Section G. Concluding Risk Remarks and Future Perspectives, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Written By Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/gsr/2025/g

Published Date: 12 October 2025

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2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb/2025

Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher: Yearly Rank to Compare the Global Political Power among Countries, Alliances and Coalitions to Survive Long Wars at the Military, Economic, and Political Levels

Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/global-survival-rank-zrb

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

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Section G. Concluding Risk Remarks and Future Perspectives, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

 

Section G - List of Contents

Section G. Concluding Risk Remarks, and Future Perspectives, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

  • Section G1. Significant Yearly Downgrade in the Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) among Top 100 During the Years 2023-2025, especially among USA Coalition/Anti-Russia Coalition

  • Section G2. High Risk for Anti-Russia Coalition in the Case of a War against Russia

  • Section G3. High Risk for Holding Disputed Colonies Due to UN Resolution on Decolonialism

  • Section G4. Risk of Lack of Credibility in the USA's Agreements due to Trump's Violations of the USA's FTAs and the USA's Commitment to the WTO by Imposing the Reciprocal Tariffs

  • Section G5. Foreign Military Presence: High Risk for Home Countries that Have Many Host Countries

  • Section G6. Lack of Multilateral Alliances by the USA Compared to the Russia-China Coalition

  • Section G6. Lack of Multilateral Alliances by the USA Compared to the Russia-China Coalition

  • Section G7. Russia-Ukraine War: Reduction in the Ranks of GSR Indicators (R1-R7) of Ukraine from GSR 2023 to GSR 2025

  • Section G8. Disunification of Yemen by Re-establishing Two Independent Countries: North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) versus Continuing with the Failure of the Unification of Yemen via Yemeni Civil War   

  • Section G9. 12-Day War between Iran and Israel: High Risk for Israel in Military Confrontations with Iran

  • Section G10. Why has Israel Failed to defeat Hamas in the Gaza War Over Two Years?: The Missing Link of the Israeli Army Size

  • Section G11. The Missing Link of the Technology Level of North Yemen (Sanaa)

 

Section G1. Significant Yearly Downgrade in the Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) among Top 100 During the Years 2023-2025, especially among USA Coalition/Anti-Russia Coalition

Looking at the Yearly Change during the years 2023-2025 among Top 100 (see Section A2) indicates that the War-Sanctions between the West and the East, especially due to the Sanctions Against Russia, has led to a significant negative impact on the global economy, and, as a result, it has reduced the political and military power of many countries around the world, as shown in Chart 133 below. More specifically, 66% of the countries among the Top 100 were downgraded in the Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) from 2023 to 2024, while 86% were downgraded in the WR of GSR from 2024 to 2025, yet with the expectation that this negative trend is going to be worse from GSR 2025 to GSR 2026, and even in the years to come due to Trump’s Trade War. Importantly, if we look at that from the Coalition perspective as shown in Table 176 below, then 61% of the countries that were part of the USA Coalition in GSR 2024 downgraded from 2024-2025 compared to only 41% of the countries that were part of the Russia-China Coalition in GSR 2024. This finding suggests that, paradoxically, the War-Sanctions backfire more on those countries that joined the War-Sanctions (Cites 1-2), especially the Sanctions Against Russia, while those countries that did not join the War-Sanctions or even bypassed them suffered less from the negative impact of the War-Sanction. However, Trump’s Trade War is going to be much worse for the Anti-Russia Coalition in the years to come, especially for EU/NATO members, because, paradoxically, Trump imposed relatively high import tariffs on the EU/NATO countries, while Trump spared Russia and its close allies from import tariffs (See Section E3.4.1). Much worse, EU/NATO members not only continue the War-Sanctions against Russia, but they also must spend much more money on defence due to Trump’s demand that NATO members will increase their defence spending to 5% of the GDP (Cite 3), regardless of the military aid and civilian aid that they have given to Ukraine since the start of the Ukraine War (Cite 4). Thereby, the big losers from the War-Sanctions against Russia are the EU/NATO members. Therefore, EU/NATO members should change course to avoid economic and political instability, including slowdown and even recession alongside the fall of governments, which have already hit the Anti-Russia Coalition (Cites 5-7). Ironically, EU/NATO members put a lot of effort into the War-Sanctions against Russia, despite that the ‘Sanction Tool’ is not effective (Cite 8), and it has even led to a ‘Trade Shift’ from Anti-Russia Coalition to the Russia-China Coalition (Cite 9), which has been carried out by the core members of the Russia-China Coalition through counter-sanctions (Cite 10).  

