number, 2023-2025
Section D5.2 Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, sorted by GSR Serial Number
Section D6. Methodology Notes
Section D6.1 Methodology Note I: Explanation about SARs of China in relation to Technology Level
Section D6.2 Methodology Note II: Explanation and Presenting the Acknowledgement by The Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy about the Database on the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil
Section D6.3 Methodology Note III: Explanation about Aspiration for 'Self-Determination' in Colonies
Section D6.4 Methodology Note IV: Explanation about the Indicators (R1-R7) of SARs of China
Section D6.5 Methodology Note V: Presenting the List of Countries that ‘Not Voted’ on the UN Resolution on New International Economic Order
Section D6.6 Methodology Note VI: Presenting the List of Countries that ‘Not Voted’ on the UN Resolution on Decolonialism
Section D6.7 Methodology Note VII: Explanation about Map 28 in relation to the Disputed Country Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)
Section D6.8 Methodology Note VIII: Explanation about Map 29 in relation to NARC - North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force
Section D6.9 Methodology Note IX: Explanation about Informal Observer States in CSTO
Section D6.10 Methodology Note X: Explanation about the Analysis in Section 26.3 regarding NATO Members with Colonies
Section D6.11 Methodology Note XI: Explanation about the Distinction between OPEC and OPEC Plus
Section D6.12 Methodology Note XII: Explanation about the Distinction between UNSC Permanent Members versus UNSC Non-Permanent Members
Section D6.13 Methodology Note XIII: Explanation about the Comparison of Multilateral Alliances in Section F1.3
Section D6.14 Methodology Note XIV: Explanation about the Comparison of Superpowers/Permanent Members of UNSC in Section F5
Section D6.15 Methodology Note XV: Explanation about the Database of Foreign Military Presence in Relation to Colonies, MMDTs and BMDTs
Section D1. Methodology: Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)
The Global Survival Rank (GSR) aims to compare the Survival in Long Wars between all countries worldwide, including Non-UN members, such as Colonies and Disputed Countries. The Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes 7 Critical Survival Indicators (R1-R7) that directly impact the survival of each country or colony in Long Wars, yet the Critical Survival Indicator R4 depends on the Sovereignty Status, namely Indicator R4 distinguishes between UN Members versus Colonies versus Disputed Countries. Besides, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes 12 Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M12) that determine the Geopolitical Position of each UN Member or Non-UN Member, which affects, directly and indirectly, the Survival of each country or colony in Long Wars. Therefore, a Low Global Survival Rank represents a High Survival, while a High Global Survival Rank represents a Low Survival. In other words, a Low Global Survival Rank represents a Low Risk, while a High Global Survival Rank represents a High Risk.
Hence, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes the following variables:
Independent Variables - Critical Survival Indicators (R1-R7): Area Size (R1), Population and Army Size (R2), Domestic Economic Activity (GDP) and Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars (R3), Technology Level (R4a)/Distance Risk from Colony to Sovereign State (R4b)/Limited International Recognition of Disputed Countries (R4c), Natural Gas-Proved Reserves (R5), Oil-Proved Reserves (R6), and Food Security (R7).
R4a by Type of Sovereignty Status:
R4a - UN Members, UN Observer States, and SARs of China.
R4b - Colonies.
R4c - Disputed Countries
Intervening Variables - Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M12): Sovereignty Status (M1), Region (M2), Religion (M3), International Recognition (M4), Sanctions Against Russia (M5), UN Resolution on New International Economic Order (M6), UN Resolution on Decolonialism (M7), Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' (M8), Foreign Military Presence in Host Countries (M9), Bilateral Military Defence Treaties (BMDT) (M10), Multilateral Alliances and Multilateral Military Defence Treaties (MMDT) (M11), and Coalitions (M12).
Dependent Variable: 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)
In light of the above, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes three Research Models that are derived from the three types of Sovereignty Status, as presented in this section.
Section D1.1 Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For UN Members, UN Observer States, and SARs
The research model that is presented in Figure 1 refers to the Sovereignty Status of UN Members, UN Observer States, and SARs of China. Hence, this research model includes the Critical Survival Indicator – Technology Level (R4a) along with the other indicators and factors that are included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR).
Figure 1. Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For UN Members, UN Observer States, and SARs
Section D1.2 Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For Colonies
The research model that is presented in Figure 2 refers to the Sovereignty Status of Colonies, namely distant territories or Non-Contiguous territories that are under the sovereignty of UN Members, such as the colony New Caledonia that is under French sovereignty yet located around 16,000 km from France. Hence, this research model includes the Critical Survival Indicator – Distance Risk from Colony to Sovereign State (R4b) along with the other indicators and factors that are included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR).
Figure 2. Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For Colonies
Section D1.3 Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For Disputed Countries
The research model that is presented in Figure 3 refers to the Sovereignty Status of Disputed Countries that proclaim a Self-Declaration of Independence, but they do not have any UN status yet, such as Taiwan and Kosovo. Hence, this research model includes the Critical Survival Indicator – Limited International Recognition of Disputed Countries (R4c) along with the other indicators and factors that are included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR).
Figure 3. Research Model of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) For Disputed Countries
Section D2. Methodology: Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR)
The Global Survival Rank (GSR) takes into account seven Critical Survival Factors (R1-R7) that directly impact the survival of each territory in Long Wars, as explained in Section B. However, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) also takes into account that some Critical Survival Factors have more impact on the whole survival in long wars compared to others. Therefore, as presented in Table 10 below, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes an equation of Weight Average (WR) that gives a different Weight to each Critical Survival Factor based on the following reasoning:
R1 – 25% of WR. The Area Size (R1) is the most important factor for survival in long wars, so its Weight is 25% of the WR, because it is very difficult to conquer big countries, as well as to create devastation over all the areas in big countries. Thus, even if part of the country is hurt, then the remaining parts can continue to function under long wars, as explained in Section B2.1. Importantly, big countries can even survive a few nuclear bombs, while even one nuclear bomb can eliminate a small country. Although, keep in mind that any country will not survive a World Nuclear War (Cite 1), so the Global Survival Rank (GSR) does not take into account Nuclear Capabilities, whether the country declares about them or not.
R2 – 20% of WR. The population, and the Army Size, which is derived from the population size (R2), indicate the country's ability to survive a long war, as explained in Section B2.2. Hence, no matter how rich the country is, and how many weapons the country has, eventually, the country needs soldiers to fight in the war. Therefore, the Weight of R2 is 20% because small armies have no chance to survive a long attrition war, while it is very difficult to defeat a big army until the 'last soldier'.
R3 – 20% of WR. The Domestic Economic Activity (GDP), and the Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars (R3) that is derived from the GDP, signal about the economic conditions of the country to survive a long war at the economic level. Thus, the Weight of R3 is 20% because poor countries do not have the ability to survive long wars at the economic level, as explained in Section B2.3.
R4 – 12% of WR. The three indicators of R4 – Technology Level (R4a) for UN Members and such, while Distance Risk for Colonies (R4b), and Limited International Recognition for Disputed Countries (R4c) – a Weight of 12% were defined for all of them because of the risk of dependency on other countries, yet with the risk of not getting their support in long wars. More specifically, if a country lacks technological capabilities, then the country depends on other countries in long wars, as explained in Section B2.4. While if a colony has a long distance to its sovereign state, then it harms the survival of a colony in long wars, as explained in Section B2.5. Even Disputed Countries without enough international recognition will suffer from a lack of backup from other countries during long wars, as explained in Section B2.6. Importantly, the three indicators of R4 were given a Weight of 12% because, on the one hand, they are less important compared to R1-R3, but on the other, they are more important compared to R5-R7.
R5 – 10% of WR. A Weight of 10% was defined for the first indicator of energy security, the Natural Gas-Proved Reserves (R5), more than what was defined for the second indicator of energy security, the Oil-Reserves, because, as shown in Chart 14 in Section B2.6, most of the Natural Gas-Proved Reserves are in the hands of fewer countries, and importantly, most of the countries that have Gas-Reserves are part of the ‘Russia-China Coalition’, while those countries that are part of the ‘Anti-Russia Coalition’ have no Gas-Reserves at all, which harms their survival in long wars.