Chart 133. Change in Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) among Top 100, 2023-2025

Table 176. Countries per Coalition among Top 100 that Downgraded in Weight Average (WR) of GSR from GSR 2024 to GSR 2025, Total and Percentage

 

Section G2. High Risk For Anti-Russia Coalition in the Case of a War against Russia

The Coalition Shift that has occurred since the start of the second term of Trump (Cite 11 and Section E3.4.1), as shown in Chart 134 below, should give a Red Alert to the Anti-Russia Coalition in the Case of a War against Russia. More specifically, the Anti-Russia Coalition should be more realistic if the USA, Turkey, and Hungary, as NATO members, actively join the war against Russia or only provide some support. In other words, the Coalition Shift has led to a situation that not only Turkey is ‘Sitting on the Fence’ as it was in 2024, but now the USA and Hungary are also ‘Sitting on the Fence’ (see Section E26.1). This may suggest that those NATO members that have the political position of ‘Sitting on the Fence’ may not join the war against Russia in terms of ‘boots on the ground’ and air attacks, including trying to avoid any kind of direct war against Russia. Although it is likely that the USA will provide weapons to the Anti-Russia Coalition, yet it is unlikely that it will be as a Military Aid but as Arms Exports, which would burden the costs of such a war on the EU and the UK. Importantly, If we take into account the recent military escalation between NATO members and Russia (Cites 12-13), then the anti-Russian coalition should be more careful about being dragged into a war against Russia because, as shown in Chart 135, the average of the 2025 GSR of NATO Members among Anti-Russia Coalition is lower (see Section E26.1) compared to the average of the 2025 GSR of the Military Backup of Russia (see Section F5.2.2).

Chart 134. Coalition Shift From GSR 2024 to GSR 2025, Total and Percentage

Chart 135. NATO Members among Anti-Russia Coalition versus Military Backup of Russia by Average of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)

 

Section G3. High Risk For Holding Disputed Colonies Due to UN Resolution on Decolonialism

Over the last two centuries, many colonies worldwide were fighting against colonialism in order to be independent countries, yet, currentely, we still have around 55 Colonies worldwide, which most of them have an aspiration for Self-Determination (See Section E3.3.2). However, the new UN Resolution on Decolonialism with the aim of Granting Independence to Colonies (see Section E3.3) has changed the ‘Rules of Game’ in relation to Self-Determination of colonies in a way that most of the Colonies today (91%) can be considered as ‘Disputed Colonies’ due to their aspiration for Self-Determination (see Section E3.3.2). This could lead to a significant risk to the sovereign states that still have Disputed Colonies because of the following reasons:

i) Political instability in the colonies due to self-determination, such as the riots that broke out in New Caledonia (Cite 14), which led France to declare a State of Emergency in New Caledonia and even to mobilise French forces 16,600 Km from France (see Section E6.3.2) in order to control the riots in New Caledonia. However, such a kind of resistance to the sovereign state can be considered as a ‘Dispute’ between the Colony and the sovereign state, but it can also be considered as a ‘resistance against occupation’ when the colony began to 'fight’ against the sovereign state.

ii) Legal complication in international courts due to self-determination, such as in the case of Diego Garcia. More specifically, in the 1960s-1970s, the UK government expelled the Chagossian people that lived on Diego Garcia island to Mauritius because of the establishment of a secret military base in Diego Garcia, which has led to a legal complication until today because the Chagossian people claim the ‘Right of Return’ to their homeland on Diego Garcia island, regardless of Mauritius's claim to get back the Chagos Archipelago from the UK. However, despite the deal that was struck between the UK and Mauritius about the Chagos Archipelago, the Chagossian people do not accept the deal, and they are still fighting in international courts about the ‘Right of Return’ to Diego Garcia (Cite 15).

iii) Disloyalty to the sovereign states in Disputed Colonies can lead to losses in wars. It is hard to expect from people that live thousands of km from the sovereign state with an aspiration for Self-Determination - which the sovereign state de facto ignored - to remain loyal to the sovereign state during wars. On the contrary, it will be easier for rivals to get cooperation from the Disputed Colony against the sovereign state, especially if the sovereign state runs the Colony under oppression.

iv) Damage to the democratic image of the sovereign state when the sovereign state insists on holding Disputed Colonies. Sovereign states that insist on holding Disputed Colonies have difficulty in explaining it from the human rights perspective because it seems like a ‘Double Standards’ when they complain about human rights violations by other countries, which could play into the hands of their rivals (Cite 16).

v) Sovereign states have responsibility for the colonies in terms of Defence, Energy Security, and Food Security, which can be a complicated task during a long war, so doubtful if it is worth to hold Disputed Colonies unless if the Disputed Colony is considered as a ‘Strategic Asset’ to the sovereign state. Although the issue of disloyalty during war can make it even more risky when the colony serves as a ‘military strategic point’ for the sovereign state. 

Considering the above, sovereign states that have Disputed Colonies should evaluate the benefits of holding Disputed Colonies versus the risks involved in holding them. That particularly applies for Disputed Colonies that have a long distance to the sovereign state, which may impact the ability to protect the colony during long wars, especially if there exists a problem of disloyalty. Importantly, holding colonies impacts not only the sovereign states but also the military alliances to which the sovereign states belong, such as in the case of NATO (see Section E26.3), and therefore a broader view of the issue of disputed colonies is required beyond the interests of a particular sovereign state.