R6 – 8% of WR. A Weight of 8% was defined for the second indicator of energy security, the Oil-Proved Reserves (R6), less than for the Gas-Reserves, because, as shown in Chart 12 and Chart 13 in Section B2.6, the Oil-Reserves are in the hands of more countries compared to the Gas-Reserves. Importantly, some countries from the ‘Anti-Russia Coalition’ have some Oil-Reserves, which reduces in some way their risk for oil dependency during long wars compared to their dependency on gas.
R7 – 5% of WR. Only a Weight of 5% was defined for the indicator of Food Security (R7) because usually, there is less food during wars due to transportation problems, so if a country has food security, then it reduces its dependency on imports of food, which increases its survival in long wars. Notably, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) does not take into account cases when a rival army intentionally destroys the food security nor a situation of weaponising starvation, which is prohibited according to international humanitarian law. Thus, no matter how a country is getting ready for wars in terms of food security, then it won’t help if a rival army intentionally kills the livestock (Cite 2) and even blockades the entry of food to the country as a war tool, as done in the Gaza War (Cite 3). Nevertheless, due to the experience of learning from the Gaza war, it may be helpful for some of a country's emergency storage facilities to be located underground to prevent them from being destroyed by military attacks.
Table 10. Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Sovereignty Status
Table 11. Indicator R4 in the Equation of Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Sovereignty Status
Cite 1. Nuclear War: Human Extinction, Global Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 17 March 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/forum/2022/03/17/nuclear-war
Cite 2. Starvation as a War-Weapon: The Case of Palestine, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 06 February 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/06/02/2024/0751
Cite 3. Famine Officially Declared in Gaza After 2 Years of Near-Total Israeli Blockade, ZNetwork, 24 August 2025
Section D3. Methodology: Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7)
This section presents each indicator (R1-R7) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) in terms of methodology definition, how it was tested, and what its data source was in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR). Importantly, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) does not use any indicator 'Per Capita' because in long wars there is no meaning for 'Per Capita' but for the 'Absolute Number', such as the two examples that are presented in Tables 12-13 below that illustrate the differences between the Rank of 'Absolute Number' versus the Rank of 'Per Capita' in relation to the indicators of GDP and Technological Capabilities. More specifically, Small Country can have a higher GDP per Capita or a higher number of Scientific and Engineering Articles per Capita, while a Big Country can have a lower GDP or a lower number of Scientific and Engineering Articles per Capita compared to the 'Absolute Number', still, at the end of the day, in long wars, there is a critical difference between a small country that has only hundreds or thousands of researchers that can contribute to the Technological Capabilities of their country during long wars versus a Big Country that can have even millions of researchers that can contribute in various ways to the Technological Capabilities of their country during long wars (See Methodology Note I in Section D6). That also applies to the GDP in relation to the ability of a country to cover high war costs for long, such as the critical difference between China that has a huge GDP compared to Monaco and Lichtenstein that have a relatively very small GDP yet with a very high GDP per Capita, as shown in Table 12. Hence, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) uses only indicators with 'Absolute Number', rather than indicators with 'Per Capita', because of the need to look at the ability of a country to survive long wars.
Table 12. The Difference between the Rank of GDP (R3) versus the Rank of GDP per Capita, Top 10
Table 13. The Difference between the Rank of Technology Level (R4a) versus the Rank of Technology Level per Capita, Top 10
Section D3.1 Area Size (R1)
The Area Size was tested via the World Bank's Indicator of the Surface Area in sq. km in 2022 or the latest available. Although other data sources were used for Colonies and Disputed Countries that are not included in the database of the World Bank. The indicator of the Surface Area includes the Land and Water in the territory of a country. More specifically, according to the World Bank's definition, the Surface area is a country's total area, including areas under inland bodies of water and some coastal waterways. The Global Survival Rank (GSR) used this indicator that includes the Territorial Water that is under the country’s sovereignty and not only the Land because the Territorial Water is played an important role in protecting the country during wars. More specifically, only the navy of a country can be stationed in the Territorial Water, while any navy from any country worldwide can sail or even stop in the middle of the High Seas, namely in the International waters (see below Map 7 and Figure 4). Moreover, Territorial Water can also play a role in relation to the expedition of Oil and Gas, as well as in relation to Gas Reserves and Oil Reserves, which led many countries to ‘increase’ their Territorial Water. It even led to the creation of a 'Gray Area of Water' via new definitions as 'Contiguous Zone' and the 'Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)' (see Figure 4 below), which de-facto increases the Territorial Water of the countries, including the control area of their Navy.
Figure 4. Territorial Water versus High Seas
Map 7. High Seas
Section D3.2 Population and the Army Size that is derived from the Population (R2)
The Population was tested via the World Bank's Indicator of Total Population in 2023 or the latest available. The Total Population refers to all residents in a country, regardless of legal status or citizenship, and it is based on midyear estimates. However, the database of CityPopulation was used for Colonies and Disputed Countries that are not included in the database of the World Bank, which was retrieved in April 2024.
The Army Size is derived from the Total Population via the equation that is presented below, which refers to the 'Maximum Availability of Men in the Age Group of 17-49' in a Country or a Colony or a Disputed Country. That’s based on the argument that only Men should be included in the Army Size and Not Women, because usually, Women do not engage in Fighting, so the critical number of the Army Size during Long Wars refers to Men who can fight on the battlefields, yet Women always played an important role during World Wars, but mainly by giving a Military backup and a Civil Backup. Furthermore, the indicator of the Army Size takes into account only the age group of 17-49 because, in most countries, the Reserve Force relies mainly on this age group. Although, as mentioned in Section B2.2, many armies in WWI and WWII increased the Conscription Age to conscript older ones, still it is doubtful if a man in the age group of 55-65 can fight effectively on the battlefield while carrying all his personal army stuff on his back. Thus, the indicator of Army Size in the Global Survival Rank (GSR) takes into account only men in the age group of 17-49 because of their ability to fight effectively on the battlefield. Moreover, in any country, there are men who get an exemption from service in the army (e.g., health problems), but the scope of the exemption is different between countries, such as in the case of Israel, where non-Jewish citizens get an exemption from service in the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), as well as Jewish religious men who study Bible Studies (Cite 4-5). Therefore, to bypass the differences in the scope of exemption from service in the army between countries, the indicator of Army Size looks at the MAXIMUM availability of men in the same age group in order to compare the Army Size among all countries, colonies and disputed countries included in the Global Survival Rank (GSR) by using the same equation that is derived from the Total Population.
In light of the above, here is the Equation of the Army Size based on the Total Population:
Army Size: [(Total Population*50% for Men)*44% for Age Group 17-49] = Maximum Availability of Men in the age group of 17-49 in the Country/Colony/Disputed CountryAn Example of Algeria to Illustrate the Use of the Equation of the Army Size:
The Total Population of Algeria is 46,164,219, so 46,164,219*50% = 23,082,109 which reflects the Total of Men in Algeria
The Total of Men in Algeria is 23,082,109.5, so 23,082,109.5*44% = 10,156,128 which reflects the Total of Men in the age group of 17-49 in Algeria
The Army Size in Algeria is 10,156,128 which reflects the Maximum Availability of Men in the age group of 17-49 in Algeria
Cite 4. IDF exemption for Haredim expires — but nothing's likely to change, for now, The Times of Israel, 1 February 2021
Cite 5. The War in Israel Over Serving in War, The New York Times, 24 August 2025
Section D3.3 Domestic Economic Activity (GDP) and the Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars (25% of GDP) (R3)
The Domestic Economic Activity was tested via the World Bank's Indicator of GDP (current US dollars) in 2023 or the latest available. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) refers to the total income earned through the production of goods and services in an economic territory in a certain year. However, other sources were used for Colonies and Disputed countries that are not included in the database of the World Bank, which were retrieved in April-May 2024.