Section G4. Risk of Lack of Credibility in the USA's Agreements due to Trump's Violations of the USA's FTAs and the USA's Commitment to the WTO by Imposing the Reciprocal Tariffs

Any country has the right to withdraw from any agreement upon the conditions of each agreement. However, when a country does not withdraw from an agreement or does not end the agreement in an orderly way but violates an agreement, especially many agreements as was done when Trump imposed the Reciprocal Tariff on 'Liberation Day' (see Section E3.4.2), then the country takes the risk of a lack of Credibility regarding their agreements, which may negatively affect the credibility of its agreements in the future. The USA has countless international agreements, such as FTAs, Foreign Military Presence, Military Defence Treaties, Military Aid treaties, Military Pacts, and more, so significant violations of the USA’s agreements, as done in the case of the Reciprocal Tariffs, raise concern if there is meaning in signing agreements with the USA. In other words, from the geopolitical perspective, the main problem is not the negative economic implication of the Reciprocal Tariffs but the permanent damage to the Credibility of the USA, especially regarding strategic international agreements. For example, many years have passed since the withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal by Trump, which is still hard to fix because of the trust issue (Cite 17), regardless of the peaceful nuclear issue. Hence, Trump’s administration should look not only at the moment in terms of generating more money for the USA, but also at the future of the USA to avoid damages to the geopolitical position of the USA, which is already suffering from a decline in its geopolitical power due to various factors, such as the ‘War-Sanctions’ against Russia and the complicity of the USA in the Gaza War.

  • Cite 17. Iran Nuclear Deal, Monitoring Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 17 February 2022 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-risks/17/02/2022

Section G5. Foreign Military Presence: High Risk for Home Countries that Have Many Host Countries

Looking at the Foreign Military Presence in terms of the gap between the 2025 GSR of the Home Countries versus the 2025 GSR of the Host Countries that each Home Country has with Foreign Military Presence (see Section E10.3 and Section F3) clearly reveals the Military Risk in holding military bases and stations in host countries. However, looking in-depth at the GSR Indicators R2 – Population and Army Size (see Table 17 below) makes it even clearer and without any doubt that holding too many host countries with Foreign Military Presence significantly increases the Military Risk, questioning whether it is possible to manage military forces in too many host countries during World War. More specifically, as shown in Table 177, all countries included in the Global Survival Rank (GSR) have the same Percentage of the Army Size of the Home Country Relative to the Home Country Population (22%) because it is based on the same equation (see Methodology, Section D3.2). However, when we calculate the Percentage of Army Size of the Home Country relative to the Host Countries Population that Required to Defend, or even more accurate, based on the Percentage of the Army Size of the Home Country Relative to the Home Country Population and Host Countries Population that Required to Defend, then the percentage decreases to a very risky level in the cases of the UK and the USA. Hence, the UK and the USA should be more cautious with their ‘Military Imperialism’ because it will backfire on them during a long World War because they need to ‘juggle’ their military capabilities over too many countries and regions. Importantly, if we take into account not only the Foreign Military Presence that the UK and USA have but also their Colonies, MMDTs and BMDTs (see Section F5.4; See Methodology Note XV), then the risk is even higher.

Table 177. Percentage of the Army Size of the Home Country Relative to the Home Country Population and Host Countries Population that Required to Defend, Sorted by Level of Risk (Higher Risk to Lower Risk)

 

Section G6. Lack of Multilateral Alliances by the USA Compared to the Russia-China Coalition

Looking at the comparison of the Multilateral Alliances (see Section F1) reveals a huge gap between the Russia-China Coalition and the Anti-Russia Coalition in relation to Multilateral Alliances, as shown in Figure 8 below. Importantly, for many decades, the USA has focused on forming Bilateral FTAs, rather than Multilateral FTAs, while Russia and China, on the contrary, put a lot of effort into establishing Multilateral Alliances, such as BRICS and SCO, which include the aspect of Multilateral FTAs but also other aspects, such as Military Cooperation, as well as Economic and Political cooperations. As I explained in my research paper (Cite 17a), international trade agreements allow preserving political power or securing new political power by creating a ’Bloc Superpower’ via regional trade agreements (e.g., SCO) or even better, via multilateral trade agreements outside the WTO, because it allows forming a ‘Trade Coalition’ among a group of allies from different geographical areas (e.g., BRICS), which can result in geopolitical change, as already happened due to the formation of Multilateral Alliances by the Russia-China Coalition, which most of them act under the principle of Anti-USA Dominance. However, the USA not only did not establish Counter-Alliances to BRICS and SCO, but Trump even de-facto withdrew from the only significant Multilateral FTA that the USA has, the USMAC, as well as from many Bilateral FTAs that the USA has, by imposing the Reciprocal Tariffs that violate these FTAs (see Section E3.4.2). It can be argued that Trump chose to run the USA’s international trade under the ‘Nationalism-Mercantilism’ policy (Cite 18), which is opposite to the Trade Liberalism policy (Cites 17a-19) that is run by the Russia-China Coalition. Hence, the USA should get back to the roots (Cite 19) in order to assess whether the ‘Nationalism-Mercantilism’ policy can preserve the political power of the USA against the Dual-Superpowers of Russia and China that run a contrast policy. 

Figure 8. Multilateral Alliances by Coalitions Included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)

Section G7. Russia-Ukraine War: Reduction in the Ranks of GSR Indicators (R1-R7) of Ukraine from GSR 2023 to GSR 2025

Looking at the comparison of the Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7) between Russia and Ukraine, as shown in Table 178 below, indicates why until today Ukraine did not succeed in winning the war against Russia, despite the unprecedented Military Aid that Ukraine has gotten from various allies since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Cite 20). More specifically, the huge gap between Russia and Ukraine among all the Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7) explains why Ukraine cannot win a war against Russia. Worse, most of the Ranks of the Survival Indicators (R1-R7) of Ukraine were reduced significantly from GSR 2023 to GSR 2025, while most of the Ranks of the Survival Indicators (R1-R7) of Russia remain the same from GSR 2023 to GSR 2025, despite the unprecedented Sanctions against Russia, especially by the EU via 18 packages of sanctions (Cite 21), which indicates that Russia has succeeded in bypassing the sanctions, including making a ‘Trade Shift’ from the Anti-Russia Coalition to the Russia-China Coalition (Cites 22-23). Hence, Ukraine should find the way to end the war even by compromising with Russia (Cite 24). Although if we look at the Weight Average (WR) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) of Russia in GSR 2023 - GSR 2025, then even Russia should have the interest to compromise with Ukraine in order to end the war because the WR of Russia was reduced from 2024 GSR to 2025 GSR, mainly because of the reduction in the rank of the GDP (R4). Therefore, a more realistic approach by Russia and Ukraine can lead to the ending of this war. 

Table 178. Russia-Ukraine War: Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7) of Russia versus Ukraine, GSR 2023 - GSR 2025

Cite 20. Europe leads in military aid to Ukraine — but can it cover for a wavering US? MSN, 22 August 2025

Cite 21. Von der Leyen announced a change in approach to sanctions against Russia, EurAsia, 02 October 2025

Cite 22. Gas & Oil War-Sanctions: USA Coalition vs. Russian Coalition, Monitoring Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 07 April 2022 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-risks/07/04/2022

Cite 23. USA Coalition vs. Russian Coalition: FDI and International Trade Analysis, Monitoring Risks by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 30 March 2022 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-risks/30/03/2022

Cite 24. Winter War in WWII between Russia and Finland: Reflection From the Past Regarding Russia-Ukraine War, Risks Timeline by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, 29 December 2022 https://www.rozen-bakher.com/timeline-risks/29/12/2022/0540

 

Section G8. Disunification of Yemen by Re-establishing Two Independent Countries: North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) versus Continuing with the Failure of the Unification of Yemen via Yemeni Civil War 

Looking at Appendix I of Yemen-North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) (see Section H1) clearly reveals that labelling North Yemen (Sanaa) as ‘Houthi-Rebels’ leads to the huge misunderstanding by the West about North Yemen (Sanaa) in general and, in particular, about their military capabilities. North Yemen (Sanaa) is not a ‘Group of Rebels that fights from Mountains’, but an independent country that was a UN member until the unification of Yemen in 1990. Importantly, North Yemen (Sanaa) was stronger and more stable compared to South Yemen (Aden) before the unification of Yemen in 1990. Besides, North Yemen (Sanaa) had a bigger population before the unification of Yemen, like today, compared to South Yemen (Aden). Importantly, if we look from a historical perspective, then North Yemen (Sanaa) had more political stability compared to South Yemen (Aden), like the situation today. More specifically, North Yemen (Sanaa) acted as an independent country from 1918 under the Kingdom of Northern Yemen, and in 1947 North Yemen (Sanaa) became a full UN Member, including membership in the Arab League and OIC until the unification of Yemen in 1990. On the contrary, South Yemen (Aden) was a British colony from 1838 until 1967, when it became an independent country and a full UN member as a Communist state, but only to fall into an unstable regime, namely under the Communist State of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSY), which survived only 3 years before being replaced by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), yet PDRY was much weaker compared to North Yemen (Sanaa) in many aspects until the unification of Yemen in 1990.