The 'Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars' is derived from the GDP. As mentioned in Section B2.3, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) looks at the 'Ability of Military Expenditure', rather than on the 'Real Military Expenditure', because the Military Expenditure in 'Peaceful Time' or 'Non-War Time' is usually around 2%-5% of GDP (Cites 6-7), which is much lower compared to the Military Expenditure in 'War Time', especially during long wars, as illustrated below in the two examples of Ukraine (Cite 8) and Israel (Cite 9). As shown in Chart 19, the Military Expenditure of Ukraine during 'Peaceful Time' or 'Non-War Time' was around 2.2%-4.4% of GDP, while since the start of the Russia-Ukraine War is has jumped to 25.9% of GDP in 2022 and even to 37.7% of GDP in 2023, but it is still unclear what the Military Expenditure will be in 2024 and 2025 because the war is not over yet. Even the Military Expenditure of Israel was jumped in 'War Time' compared to 'Non-War Time', as shown in Chart 20. More specifically, the Military Expenditure of Israel during 'Non-War Time' was around 5%-7% of GDP, a relatively high figure compared to other countries because in Israel, 'Peaceful Time' doesn't really exist, but only 'Non-War Time' versus 'War Time'. However, in the Six-Days War in 1967, it was jumped to 15.4%, while in the years after that, during the Attrition War, it was jumped to around 20%-23% of GDP. Although the big increase was occurred during the Yom-Kippur War and the years after that to fill the emergency storages after the war, namely the Military Expenditure was jumped to around 27%-30% of GDP. Even the South Lebanon Conflict that includes the Lebanon War I and the Lebanon War II, which lasted for around three decades, was led to large Military Expenditure that was around 10%-30% of GDP. Still, it is not yet clear what is going to be the impact of the Gaza War on the Israeli Military expenditure. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section B2.3, the 'War-Costs' include not only the 'Military Expenditure' (e.g., weapons) but also the 'War-Civilian Costs', such as restoration costs due to war devastation, casualty costs, lost workdays due to the mass mobilisation, and reduction in business activity. Importantly, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) takes into account only the Military Expenditure that relies on the money that each country has, namely based on its GDP, rather than on Military Aid that is given by other countries because the ability of strong countries to give Military Aid to their weak allies is very limited during long wars, especially during world wars. Thus, the survival of each country in long wars in terms of 'War-Costs' depends on the Self-Money (GDP) that each country has. Considering the above, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) assumes that the Military Expenditure in Long Wars is supposed to be at least 25% of GDP, while clearly that the 'War Costs', which include the 'Military Expenditure' (e.g., weapons) and the 'War-Civilian Costs' are going to be even much higher than 25% of GDP. Even so, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) takes into account a medium evaluation, namely that the Military Expenditure in Long Wars is supposed to be 25% of GDP. Thereby, the 'Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars' in Global Survival Rank (GSR) is based on the equation of GDP*25%.
Chart 19. An Example of the Impact of Russia-Ukraine War on Ukrainian Military expenditure (% of GDP)
Source of the Database of Military expenditure (% of GDP): World Bank
Chart 20. An Example of the Impact of Israeli Wars on Israeli Military expenditure (% of GDP)
Source of the Database of Military expenditure (% of GDP): World Bank
Cite 6. Is NATO Forever? Trump’s Demand of 5% Defense Spending of GDP, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 14 April 2025 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/14/04/2025/1500
Cite 7. All NATO members hit old spending target, only three meet new goal, AOL-Reuters, 28 August 2025
Cite 8. Mapping the Russia-Ukraine War Endgame, National Interest, 29 August 2025
Cite 9. The Tragedy of the Israeli Win in Six Days War: Invading Palestine and Egypt Territories without any Defence Reason but Only Because of the Military Capabilities to Do It, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 03 September 2022 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/03/09/2022/0413
Section D3.4 Technology Level Indicator (R4a)
The Technology Level was tested via the World Bank’s Indicator of Scientific and Technical Journal Articles in 2022 or the latest available. This indicator refers to the Number of Scientific and Engineering Articles Published in the following fields: Physics, Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics, Clinical Medicine, Biomedical Research, Engineering and Technology, and Earth and Space Sciences. Thus, this indicator gives well-grounded support for the Technological Capabilities at the Country Level, especially with regard to Research and Development (R&D) Capabilities, including the R&D Capabilities of Weapons and Ammunitions, as well as with regard to the ability to maintain weapons and to improvise alternative spare parts for weapons when their availability on the global market is limited during long wars.
Section D3.5 Distance Risk from Colony to Sovereign State (R4b)
There are three main options for measuring distance from one place to another at the global level: by Air, by Land or by Sea, which each of them provides a different distance. However, in the case of Colonies that many of them are located on islands, then the relevant options for measuring distance from colonies to their sovereign states are by Sea or by Air. Still, there are usually several routes by Air and several routes by Sea that can be used to measure a distance from a colony to its sovereign state, as illustrated in Map 8 and Map 9 below. Hence, the Global Survival Rank used the indicator that measures the shortest distance from the capital of a colony to the capital of its sovereign state via a 'Straight Line Distance on the Global Map' instead of using the shortest distance via a certain air route or a certain sea route, which allows comparing the Distance Risk among all colonies included in the Global Survival Rank. Considering the above, the Distance Risk from a Colony to its Sovereign State is tested via the indicator of the 'Straight Line Distance on the Global Map' from capital to capital in Km.
Map 9. Main World Sea Routes
Map 8. World Air Routes
Section D3.6 Limited International Recognition of Disputed Countries (R4c)
The scope of the International Recognition of Disputed Countries, in terms of how many countries already formally recognised the Self-Declaration of Independence that made by the Disputed Country, determines whether the Disputed Country has the prospect of becoming an independent country by getting the status of UN Membership, or vice versa, whether the dispute with the sovereign state that claims sovereignty over the territory is going to drag on for long. Considering the above, the Limited International Recognition of Disputed Countries is tested via the indicator of the number of UN members and Non-UN members that already formally recognised the Self-Declaration of Independence of the Disputed Country. This indicator is based on various sources that were retrieved in April 2025. Notably, there is a significant dynamic regarding International Recognition, especially regarding the State of Palestine, so keep in mind that the database of Limited International Recognition, either regarding UN Members or Non-UN members in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), is updated to April 2025. Although, for the latest International Recognition of Palestine, please see International Recognition of the State of Palestine https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoringrisks/palestine-recognition . Moreover, for Background about Disputed Countries with Limited International Recognition, please see Section H5. Appendix V: Background about Non-UN Members with Limited International Recognition, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/h/appendix5
Nevertheless, the case of the Disputed Countries - North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) – is unique because North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) were both Independent Countries with full UN membership until the Unification of Yemen in 1990, only to get the failure of Yemeni Unification four years later, when the Yemen Civil War started in 1994, which has dragged on until today. Hence, the Yemeni Civil War, which has lasted for over 25 years to this day, has led to the reverse status before the Unification of Yemen, in which there are de facto two countries as there were before the unification of Yemen, and even worse, as explained in full details in Section H1. Appendix I: Yemen - North Yemen and South Yemen https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/h/yemen, which also includes historical background and how the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) handle the GSR Indicators (R1-R7) regarding North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden).
Section D3.7 Energy Security: Gas and Oil
The Global Survival Rank (GSR) used the measure of Proved Reserves because it gives the best indication about the Energy Security at the country level during long wars compared to the other indicators, such as the level of Production that reflects how much gas or oil the country produced in a certain year, which depends on how much the country buys or sells in a certain year (Cite 10). Importantly, even if the country has some Proved Reserves, then this indicator also gives the best indication of whether the reserves may be enough for a long war or not, as explained in-depth in Section B2.7.
However, when the database on the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil were retrieved for the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), then a note was given by the Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy that the database of these indicators is under review, as presented in full details in Methodology Note II in Section D6. Thus, the indicators of the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) are based on the calculation of the Proved Reserves that were in 2020 minus the Production of Gas and Oil that was during the years 2021-2023. Even though, this type of calculation is a common method that is used either to estimate the future Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil based on the expected Production of Gas and Oil, or when new data is not available for the Proved Reserves. Nevertheless, in the 2024 Global Survival Rank (GSR), there was no need to make this calculation because the database on the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil were available.
Cite 10. Biden sold off nearly half the U.S. oil reserve. Is it ready for a crisis?, POLITICO, 16 October 2023
Section D3.7.1 Energy Security: Gas-Proved Reserves (R5)
In the light of what explained in Section D3.7, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) uses the indicator of the Gas-Proved Reserves in cubic meters in 2023, based on the calculation of the Gas-Proved Reserves that were in 2020 minus the Gas Production that was during the years 2021-2023, as explained in full details in Methodology Note II in Section D6. The database was retrieved from the Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy on 24 April 2025.
Section D3.7.2 Energy Security: Oil-Proved Reserves (R6)
In the light of what explained in Section D3.7, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) uses the indicator of the Oil-Proved Reserves in tonnes in 2023, based on the calculation of the Gas-Proved Reserves that were in 2020 minus the Gas Production that was during the years 2021-2023, as explained in full details in Methodology Note II in Section D6. The database was retrieved from the Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy on 24 April 2025.
Section D3.9 Food Security (R7)
The Global Survival Rank (GSR) used the indicator of Agricultural Land because it gives a good indication about the Food Security at the country level during long wars. More specifically, the indicator of Agricultural Land gives a clear indication of whether the country can rely on local food instead of imported food, which can be a critical problem due to difficulties in transporting food during long wars, as explained in-depth in Section B2.8. Considering the above, the Food Security is tested via the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s Indicator of Agricultural land in 1000 Hectares (ha) in 2022. This indicator refers to the share of land area that is arable, under permanent crops, and under permanent pastures. Although other data sources were used for Colonies and Disputed Countries that are not included in the database of the FAO.
Section D4. Methodology: Determination of Geopolitical Position
Each year, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) looks at the Geopolitical Position factors that are relevant to a given year in order to determine the Geopolitical Position of a country or a colony. Thereby, any Geopolitical Position Factor has a direct and indirect impact on the survival in long wars. Considering that, as shown in Figure 5 below, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes 12 Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M12), as follows: Sovereignty Status (M1), Region (M2), Religion (M3), International Recognition (M4), Sanctions Against Russia (M5), UN Resolution on New International Economic Order (M6), UN Resolution on Decolonialism (M7), Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' (M8), Foreign Military Presence in Host Countries (M9), Bilateral Military Defence Treaties (BMDT) (M10), Multilateral Alliances and Multilateral Military Defence Treaties (MMDT) (M11), and Coalitions (M12). Hence, this section discussed how each factor impacts the Geopolitical Position of a country or a colony.
Figure 5. Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M12) in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)
Section D4.1 Sovereignty Status (M1)
The 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes four types of Sovereignty Status, as follows:
UN Members and UN Observer States. A UN Member refers to an Independent Country that has Full Membership in the United Nations (UN). Membership in the UN gives a clear indication that a country has Sovereignty over a certain territory at the Formal Level. However, a status of UN Observer State signals that the Disputed Country already has enough International Recognition to be in the process of becoming an Independent Country. For example, Palestine has the status of a UN Observer State because it already has International Recognition from around 150 UN Members and Non-UN members, while Kosovo, despite that 111 UN Members and Non-UN members recognised the Self-Declaration of Independent Country, then Kosovo still does not have the status of a UN Observer State like Palestine (For full details, see Section E9 Limited International Recognition of UN Members and Non-UN Members).
Disputed Countries. A Disputed Country refers to a country that proclaims a Self-Declaration of Independent Country, including running its territory as an independent country. However, a Disputed Country lacks the status of a UN Member or UN Observer State, yet has a Limited International Recognition from other UN Members and Non-UN Members, as presented in Section E9. Importantly, a Disputed Country has an ongoing conflict over sovereignty with the country that claims sovereignty for its territory, such as the Disputed Country Kosovo that has a sovereignty conflict with Serbia, or the Disputed Country Somaliland that has a sovereignty conflict with Somalia, or the Disputed Country Taiwan that has a sovereignty conflict with China. Still, in the case of the Disputed Countries - North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) – the sovereignty dispute is between them because each of them claims sovereignty over all Yemen, so some countries recognised North Yemen (Sanaa) as Yemen, while other countries recognised South Yemen (Aden) as Yemen, yet both of them run de-facto as two independent countries as it was before the Unification of Yemen (For full details, see Appendix I: Yemen - North Yemen and South Yemen https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/h/yemen)
Colonies. A Colony refers to a 'Non-Contiguous Territory' under the sovereignty of a distant State without that the Territory having declared 'Self-Declaration of an Independent Country'. Colonialism started in the 15th century as part of the Imperialism and Mercantilism Doctrine, but since then, most of the Colonies became Independent Countries, so currently, most of the remaining Colonies are small and vulnerable, yet most of them have aspirations for 'Self-Determination' (Cite 11; see also Methodology Note III in Section D6), especially following the UN resolution on Decolonialism (Granting Independence to Colonies) from 04 December 2024 (For more details, please see Section B2.5, Section E3.3, Section E6.3).
Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of China. China has two Special Administrative Regions (SARs): Hong Kong and Macau. Both of them are former Colonies that were handed over to their ‘Home Country’, China, yet after their handover, Hong Kong and Macau got the status of Special Administrative Region in China (see Methodology Note IV in Section D6). Hong Kong was a Colony of the UK from 1841 until 1997 when it was handed over to China, while Macau was a Colony of Portugal from 1557 until 1999 when it was handed over to China. Nevertheless, since the handover to China, Hong Kong can be considered as a Disputed Territory due to 'Self-Determination' and a conflict that arising over the transformation from Democracy Regime to Communist Regime.
Cite 11. New Caledonia: Force Colony of France by Manipulation of Forthcoming Referendum via Intense Immigration From France and Electoral Reform, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 16 May 2024 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/16/05/2024/1000
Section D4.2 Region (M2)
Analyzing the Region Level allows us to identify the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of each region, especially in the case of Long War. The Regional Classification in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes eight Sub-Regions that reflect the current geopolitics and global order, as follows (by a-b):
Africa
East-South Asia
Europe-East Oriented and Central Asia
Europe-West Oriented
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle-East and North Africa
North America
Oceania
Section D4.3 Religion (M3)
The Main Religion in a country impacts significantly on how the country runs, who the allies of the country are, and to which alliances, blocs and coalitions the country belongs, and it even impacts the military-culture of the country. However, Main Religious Denomination plays an important role in the national culture of a country because it impacts the country at the economic and political levels, including the attitude towards conflicts and wars, such as the significant differences between Catholic versus Protestant or between Islam-Sunni versus Islam-Shia.
Considering the above, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes two indicators that were retrieved in April 2025 from The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), as follows:
Main Religion (Relative Majority %)
Main Religious Denomination of Main Religion
Section D4.4 International Recognition (M4)
The 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) looks at the International Recognition of UN Members and Non-UN Members because it gives a clear indication about the conflicts that each country is involved in when it has a limited International Recognition, such as in the case of Israel that around 29 UN members worldwide still don’t recognise the State of Israel (See Section E9), mainly due to the Israeli Occupation of Palestine. Hence, the indicator of International Recognition (M4) presents the Total Number of UN Members and Non-UN Members that recognise each country and colony, including distinguishing between the UN Members that recognise the country versus the Non-UN Members that recognise the country. That’s because recognition by a UN Member has more value in terms of geopolitics compared to Non-UN Member, particularly in relation to UN Votes.
For Background about UN Members and Non-UN Members with Limited International Recognition, please see the following appendices:
Section H4. Appendix IV: Background about UN Members with Limited International Recognition, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/h/appendix4
Section H5. Appendix V: Background about Non-UN Members with Limited International Recognition, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/h/appendix5
Section D4.5 Sanctions Against Russia (M5)
The Sanctions Against Russia following the Russia-Ukraine War have led to a new global order in a way that it splits the world into two groups: those countries that joined the Sanctions Against Russia and those countries that did not join the Sanctions Against Russia, which determines the geopolitical position of each country or colony.
Considering the above, the indicator of Sanctions Against Russia was retrieved in April 2025 from Russia's list of Unfriendly Countries. Thereby, the indicator of Sanctions Against Russia is a dichotomous indicator, as follows:
YES - Countries that joined the Sanctions against Russia.
NO - Countries that did not join the Sanctions against Russia.
Section D4.6 UN Resolution on New International Economic Order (M6)
The UN Resolution on the New International Economic Order that was brought to vote by Russia on 14 December 2022 gives a clear indication about which countries would like to preserve the economic dominance of the USA or, vice versa, which countries would like to replace the economic dominance of the USA with other alternatives. However, keep in mind that this UN Resolution was brought to vote in December 2022, and since then, leadership change has taken place in some countries, such as in Argentina that has became a close ally of the USA since President Javier Milei Assumed office in December 2023 (Cite 12), so the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) takes into account these changes when the determination of the Geopolitical position was made regarding each country.