Considering the above, if the architects of the unification of Yemen aimed to solve the 'problems’ of South Yemen (Aden), then they got a much worse situation that lasted for more than 30 years, since the beginning of the Yemeni Civil War in 1994, just 4 years after the failure of the unification of Yemen. It can be argued that the unification of Yemen failed because of the following main reason: The smaller post-unification Yemeni population that located in South Yemen (Aden) with Sunni-Islamic majority tried to impose rules that did not fit the majority of the post-unification Yemeni population that located in North Yemen (Sanaa) with a Shia-Islam majority. Importantly, Arab Sunni countries near Yemen saw an opportunity to take 'control’ over Yemen after the unification, which encouraged the Sunni-population in Yemen to impose rules on the Shia-population in Yemen that fit their agenda. This has led to a conflict between North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) that eventually escalated into a civil war that continues to this day, for more than 30 years, which the West and Arab Sunni countries near Yemen call it as a 'Rebellion' by North Yemen (Sanaa). 

However, paradoxically, despite the huge aid to South Yemen (Aden) by West and Arab Sunni countries, including treating South Yemen (Aden) by the West as the legitimate ruler of Yemen, while treating North Yemen (Sanaa) as ‘Houthi-Rebels’, then North Yemen (Sanaa) today is still more stable compared to South Yemen (Aden). More specifically, North Yemen (Sanaa) controls most of its territory before the unification of Yemen, while 3 different forces control the territory of South Yemen (Aden) before the unification of Yemen, as shown in Map 62 below, regardless of Socotra Island that is controlled by the United Arab Emirates. Thus, ironically, the force that internationally recognised by the West and Arab Sunni countries around Yemen and even represents Yemen in the UN, Arab League and OIC, controls mainly the area of Yemen with the least population compared to the other areas of Yemen that are controlled by other forces and have the majority population of Yemen, as shown in Map 63 below that presents the Density Population map of Yemen.

In light of the above, continuing with the concept by the West and Arab Sunni countries near Yemen that the people of North Yemen (Sanaa) are ‘Houthi-Rebels’ will not solve the ongoing crisis in Yemen but may worsen it, while admitting that the unification of Yemen has failed may open the path for the disunification of Yemen by re-establishing two independent countries: North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) as they were before the failure of the unification of Yemen. Paradoxically, this solution will allow for greater control over North Yemen (Sanaa) within the UN framework when North Yemen (Sanaa) once again will become a UN member, compared to the current situation in which the West treats approximately 30 million people in North Yemen (Sanaa) as ‘Houthi-Rebels’. 

Map 62. Map of North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) before the Unification of Yemen compared to the Map of Current Control over the Territory of Yemen

Map 63. Yemen Population Density

Section G9. 12-Day War between Iran and Israel: High Risk for Israel in Military Confrontations with Iran

Looking at the comparison of the Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7) between Iran and Israel, as shown in Table 179 below, clearly indicates why Israel had the interest to end the war against Iran after 12 days (Cite 25) compared to the ongoing military confrontations that Israel has with other countries that seem to Israel as inferior rivals, namely they have equal or lower 2025 GSR compared to Israel, as shown in Chart 136. For Example, Israel has no interest in ending the military confrontations against Lebanon because of the gap in GSR in favour of Israel, as shown in Table 180 below. Therefore, Israel repeatedly has violated the ceasefire deal with Lebanon over the last year (Cite 26) only because Israel sees the attacks against Lebanon as a low risk for Israel. 

However, the huge gap between Iran and Israel in relation to most of the Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7) explains why Israel cannot win a war against Iran, which even led Israel to look for a fast ceasefire deal with Iran to end the 12-Day War. Importantly, the indicators Army Size (R2), Technology Level (R4a) and Area Size (R1) explain how Iran had the ability to make a successful counter-offensive against Israel, including preventing Israel from achieving its military objectives. More specifically, despite the Israeli surprise attack against the nuclear sites of Iran that included the assassination of the Iranian military leadership (Cite 27), Iran was able to quickly replace the military leadership because Iran has a big army with a significant pool of army officers and, importantly, to carry out a successful counter-offensive in less than 24 hours from the start of the Israeli surprise attack (Cite 28). Unlikely that a country with a small army has the ability to replace the military leadership that was assassinated by the enemy, including making a counter-offensive in less than 24 hours from the start of the surprise attack. Even the significant gap between Iran and Israel in relation to the Technology Level (R4a) explains how Iran succeeded in surprising the Israeli defence with its missiles and drones until the breaking-point of the Israeli anti-missile defence, namely the barrages from Iran was so intense, so Israel started using interceptors faster than it could make them (Cite 29), which led to the ceasefire deal. The gap in the Area Size (R1) between Iran and Israel also plays in favour of Iran because of the significant gap in the coverage of the area attack, namely Israel has a relatively small area size, so the Iranian attacks hit most of the areas in Israel, while Israel had more difficulties in attacking all the areas of Iran. Thus, the combination of a big Area Size and Technological Capabilities explains how the Iranian defence managed to hit Israeli F35 fighter jets (Cites 30-31), marking the first time in many decades that a country had managed to hit Israeli fighters. Considering the above, if Iran had not have the military capabilities to make a fast counter-offensive in an effective way, then likely that the war between Israel and Iran was not last for 12-Days but for many months or even years, because Israel like Iran, had the interest to end the war, which is contarary to the Israeli interest to keep the flames of the wars against other neighboring countries due their inferior military capabilities to deal with a war against Israel like Iran. Hence, Israel should be more cautious in starting a war against Iran because it will backfire on Israel, especially in Mid-Long Wars (Cite 32).   