Considering the above, the results of the UN Vote on the New International Economic Order in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) include five options that reflect in general the following geopolitical positions:
Against. Countries that voted ‘Against’ the resolution on the ‘New International Economic Order’ would like to preserve the economic dominance of the USA.
In-Favour. Countries that voted In-Favour the resolution on the ‘New International Economic Order’ would like to replace the economic dominance of the USA with other alternatives.
Abstain. Countries that voted to Abstain from the resolution on the ‘New International Economic Order’ have a neutral position regarding this issue.
Not Voted. Not Voted has became a tactical tool in UN Votes to avoid pressure from powerful countries, which is mainly implemented by small or weak countries (Cite 13), such as in this vote, that most of the countries that ‘Not Voted’ (see Methodology Note V in Section D6) likely prefer to replace the economic dominance of the USA with other alternatives.
Not Applicable (N/A). Not Applicable refers to Non-UN members that have no Right to Vote in the UN.
Cite 12. Argentina formally announces it won't join the BRICS alliance in Milei’s latest policy shift, AP, 29 December 2023
Cite 13. Is ‘Not Voted’ in UN votes Should Consider as ‘Abstain’ or ‘Soft Against’?, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/25/02/2023/1000
Section D4.7 UN Resolution on Decolonialism (M7)
The UN Resolution on Granting Independence to Colonies by Decolonialism that was brought to vote on 04 December 2024, gives a clear indication about which countries would like to preserve the Colonies or, vice versa, which countries would like to abolish the colonies by Granting Independence to the remaining Colonies. Therefore, this split reflects the transformation from the old era of Post-Imperialism into the new global order that opposes colonialism, which has led, for example, many African countries to end the Foreign Military Presence of Western countries on their territories as part of ending the Military Imperialism that is considered as a remnant of colonialism, such as the ending of the French Military Presence in several African countries (Cite 14).
Considering the above, the results of the UN Vote on Granting Independence to Colonies by Decolonialism in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) include four options that reflect in general the following geopolitical positions:
Abstain. Countries that voted to Abstain from the resolution on Granting Independence to Colonies by Decolonialism would like to preserve the Colonies, because many Colonies serve for these countries and for their allies as ‘Military Strategic Points‘. Importantly, any country did not vote Against the resolution on Decolonialism, just as not any country that still has colonies voted in favour, nor any ally of those countries voted In-Favour. In other words, all Western countries and their allies voted to Abstain from this resolution. Thus, in this case, Abstain can be considered as a ‘soft-Against’ that seems more politically correct compared to Against.
In-Favour. Countries that voted In-Favour the resolution on Decolonialism would like to abolish the colonies by Granting Independence to the remaining Colonies.
Not Voted. As already mentioned, Not Voted has become a tactical tool in UN Votes to avoid pressure from powerful countries, which is mainly implemented by small or weak countries. In this vote, most of the countries that ‘Not Voted’ (see Methodology Note VI in Section D6) likely prefer to abolish the colonies by Granting Independence to the remaining Colonies, so they likely ‘Not Voted’ to avoid pressure from influential countries.
Not Applicable (N/A). Not Applicable refers to Non-UN members that have no Right to Vote in the UN, which also include all Colonies that lack the right to vote in the UN.
Cite 14. Africa in the Hand of Russia-China Coalition: The Colonialism Backfire on the USA Coalition, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 20 November 2022 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/20/11/2022/1522
Section D4.8 Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' (M8)
The start of Trump’s second term as the President of the USA signals the policy shift of the USA from the Post-Cold War era that was run by President Biden against Russia (Cite 15) into the era of abolishing the USA Coalition when Trump de-facto has become an ally of Putin (Cite 16). In other words, it can be argued that Trump 'Abolished' the USA Coalition by 'Sitting on the Fence' between Anti Russia Coalition (NATO/EU) and the Russia-China Coalition, while Putin has started to play in parallel, as a soft-ally of the USA, yet without abandoning his close allies that are rivals of the USA (e.g., China and Iran). However, Trump not only moved to the 'Fence', but he also tried to split the dual-superpowers of Russia and China by trying to make Russia as a close ally, while 'Play Hard' with China by imposing on China the highest Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' (see Section E3.4) in trying also to break the global dominance of China as a superpower.
This foreign policy shift of Trump is reflected in many areas (Cite 17), but in particular, regarding his decision about the Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' (see Section E3.4.1). Hence, paradoxically, Trump imposed higher Reciprocal Tariffs on the traditional allies of the USA (e.g., NATO and the EU), while Trump spared Russia and Russia’s close allies (e.g., Belarus, Cuba, and North Korea) from the Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' (Cite 18). Trump also spared controversial regimes, such as Burkina Faso (Cite 19) that was suspended as a member of the African Union following the coup d'état that was led by the current interim President Ibrahim Traoré (Cite 20). Still, after the coup d'état, Burkina Faso aligned with Russia and the Wagner Group (Cite 21), including becoming a member of the Alliance of Sahel States (Cite 22), together with Mali and Niger, which all of them were suspended by the African Union because they rise to power following coups d'état (Cite 23), yet the Alliance of Sahel States aligned with Russia (Cite 24). Thus, Burkina Faso was spared from Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs, while Trump imposed only a 10% Reciprocal Tariff on Mali and Niger (see Section E3.4.1), which all of them suspended from the African Union following coups d'état. Even Somalia and the Disputed Country Somaliland were spared from Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs (Cite 19), while Trump has even considered recognising Somaliland as an Independent Country as part of a deal in which Somaliland would agree to get into its territory Palestinians that that are going to be displaced by force from Gaza (Cite 25). That’s despite that Somalia still claims sovereignty over Somaliland (Cites 26-27).
Considering the above, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) tests Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' via two indicators, as follows:
The percentage of Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' on 02 April 2025, which was retrieved from the US Department in April 2025. Thereby, lower Reciprocal Tariffs reflects political motivation by Trump to secure an ally or to preserve an ally, while higher Reciprocal Tariffs reflects political motivation by Trump to overcome rivals (e.g., China) or to exploit 'Rich' allies, especially those who are dependent on the USA at the military level, such as NATO/EU members.
Violation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) of the USA through Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day'. The USA has bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 12 countries, as well as two multilateral FTAs: USMCA and CAFTA, so in these cases, the ‘Reciprocal Tariffs’ violate the FTAs of the USA with each country that is party to one of these FTAs. Moreover, Trump’s ‘Reciprocal Tariffs’ also violate the USA’s commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in relation to the Bound Tariffs, namely the USA has Simple Average Bound Tariffs of 3.4%, so any of the USA’s ‘Reciprocal Tariffs’ against any WTO member above 3.4% de-facto violate the commitment of the USA to the WTO in relation to the Bound Tariffs (Cite 28). Hence, non-violation of FTA or Bound Tariffs reflects political motivation by Trump to secure an ally or to preserve an ally, while violation of FTA or Bound Tariffs reflects the trying to exploit 'Rich' allies of the USA. This indicator was retrieved from the US Department and the WTO in May 2025. Considering that, this indicator is a dichotomous indicator, as follows:
YES-Violation. Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs violates the FTA with a certain country or colony, or if the percentage of the Reciprocal Tariffs for a member of the WTO is higher than the Simple Average Bound Tariffs of the USA.
NO-Violation. Trump's Reciprocal Tariffs does not violate any FTA with a certain country or colony, or if the percentage of the Reciprocal Tariffs for a member of the WTO is lower than the Simple Average Bound Tariffs of the USA.