Table 179. 12-Day War between Iran and Israel: Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7) of Iran versus Israel, GSR 2023 - GSR 2025

Chart 136. Countries Involved in the Fighting Fronts of Israel by the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)

Table 180. Military Confrontations between Israel and Lebanon: Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7) of Israel versus Lebanon, GSR 2023 - GSR 2025

 

Section G10. Why has Israel Failed to defeat Hamas in the Gaza War Over Two Years?: The Missing Link of the Israeli Army Size

Since 07 October 2023, Israel has crossed every red-line in the Gaza War to defeat Hamas (Cite 33-35), but without success, so the question that arises is why Israel has failed to defeat Hamas in the Gaza War over two years? Looking at the Global Survival Rank may give some answers, as shown in Tables 181-184 and Map 64 below. Thereby, it can be argued that there are four main reasons for the Israeli failure to defeat Hamas in Gaza:

i) As I mentioned in my Risks Timeline from 14 May 2024 (see Cite 36), Hamas, for many years, has been preparing for a major war against Israel by creating a network of Tunnels inside Gaza and a network of Tunnels from Gaza to Israel and from Gaza to Egypt, which allows the movement of people, weapons and goods through the Tunnels. Therefore, under the combination of a network of Tunnels under an intense building area in a very small area size, with a high population density, like in Gaza, the IDF has no chance to release the Hostages. Worse, bombing or demolishing buildings by the IDF even makes it more difficult for the IDF to release hostages because it does not allow revealing the network of Tunnels or from where it is possible to access them unless you know the access points like Hamas. Importantly, the combination of tunnels and ruins from the bombarding has allowed Hamas to hide among the rubble with the ability to easily carry out attacks against IDF Forces and then to escape into the tunnels, which explains the high number of casualties among Israeli soldiers in Gaza. Much worse, the reality in Gaza in terms of high population density in a very small area makes it impossible to conduct military operations without causing mass killings of Palestinian civilians, regardless of the high risk of killing the Hostages by the IDF during the bombardment, which indeed occurred during the military operations by the IDF.

ii) Since 07 October 2023, Israel has run not only the war in Gaza but also military operations and wars on additional fronts against Iran, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank, and North Yemen (Sanaa) (see Section G9, Section G11, and Cite 37), and even Assassination Attempt Attack in Qatar against the Hamas leadership (Cite 38), regardless of the Israeli Drone Attacks against Gaza Aid Flotilla in Territorial Waters in North Africa (e.g., Tunisia) and Europe (e.g., Greece) (Cites 39-40), while military militant groups from Iraq (e.g., the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)) and Bahrain have also joined the attacks against Israel (Cites 41-42), so Israel has needed to juggle its army over too many fighting fronts (Cite 37), as shown in Map 63 below.

iii) Usually, every man in a country has no restriction in joining the army, so the Army Size in the Global Survival Rank based on a general equation that fits to regular countries (see Methodology, Section D3.2). However, Israel is not a typical case in relation to the Army Size (Table 182 below) because in Israel there are restrictions on who can join the army based on religion (Cite 43) and vice versa, there are also mass exemptions in Israel from serving in the Israeli army based on Jewish religious denomination (Cite 44). Nevertheless, since the beginning of the Gaza War, the issue of the Israeli Army Size has become even more complicated because too many Israelis have refused to serve as soldiers in Gaza due to ideological, ethical, and legal concerns (Cite 45), as well as due to fighting exhaustion, both Physical and Emotional (Cite 46). Besides, there has also been a mass exodus of Israeli citizens that immigrated to other countries, temporarily or permanently, in an attempt to avoid serving in the Israeli Army (Cites 47-48). Hence, the Israeli Army Size has become the Missing Link in the Israeli military capabilities, which also impacts the Global Survival Rank (GSR) of Israel, as shown in Tables 182-183 below. Therefore, the small size of the Israeli army prevented Israel from carrying out land operations that fit for the conditions of Gaza, which has led Israel to focus on bombarding and even to use terror methods like the 'booby-trapped vehicles' in Gaza city (Cite 49), including starvation via siege as a weapon for over one year, but despite all of that, it did not help to defeat Hamas nor bring success in releasing the Israeli hostages. Eventually, what led to the deal with Hamas (Cite 50) that could have been agreed upon many months earlier, but Israel refused for such a deal, was the pressure from the international community on the USA and Israel to stop the genocide in Gaza. The problem of the Israeli army size can be illustrated by the following two examples: i) Russia (USSR) is the only army in WWII that succeeded in stopping the advance of the Nazi army because Russia (USSR) had a bigger army, and because of that, Russia (USSR) had the highest casualties in WWII due to the land operations against the Nazis (Cite 51), yet Russia (USSR) could afford it due to its big army size.  ii) As I mentioned in my Risks Timeline from 11 June 2024 (see Cite 52), Russia was the only army that succeeded in stopping Napoleon's invasion by using Attrition warfare, but they could carry it out only because Russia had a big army with a high level of patriotism, resulting in many casualties on the Russian side, but eventually, Russia defeated Napoleon. Even Hamas used Attrition warfare against the Israeli army by causing significant casualties for Israel, yet Hamas did not defeat Israel, but also Israel did not defeat Hamas, because Israel has a small army size with a low level of patriotism compared to the high level of patriotism among the Palestinians, especially in Gaza. From a patriotism perspective, there is a big difference between offence and defence, namely Israel sacrifices its soldiers just to continue holding the occupation of Palestine, including the creation of a Jewish riviera in Gaza through ethnic cleansing as part of the ‘Greater Israel’ vision by the Israeli far-right government (Cite 53), which explains the low level of patriotism in Israel, resulting in mass refusal and mass exodus of many Israelis to avoid serving in Gaza (Cites 45-48) compared to the high level of patriotism among the Palestinians in Gaza because they are fighting on their land against a harsh occupier (Cite 54).

iv) Paradoxically, the biggest mistake of Israel is the elimination of the fabric of life in Gaza through the mass bombarding in a way that no one has a place to work at (Cite 55) or study at (Cite 56) or even live in decent conditions (Cite 57), except to fight against the Israeli occupation. Thus, as time has passed since the start of the Gaza war, everyone in Gaza has joined Hamas and other military factions in Gaza in fighting against the Israeli occupation. Therefore, under these circumstances, the objective of eliminating Hamas by Israel becomes equivalent to eliminating all the Palestinians in Gaza because everyone there becomes part of Hamas's Resistance. Importantly, if we look at that from the Army Size perspective, then the ‘Army Size’ of the Palestinians in Gaza is even higher (see Table 184 below) compared to the army size of Israel that has operated in the Gaza War, because all Palestinians in Gaza become like a ‘People's Army’ against the Israeli army, which is typical of cases of occupation when the civilian population joins the resistance against the occupation.

In light of the above, Israel can not defeat the Palestinian population in Gaza under the circumstances mentioned above and also because of the significant backup that the State of Palestine has got from the international community, which has led many countries to join the fight against the Israeli occupation in various ways (Cite 58). Importantly, comparing the Population and Army Size between the Two-State Solution versus the One-State Solution (Cite 59), as shown in Table 184, clearly indicates that the Jewish population under the One-State Solution will be the minority religion compared to the Islam-Sunni that will be the majority religion, which already reflects the situation today under Israeli occupation of Palestine, so the One-State Solution is a dead-end solution with endless military conflicts without any hope of a normal life for both sides (Cite 60). Even if we look at that from a historical perspective, then the whole idea of the Partition Plan for Palestine from 1947 (see Section H4.4 and Section H4.6) was to create two states to prevent religious conflicts: one state with a Jewish majority for the Israeli jewish people, and the second state with an Islamic majority for the Palestinian people. Therefore, the only way for Israel to get back into normal life and prosperity without international isolation is to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine by agreeing to the establishment of the State of Palestine under a peace agreement (Cite 61). This will also lead to normalisation between Israel and other Arab/Islamic countries that currently do not recognise Israel (see Section E9), which will open the horizon for a new era for the Middle East (see Section E32). Otherwise, if Israel insists on continuing with the occupation of Palestine, then Israel will suffer from military attrition and international isolation (Cite 60), yet eventually, Israel will be forced by the international community to accept the reality of the State of Palestine (Cite 58 and Cite 62), and therefore it is better for Israel to do so under cooperation rather than under harsh reality. 

Table 181. Gaza War and the Military Confrontations in West Bank: Global Survival Rank Indicators (R1-R7) of the State of Israel versus the State of Palestine, GSR 2023 - GSR 2025

Map 64. Fighting Fronts of Israel, Including Israeli Assassination Attempt Attack, Military Militants Attacks against Israel, and Israeli Drone Attacks against Aid Ships to Gaza in Territorial Waters

Table 182. Israeli Army Size: Restrictions, Exemptions, Refusing, and Avoiding from Serving in Israeli Army

Table 183. Impact of Israeli Army Size on 2025 GSR of Israel

Table 184. Population and Army Size: Two-State Solution versus One-State Solution by Religion Majority

 

Section G11. The Missing Link of the Technology Level of North Yemen (Sanaa)