Cite 15. Sanctions against Russia: USA Coalition vs. Russian Coalition, Monitoring Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 14 March 2022 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-risks/14/03/2022
Cite 16. Do We Have Anymore USA Coalition? Trump as an Ally of Putin, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 25 February 2025 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/25/02/2025/1623
Cite 17. The New Era of ‘Global Dictator’: Trump, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 03 April 2025 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/03/04/2025/0912
Cite 18. Only a few major countries were spared Trump's tariffs. Russia is 1 of them, Yahoo, 3 April 2025
Cite 19. Full List of Countries Not Hit With Reciprocal Tariffs by Donald Trump, Newsweek, 3 April 2025
Cite 20. Burkina Faso Suspended From African Union Following Coup, The Organization for World Peace (OWP), 2 February 2022
Cite 21. After Burkina Faso ousts French, Russia's Wagner may Arrive, AP, 7 April 2023
Cite 22. West Africa bloc warns of 'disintegration' as juntas form 'Confederation of Sahel States', France 24, 8 July 2024
Cite 23. AU Suspension: Burkina Faso, 5 Other Countries Banned, The Kenya Times, 12 February 2025
Cite 24. Next meeting between Russia, Alliance of Sahel States to be held in Africa — MFA, TASS, 3 April 2025
Cite 25. Somaliland recognition for forced transfer of Palestinians? 'Not Worth It, Aljazeera, 8 September 2025
Cite 26. China says it recognises Somalia sovereignty over Somaliland, TRT Global, 30 April 2025
Cite 27. The U.S. Should Not Recognize Somaliland, Foreign Policy, 09 September 2025
Cite 28. Are Trump’s ‘Reciprocal Tariff’ Illegal?: The Violation of the USA’s Free Trade Agreements, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 29 May 2025 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/29/05/2025/1824
Section D4.9 Foreign Military Presence in Host Countries (M9)
Foreign Military Presence has advantages and disadvantages from both the home country perspective and the host country perspective, as discussed in Section C3. Importantly, the Foreign Military Presence gives an important indication about the military dependency of a country on a superpower or on another influential country. It also gives an indication about the international relations between the home country and the host country, which contribute to the determination of the geopolitical position of a country, including to which coalition the country belongs to.
Over the years, Foreign Military Presence has become a political issue in home countries and host countries, which has led to many definitions for Foreign Military Presence. Thus, it is important to look carefully at the definition of Foreign Military Presence, which affects which Foreign Military Presence is included in the database. Therefore, first, it is important to distinguish between Military Training and Military exercise. Military Training aims to acquire new military skills, while a Military Exercise is the daily routine of combat troops that are stationed in military bases in order to keep military readiness, especially when military operations do not exist, still, keep in mind that there are military bases and military installations that are used both for training and exercises and even for military operations. Thereby, the database of Foreign Military Presence that is included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) refers only to a Formal Army that has Foreign Military Bases or Foreign Military Installations with Combat Forces (Land, Air, Navy) that carry out Military Operations and Military Exercises for operational readiness, excluding Foreign Military Bases and Installations with Training or Research or Logistics or Testing. Nevertheless, the ‘Total Number’ of bases and installations also includes bases and installations with Training, Research, Logistics and Testing. Importantly, Foreign Military Presence in Host Countries is carried out based on a Multilateral Military Defence Treaty (MMDT) or Bilateral Military Defence Treaty (BMDT) or Agreement or Leased Land or ad hoc Arrangement. Besides, in the case of Colony, it refers to the army of the sovereign country that was sent to the Colony and stationed there, or to a Foreign Army that was sent to the Colony and stationed there. The database of Foreign Military Presence was retrieved in May-June 2025 from World BEYOND War.
In the light of the above, the Foreign Military Presence tests in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) via six indicators, as follows:
Home Country Perspective
Home Country with Foreign Military Presence: YES/NO
Total Number of Host Countries that the Home Country has with Foreign Military Presence
Total Number of Foreign Military Bases and Installations that the Home Country has in Host Countries
Host Country Perspective
Host Country with Foreign Military Presence: YES/NO
Foreign Military Presence in the Host Country: Names of the home countries that have Foreign Military Presence in the host country
Total Number of Foreign Military Bases and Installations in the Host Country
Section D4.10 Bilateral Military Defence Treaties (BMDT)(M10)
Bilateral Military Defence Treaty (BMDT) includes only two parties to the defence treaty, which reflects the special relations between the two countries at the time of signing or renewing the treaty. Importantly, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes only BMDTs that have a clause with a clear commitment to defend each other in the case of an attack, either under hard-definition or mid-definition, or even soft-definition, as discussed in Section C1 in general and in Section C1.4.2.1.1, in particular. Besides, it can be a BMDT with Two-Directions (TD) or a BMDT with One-Direction (OD), as discussed in Section C1.2. The database of BMDTs included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) was retrieved in June 2025 from various sources.
Considering the above, the BMDTs in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) include the following information in the BMDT's column in the Tables of the Geopolitical Position:
Under each country that is party to the BMDT, it mentioned: Country A-Country B (TD or OD, Year of signing the Treaty), such as Russia-Belarus (TD, 2024).
Section D4.11 Multilateral Alliances and Multilateral Military Defence Treaties (MMDT) (M11)
Traditionally, there are various types of alliances, such as Military alliances (e.g., NATO), Trade Alliances (e.g., Mercosur), Political Alliances (e.g., OIC), and such. However, over the years, the alliances have evolved into complex alliances that combine multiple activities, such as the GCC and the African Union (AU) that act as a combination of Military alliances, Trade Alliances, Political Alliances and Economic Alliances. Therefore, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes two types of Alliances, as follows:
‘Multilateral Military Alliances‘. A Multilateral Military Defence Treaty (MMDT) refers to a defence treaty that includes more than two parties. The 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes only active BMDTs that have a clause with a clear commitment to defend each other in the case of an attack, as discussed in Section C1 in general and in Section C1.3, in particular. Still, keep in mind, that a MMDT refers only to ‘Multilateral Military Alliances‘ (e.g., NATO and CSTO) and not to ‘General Multilateral Alliances‘ that can include a combination of a few activities, yet with or without Defence Treaty. In other words, there are additional ‘Multilateral Military Alliances‘, such as the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), that it is like a MMDT, but this force is run under the ‘General Multilateral Alliance‘ of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that also includes several areas of activity, such as political, economic, and trade. Even the African Standby Force (ASF) is like a MMDT, but it is run under the African Union (AU) that also includes political, economic, and trade activities. Thus, the category of MMDTs in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes only dedicated ‘Multilateral Military Alliances‘, such as NATO and CSTO. However, military forces and/or military treaties under ‘General Multilateral Alliances‘ with multiple activities are not included in the category of MMDTs but under ‘General Multilateral Alliances‘. The database of MMDTs that is included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) was retrieved in May-June 2025 from various sources.
‘General Multilateral Alliances‘. A ‘General Multilateral Alliance‘ refers to an alliance that has either only one type of non-military activity or an alliance that has multiple activities, either with military operation or not. OPEC (sectoral-trade activity), New Development Bank (NDB) (economical activity), and Mercosur (trade activity) are examples of a ‘General Multilateral Alliance‘ with only one type of non-military activity. On the opposite, the Arab League is an example of ‘General Multilateral Alliances‘ with multiple activities that also includes a military treaty, while BRICS and SCO are examples of ‘General Multilateral Alliances‘ with only Military Cooperation, as discussed in Section C2. Still, EFTA is an example of a ‘General Multilateral Alliance‘ without any military activity. The database of ‘General Multilateral Alliances‘ included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) was retrieved in May-June 2025 from various sources, while Trade Alliances were retrieved in May-June 2025 from the database of WTO-Regional Trade Agreements.
Considering the above, Table 14. below presents all the 24 Multilateral Alliances and MMDTs that are included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR). For more details about each alliance, please see Sections E11-E35, as well as Monitoring Alliances by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-alliances . Hence, the Multilateral Alliances that each country or colony belong to, are mentioned in the Multilateral Alliance's column in the Tables of the Geopolitical Position, including the membership status of each alliance, such as a Member or an Observer State or Candidate or Applicant or Suspended Member, as shown in Table 15 that presents the various types of Membership Status. For example, Algeria belongs to the following alliances, which are mentioned in the Algeria’s Row under the Multilateral Alliance's column, as follows: UN, BRICS-IPS, OPEC, Arab League, OIC, NDB, African Union, PAFTA, WTO-O. Thereby, Algeria is a member of UN, OPEC, Arab League, OIC, NDB, African Union, PAFTA, while an Observer State (O) in WTO and Invited Partner State (IPS) in BRICS.
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 15, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) does not include the membership status of ‘Dialogue Partner’ because it does not impact the political power or the military power of the alliance.
Hence, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) includes three layers of membership status, as follows:
Layer I – Active with Direct Impact. The Global Survival Rank (GSR) looks at which countries currently impact in a direct way the political power of an alliance via the current Members, Associate Members, and Partner States. Even Suspended Members are included in this layer because the suspension can be temporary.
Layer II – Active with Indirect Impact. The Global Survival Rank (GSR) looks at which countries currently impact in an indirect way the political power of an alliance via the current Observer States, Informal Observer States, Candidates, Invited Members, and Invited Partner States. Keep in mind that all the countries that are included in this layer have already given an application to join the alliance, and the alliance approved the application by inviting the countries to join the alliance (Invited Members/Invited Partner States), or the alliance approved the country as an Observer State. And yet, sometimes for political reasons, countries act as informal observer states by "permanently" participating in the alliance’s summits, not as ad hoc guests but in an active way. Still, the status of Informal Observer State is particularly relevant in the case of Military Alliances when countries participate in summits, training, and joint military drills of the military alliance.
Layer III – Prospect Impact in the Future. The Global Survival Rank (GSR) looks at which countries may impact the political power of an alliance via the current Applicants, and Prospect Applicants.
However, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) does not take into account ‘Diplomatic Relations’ between the Alliance and ‘Dialogue Partners’ because it does not in any way affect the political power or the military power of the alliance, namely the mechanism of ‘Dialogue Partner’ aims to create a diplomatic channel between the alliance and other countries that may evolve in the future into Layer III as an Applicant or Layer II as an Observer State or even Layer I as a member.
In light of the above, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) distinguishes between the three layers when the membership status of each alliance is presented in Section E, yet the comparison of Alliances in Section F takes into account only those countries included in Layer I.
Table 14. List of Multilateral Alliances and Multilateral Military Defence Treaties (MMDTs) included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Full Name and Abbreviate
Table 15. Types of Membership Status in Multilateral Alliances included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Full Title and Abbreviate
Section D4.12. Coalitions (M12)
The 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) looks at the Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M11) in order to determine to which Coalition (M12) each UN Member or Non-UN Member belongs. Thereby, as shown in Figure 6, the combination of the Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M11) determines to which Coalition each country or colony belongs. However, keep in mind that there has been a major Coalition Shift from the 2024 GSR to the 2025 GSR due to the significant change in the Foreign Policy of the USA under President Trump. As already mentioned in Section D4.8, the start of Trump’s second term as the President of the USA signals the policy shift of the USA from the Post-Cold War era that was run by President Biden against Russia (Cite 29) into the era of abolishing the USA Coalition when Trump de-facto has become an ally of Putin (Cite 30). In other words, it can be argued that Trump 'Abolished' the USA Coalition by 'Sitting on the Fence' between Anti Russia Coalition (NATO/EU) and the Russia-China Coalition, while Putin has started to play in parallel, as a soft-ally of the USA, yet without abandoning his close allies that are rivals of the USA (e.g., China and Iran). However, Trump not only moved to the 'Fence', but he also tried to split the dual-superpowers of Russia and China by trying to make Russia as a close ally, while 'Play Hard' with China by imposing on China the highest Reciprocal Tariffs on 'Liberation Day' (see Section E3.4) in trying also to break the global dominance of China as a superpower.
Considering the above, as shown in Figure 7 below, in the 2024 Global Survival Rank (GSR), we had the following Coalitions: the USA Coalition, the Russia-China Coalition and the 'Sitting on the Fence' countries (Cite 31), while in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), the USA Coalition was de-facto 'Abolished' by Trump, so instead, we have the Anti-Russia Coalition, the Russia-China Coalition (Anti-USA dominance), as well as the 'Sitting on the Fence' countries, which include the USA and also some USA allies that started to act upon Trump’s foreign policy, such as Argentina that even withdrew its application to join BRICS (Cite 32). That’s regardless of the 'Sitting on the Fence' countries that have already been in this geopolitical position since the 2024 Global Survival Rank (GSR), such as Turkey, which from the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War did not join the sanctions against Russia, despite being a member of NATO.
In light of the above, Table 16 below presents how each category of each Geopolitical Position Factor (M1-M11) determines to which coalition each category belongs, but keep in mind that the combination of the Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M11) ultimately determines to which Coalition each country or colony belongs, as presented in the Coalition’s column in the Tables of Geopolitical Position in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR). Moreover, there is a significant dynamic regarding some Geopolitical Position Factors, especially regarding Multilateral Alliances, BMDT, and Foreign Military Presence. Therefore, the Coalition Status in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) refers to June 2025, so any change that occurred after that is not included in the database of the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR).
Figure 6. Determination of the Coalition Factor (M12) by the Combination of the Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M11)
Figure 7. The Impact of Trump's Foreign Policy and Reciprocal Tariffs on Coalitions Shift
Table 16. Determination of Coalitions by Geopolitical Position Factors (M1-M11)
Cite 29. Sanctions against Russia: USA Coalition vs. Russian Coalition, Monitoring Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 14 March 2022 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-risks/14/03/2022
Cite 30. Do We Have Anymore USA Coalition? Trump as an Ally of Putin, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 25 February 2025 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/25/02/2025/1623
Cite 31. USA Coalition versus Russia-China Coalition, Monitoring Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 12 February 2023 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-risks/12/02/2023
Cite 32. Argentina formally announces it won't join the BRICS alliance in Milei’s latest policy shift, AP, 29 December 20
Section D5. Methodology: GSR Serial Number
Section D5.1 Global Survival Rank (GSR) sorted by GSR Serial Number, 2023-2025
Appendix III: All UN Members and Non-UN Member sorted by GSR Serial Number https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/h/gsr-serial-number
Each country or colony included in the Global Survival Rank (GSR) is assigned with a GSR serial number that will remain for all subsequent years, so that a particular country can be tracked using its GSR serial number across different years of the Global Survival Rank (GSR) (see Appendix III). Thereby, Global Survival Rank (GSR) started in 2023, so currently, we have three years of Global Survival Rank (GSR), from 2023 to 2025. However, as shown in Figure 21, over the years, more UN members and Non-UN members have been added to the Global Survival Rank (GSR). More specifically, the 2023 Global Survival Rank (GSR) included mainly UN Members (198), while in the 2024 Global Survival Rank (GSR) were added also Colonies and Disputed Countries (N=256), and in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) were added additional Colonies and Disputed Countries (N=263), yet each country that was included in 2023 has the same GSR Serial Number in 2024 and 2025.
Chart 21. Number of UN Members and Non-UN Members included in Global Survival Rank (GSR), Years 2023-2025
Section D5.2 Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, sorted by GSR Serial Number
Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher to Identify Risks versus Opportunities at the Country Level
Appendix II. Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, sorted by GSR Serial Number https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/h/blog-gsr
Each UN member and Non-UN Member included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) has a post in the Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade that includes important information about the country or colony, including citations from the research literature. Therefore, any UN member and any non-UN member can be found on the blog using two types of search, as follows:
Blog by GSR Serial Number. Appendix II. Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, sorted by GSR Serial Number https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/h/blog-gsr
Blog by Alphabetical Order. Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/search-blog-1
Section D6. Methodology Notes
Section D6.1 Methodology Note I: Explanation about SARs of China in relation to Technology Level I
In the example of the Rank of Technology Level per Capita, SARs were excluded because their data for this indicator are based on calculation.
Section D6.2 Methodology Note II: Explanation and Presenting the Acknowledgement by The Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy about the Database on the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil
When the database on the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil were retrieved for the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), then a note was given by the Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy that the database of these indicators is under review, as presented in Document 3 below. Thus, the indicators of the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) are based on the calculation of the Proved Reserves that were in 2020 minus the Production of Gas and Oil that was during the years 2021-2023. Even though, this type of calculation is a common method that is used either to estimate the future Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil based on the expected Production of Gas and Oil, or when new data is not available for the Proved Reserves. Nevertheless, when the database on the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil were retrieved for the 2024 Global Survival Rank (GSR) on 09 February 2024, there was no need to make this calculation because the database on the Proved Reserves of Gas and Oil were available.
Document 3. Acknowledgement by The Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy that the Data on the Natural Gas-Proved Reserves and Oil-Proved Reserves are Under Review as of 24 April 2025
Section D6.3 Methodology Note III: Explanation about Aspiration for 'Self-Determination' in Colonies
Aspiration for 'Self-Determination' in colonies refers not necessarily by the formal administration of the colony, but by some political parties in the colony that have aspiration for 'Self-Determination'.
Section D6.4 Methodology Note IV: Explanation about the Indicators (R1-R7) of SARs of China
There are many indicators that Hong Kong and Macau, each of them, have separate data from China, such as Area Size (R1), Population (R2), Domestic Economic Activity (GDP) (R3), and Food Security (R7). However, there are indicators that Hong Kong and Macau are part of China, such as Technology Level (R4a), Gas-Proved Reserves (R5), and Oil-Proved Reserves (R6). Therefore, in the case of the indicator of Technology Level (R4a), a calculation was made based on the relative share of the total citations that Hong Kong and Macau have, each of them, from the total citations of China. Thus, the Technology Level (R4a) based on this calculation showed that Hong Kong has 5.5% of the total number of Scientific and technical journal articles of China, while Macau has 1.2% of the total number of Scientific and technical journal articles of China. Besides, based on various sources, Hong Kong and Macau have no Gas-Proved Reserves (R5) nor Oil-Proved Reserves (R6).
Section D6.5 Methodology Note V: Presenting the List of Countries that ‘Not Voted’ on the UN Resolution on New International Economic Order
Table 17. List of Countries that ‘Not Voted’ on the UN Resolution on New International Economic Order
Section D6.6 Methodology Note VI: Presenting the List of Countries that ‘Not Voted’ on the UN Resolution on Decolonialism
Table 18. List of Countries that ‘Not Voted’ on the UN Resolution on Decolonialism
Section D6.7 Methodology Note VII: Explanation about Map 28 in relation to the Disputed Country Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)
Map 28 shows all the members of the African Standby Force (ASF) at the formal level. However, keep in mind that in some cases the ASF fights against forces of coups or forces of civil wars, especially when African countries were suspended from the African Union (AU) following coups and civil wars. Moreover, Map 28. refers to the Disputed Country Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), rather than to Morocco, because Morocco is not a member of the African Standby Force (ASF), while Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) is a member of the African Standby Force (ASF), namely a member of NARC – North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force. Notably, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) uses Excel for creating Non-Interactive maps, so the Disputed Country Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) is not included in the Excel's maps, including Map 28, and because of that, Map 28. shows Morocco instead of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara).
Section D6.8 Methodology Note VIII: Explanation about Map 29 in relation to NARC - North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force
NARC - North African Regional Capability (NARC) Standby Force in Map 29 refers to the Disputed Country Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), rather than to Morocco, because Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) is a member of NARC. Notably, the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) uses Excel for creating Non-Interactive maps, so the Disputed Country Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) is not included in the Excel maps, and because of that, NARC in Map 29. shows Morocco instead of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara).
Section D6.9 Methodology Note IX: Explanation about Informal Observer States in CSTO
Countries that participate in joint drills and summits of CSTO without the formal status of an Observer State can be considered as Informal Observer States of CSTO (Source: Briefing by Andrei Serdyukov, Chief of the CSTO Joint Staff, 29.08.2024, CSTO Website).
Section D6.10 Methodology Note X: Explanation about the Analysis in Section 26.3 regarding NATO Members with Colonies
The analysis in section 26.3 was conducted because every NATO member with colonies must independently defend those colonies in the event of an attack, which is expected to affect NATO's military power during wars. More specifically, According to ‘The area of responsibility’ (697) mentioned in the original treaty of NATO, the Colonies of the NATO members are not party to the Treaty of NATO. Nevertheless, even if NATO eventually, formally or informally, provides military backup to the colonies of NATO members, it is still supposed to impact the military power of NATO. This is because NATO members collectively have 45 colonies, which are on average 6,501 km away from their respective sovereign states, thereby increasing the military risk for NATO and particularly for those members with colonies.
Section D6.11 Methodology Note XI: Explanation about the Distinction between OPEC and OPEC Plus
It is important to distinguish between OPEC and OPEC Plus, namely Members of OPEC versus Voluntary Members of OPEC Plus. More specifically, OPEC includes the Founding Members and the Full Members that established OPEC, while OPEC Plus (OPEC+) includes countries that voluntarily joined the mechanism of OPEC to protect the interests of the Oil Market.
Section D6.12 Methodology Note XII: Explanation about the Distinction between UNSC Permanent Members versus UNSC Non-Permanent Members
It is important to distinguish between UNSC Permanent Members versus UNSC Non-Permanent Members. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has 15 members, which include 5 Permanent Members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – as well as 10 Non-Permanent Members who are elected for a two-year term, but the rotation of non-permanent members occurs every year in a way that each year, 5 non-permanent members begin their two-year term, while the other five non-permanent members complete their two-year term.
Section D6.13 Methodology Note XIII: Explanation about the Comparison of Multilateral Alliances in Section F1.3
Section F1.3 compares the Indicators R1-R7 among ALL the Multilateral Alliances included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR). However, keep in mind that some Multilateral Alliances are less relevant for certain indicators (e.g., Army Size and the Ability of Military Expenditure), such as Trade Alliances that are based solely on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Although, bear in mind that some Trade Alliances have Military Cooperation, as explained in Section C2.
Section D6.14 Methodology Note XIV: Explanation about the Comparison of Superpowers/Permanent Members of UNSC in Section F5
The comparison in Section F5 focuses on the three Superpowers: the USA, China and Russia, but it also includes the additional two permanent members of the UNSC: France and the UK. Keep in mind that the three Superpowers are also permanent members of the UNSC, yet it is worth to distinguish between the Superpowers and ‘regular’ permanent members of the UNSC like France and UK. Thereby, the comparison in Section F5 aims to reveal the ‘Military Backup’, and vice versa, the ‘Military Risk’, that each superpower and permanent member of the UNSC has. Thus, it is important to distinguish between ‘Military Backup’ versus ‘Military Risk’, as follows:
‘Military Backup’ refers to the backup that the Superpower/UNSC Permanent Member has in the case of an attack via Military Defence Treaties with a clear commitment to defend in the case of an attack.
‘Military Risk’ refers to the risk faced by the Superpower/UNSC Permanent Member due to its commitment to protect other countries, colonies, or territories.
Considering the above, the comparison of superpowers, including the permanent members of the UNSC was conducted through three layers, as follows:
Layer I: The Comparison of Military Backup (Layer I) includes only Military Defence Alliances with Two-Directions that have a clear commitment to defend in the case of an attack.
Layer II: The Comparison of Military Risk (Layer III) includes Military Defence Alliances with either Two-Direction (TD) or One-Direction (OD), as well as the colonies and territories under the sovereignty of the Superpower/UNSC Permanent Member, along with its Foreign Military Presence in Host Countries.
Layer III: The Comparison of Military Risk (Layer III) includes Military Defence Alliances with either Two-Direction (TD) or One-Direction (OD), as well as Colonies and territories that the Superpower/UNSC Permanent Member has alongside the Foreign Military Presence that the Superpower/UNSC Permanent Member has in Host Countries.
Moreover, under each Layer, there are two levels of comparison, as follows:
‘Alliance Level’: This level shows the average of the 2025 GSR of each alliance/group of colonies/group of host countries that each superpower has, so a particular country may be included in multiple alliances, such as Canada, which is a member of NATO in addition to being a party to the US-Canada BMDT treaty.
‘List of countries Level’: This level shows the average of the 2025 GSR of all countries included in the layer of each superpower without duplication of countries, namely a country can appear only once in the list of countries of each superpower.
Section D6.15 Methodology Note XV: Explanation about the Database of Foreign Military Presence in Relation to Colonies, MMDTs and BMDTs
The Database of Foreign Military Presence (for a full explanation, see Section D4.9) does not include Colonies that do not have any military bases or military installations, so in the case of a war, the sovereign state may need to mobilise military forces to colonies that do not have military bases or military installations. Moreover, the Database of Foreign Military Presence does not include countries that are parties to MMDTs or BMDTs yet do not have Foreign Military bases or Foreign Military installations, so in the case of a war, countries that are parties to the same MMDTs or BMDTs may be required to mobilise military forces to countries that do not have Foreign Military Presence.