The indicator of the Technology Level (R4a) in the Global Survival Rank (GSR) is based on the comparison of the ‘Number of Published Scientific and Engineering Articles’, which gives well-grounded support for the Technological Capabilities at the Country Level, especially with regard to Research and Development (R&D) Capabilities, including the R&D Capabilities of Weapons and Ammunitions, as well as with regard to the ability to maintain weapons and to improvise alternative spare parts for weapons when their availability on the global market is limited during long wars (see Section D3.4). Keep in mind that, as explained in Section D3, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) does not use any indicator 'Per Capita' because in long wars there is no meaning for 'Per Capita' but for the 'Absolute Number', as shown in Table 13 in Section D3 that illustrates the difference between the Rank of 'Absolute Number' versus the Rank of 'Per Capita' in relation to the indicator of Technology Level (R4a). More specifically, Small Country can have a higher GDP per Capita or a higher number of Scientific and Engineering Articles per Capita, while a Big Country can have a lower GDP or a lower number of Scientific and Engineering Articles per Capita compared to the 'Absolute Number', but at the end of the day, in long wars, there is a critical difference between a small country that has only hundreds or thousands of researchers that can contribute to the Technological Capabilities of their country versus a Big Country that can have even millions of researchers that can contribute in various ways to the Technological Capabilities of their country.

However, when we look at the Technology Level (R4a) of North Yemen (Sanaa), as shown in Table 185 below, then we get a ridiculous number of ‘Published Scientific and Engineering Articles’ compared to Rival Countries Involved in Military Confrontation with North Yemen (Sanaa), which definitely does not reflect the Technology Level (R4a) of North Yemen (Sanaa) if we look at that based on the reality of the military capabilities of North Yemen (Sanaa). Too many times the international community was surprised by the advanced technology of North Yemen (Sanaa) in Military Confrontations, such as the drone strikes that directly hit the Eilat airport of Israel (Cite 63) and the city of Eilat, resulting even in Israeli casualties (Cite 64), which were conducted successfully due to the technological ability of North Yemen (Sanaa) to 'maneuver' the Israeli defence system (Cites 65-66 ). Besides, too many times, we hear how the defence system of North Yemen (Sanaa) shot down expensive and advanced American Reaper drones (Cite 67). Even the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, which included 10 countries with the goal of defeating North Yemen (Sana'a) within 6 weeks, failed to defeat North Yemen (Sana'a) even after 10 years (Cite 68). Not to mention the "expertise" of the navy of North Yemen (Sanaa) in carrying out precise direct hits on vessels and tankers (Cite 69) and even direct hits on warships and destroyers (Cite 70) that do not obey the North Yemen (Sanaa) siege in the red sea when North Yemen (Sanaa) joined the war against Israel to save the Palestinians from the Israeli genocide and starvation (Cite 71). Moreover, before the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel, many in the West blamed Iran for the Technological Capabilities of North Yemen (Sanaa) (Cite 72) and even used to call North Yemen (Sanaa) as ‘Iran-Backed Houthi Rebels’ (Cite 73), but Iran repeatedly argued that North Yemen (Sanaa) has its own weapons (Cite 74). The 12-Day War confirmed the argument of Iran, namely the Iranian missiles and drones are much more sophisticated than those of North Yemen (Sanaa) (Cite 75), based on the success rate of hitting the targets and the damages that they caused (See Section G9).    

In light of the above, the question that arises is how can it be that North Yemen (Sanaa) has so ridiculous number of ‘Published Scientific and Engineering Articles’ compared to Rival Countries. The answer is simple, using a rhetorical question – can a ‘Houthi-Rebel’ publish a research paper with an American publisher or with a British publisher? – and the answer is NO, and if I want to be more politically correct, then the answer is Unlikely, which explains how the Technology Level is the missing link in the military capabilities of North Yemen (Sanaa). In other words, the international isolation of North Yemen (Sanaa) due to the wish of the West and Arab countries near Yemen to control Yemen via the leadership of South Yemen (Aden) has brought the opposite results, as explained in Section G8 and Appendix I. That has led to the situation where the international community knows almost nothing about the Scientific and Technological Capabilities of North Yemen (Sanaa) and its military capabilities, in particular. 

As I mentioned in Section G8, the time has come for the international community to admit that the unification of Yemen has failed and to re-establish two independent countries as UN members: North Yemen (Sanaa) and South Yemen (Aden) as they were before the unification of Yemen in 1990. When North Yemen (Sanaa) becomes a UN member again, then the international community will have the ability to start knowing again about the Scientific,  Technological and Military Capabilities of North Yemen (Sanaa) because researchers from North Yemen (Sanaa) will be able to publish articles, and importantly, North Yemen (Sanaa) will be needed to give again its data to international institutions, such as the World Bank. That will be much better compared to the situation today, when the international community is calling around 30 million people ‘Houthi-Rebels’, while North Yemen (Sanaa) in response operates without the control of the UN framework. 

Table 185. Technology Level (R4a) of North Yemen (Sanaa) Compared to Rival Countries that were Involved in Military Confrontations with North Yemen (Sanaa)

Please see Section H1. Appendix I: Yemen - North Yemen and South Yemen

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher - A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/
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Section F5. Comparison of Superpowers/ Permanent Members of UNSC: Military Backup and Military Risk, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
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Section H. Appendices, 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher