Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher For the Year 2024

Written By Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher
 

Acknowledgement: During the Final Work on ‘Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher For the Year 2024’, ICCG blocked the ability of Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher to work fully with Microsoft 365, so currently, ‘Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher For the Year 2024’ is under the status of Pre-Published, and when Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher will have again the ability to work fully on Microsoft 365, then she will finalize ‘Section 4. Analysis of the Results and Policy Recommendations’, including the editing of Section 4.‍ ‍

 

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-international-trade/2024

Pre-Published Date: 01 August 2026 - Section 4 is not yet finalized

COPYRIGHT ©2026 ZIVA ROZEN-BAKHER ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Rozen-Bakher, Z, Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher For the Year 2024, Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-international-trade/2024

Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher: Annual Analysis of Exports, Imports, Trade Balance, and Top Trade Partners at the Country Level and at the Multilateral Trade Alliances Level through the Global Political Power Rank vs Global Market Size Rank

Rozen-Bakher, Z. Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-international-trade

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Researcher in International Relations and Foreign Policy with a Focus on International Security alongside Military, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

CV

Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher For the Year 2024

List of Contents

  • Section 1. Why Do We Need Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank to Monitor International Trade?

    • Section 1.1 International Trade: Mercantilism versus Comparative Competitive Advantages

    • Section 1.2 Top Export/Import Partner of a Country versus Global Top Export/Import Partner of Many Countries

    • Section 1.3 Conceptual Research Model of ‘Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher’

      • Section 1.3.1 Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank

      • Section 1.3.2 Geopolitical Factor: Region, Religion, Sovereignty Status, Limited International Recognition, New International Economic Order, Decolonialism‍, Multilateral Alliances, Foreign Military Presence, Sanctions, Involvement in Wars

      • Section 1.3.3 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

  • Section 2. Methodology

    • Section 2.1 Home Country Characteristics as Independent Variables

    • Section 2.2 International Trade as Dependent Variables

    • Section 2.3 Geopolitical Factors as Moderating Variables: Region, Religion, Sovereignty Status, Limited International Recognition, New International Economic Order, Decolonialism‍, Multilateral Alliances, Foreign Military Presence, Sanctions, Involvement in Wars

    • Section 2.4 Global Survival Rank (GSR) as Moderating Variable for two Geopolitical factors: Sanctions and Involvement in Wars

  • Section 3. Results

    • Section 3.1 Highlights

    • Section 3.2 Analysis of Global Top Partners of Exports and Imports in 2024 - Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

    • Section 3.3 Analysis of Top Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Partners in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.3.1 Analysis of Top Import Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Import Partners

      • Section 3.3.2 Analysis of Top Export Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Export Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.3.3 In which Countries the Country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, sorted by Global Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, Higher to Lower: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.3.4 In which Countries the Country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner, sorted by Global Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner, Higher to Lower: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

    • Section 3.4. Analysis of International Trade Balance, Total Exports and Total Imports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members 

      • Section 3.4.1 Comparison of International Trade Balance in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.4.2 Comparison of Total Imports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.4.3 Comparison of Total Exports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

    • Section 3.5 The Impact of the Geopolitical Position Factors on International Trade

      • Section 3.5.1 The Impact of Region on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.5.2 The Impact of Religion on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.5.3 The Impact of Sovereignty Status on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.5.4 The Impact of Limited International Recognition on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.5.5 The Impact of the Attitude towards the New International Economic Order on International Trade: Countries with UN Vote Right

      • Section 3.5.6 The Impact of Decolonialism‍ on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.5.7 The Impact of Multilateral Trade Alliances (Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)) and Multilateral Military Alliances on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.5.8 The Impact of Foreign Military Presence on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

      • Section 3.5.9 The Impact of Sanctions on International Trade:  All UN Members and Non-UN Members 

      • Section 3.5.10. The Impact of Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts on International Trade:  All UN Members and Non-UN Members

    • Section 3.6. Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator for Two Geopolitical Factors: Sanctions and Involvement in Wars

      • Section 3.6.1 The Impact of Sanctions on International Trade: Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator

      • Section 3.6.2 The Impact of Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts on International Trade: Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator

  • Section 4. Analysis of the Results and Policy Recommendations

  • Section 5. Methodological Notes

  • Section 6. Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order

  • Section 7. Relevant Items From the Research Projects of Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

  • Section 8. Recommended Reading from the Scientific Literature

List of Tables

  • Table A. Total of Exports/Imports in 2024 relative to Global Top Export/Import Partners in 2024: China, USA, and Germany, Section 1.2

  • Table B. Population versus GDP per Capita relative to International Trade Balance: The cases of China vs India, Germany vs USA, Liechtenstein vs San Marino, and Eritrea vs Central African Republic, Section 1.3

  • Table C. Comparison of Russia vs Ukraine: Indicators (R1-R7) of Global Survival Rank (GSR), GSR 2023 - GSR 2025, Section 1.3.3

  • Table D. All indicators included in the Results Tables 1-26: Each Indicator by Each Table, Section 2

  • Table 1. Global Top Partners of Exports and Imports: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Global Political Power Rank, Section 3.2

  • Table 2. Global Top Partners of Exports and Imports: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Global Market Size Rank, Section 3.2

  • Table 3. Global Top Partners of Exports and Imports: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order, Section 3.2

  • Table 4. Top Import Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Import Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Global Political Power Rank, Section 3.3.1

  • Table 5. Top Import Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Import Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order, Section 3.3.1

  • Table 6. Top Export Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Export Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Global Market Size Rank, Section 3.3.2

  • Table 7. Top Export Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Export Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order, Section 3.3.2

  • Table 8. In which Countries the Country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, sorted by Global Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, Higher to Lower, Section 3.3.3

  • Table 9. In which Countries the Country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner, sorted by Global Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner, Higher to Lower, Section 3.3.4

  • Table 10. International Trade Balance: All UN Members and Non-UN Members with a Positive International Trade Balance, sorted from Higher to Lower, Section 3.4.1

  • Table 11. International Trade Balance: All UN Members and Non-UN Members with a Negative International Trade Balance, sorted from Higher to Lower, Section 3.4.1

  • Table 12. Total Imports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted from Higher to Lower, Section 3.4.2

  • Table 13. Total Exports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted from Higher to Lower, Section 3.4.3

  • Table 14. Geopolitical Position Factors: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order, Section 3.5

  • Table 15. Average of International Trade in 2024 by Region, sorted by the Average of International Trade Balance in 2024, Section 3.5.1

  • Table 16. Average of International Trade in 2024 by Main Religion, sorted by the Average of International Trade Balance in 2024, Section 3.5.2

  • Table 17. Average of International Trade in 2024 by Main Religious Denomination, sorted by the Average of International Trade Balance in 2024, Section 3.5.2

  • Table 18. Average of International Trade in 2024 by the Categories of Limited International Recognition, sorted by the Average of International Trade Balance in 2024, Section 3.5.4

  • Table 19. The Impact of Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances on International Trade, sorted by the Total of International Trade Balance in 2024, Section 3.5.7

  • Table 20. The Impact of the Sanctions against Russia on International Trade: Comparison between Home Countries that Imposed Sanctions on Russia versus Home Countries that did not impose sanctions on Russia, Sorted by International Trade Balance, Section 3.5.9

  • Table 21. The Impact of Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts in 2024 on the International Trade, sorted by International Trade Balance in 2024, Section 3.5.10

  • Table 22. Countries Under Sanctions - Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, and North Korea - Comparison of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) versus the Rank of International Trade Balance, Sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Section 3.6.1

  • Table 23. Countries Under Sanctions - Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, and North Korea - Comparison of the Indicators (R1-R7) of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Section 3.6.1

  • Table 24. Involvement in Wars in 2024 - All UN Members and Non-UN Members: Positive International Trade Balance vs Negative International Trade Balance in 2024, sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Section 3.6.2

  • Table 25. Involvement in Wars in 2024 - Russia, Iran, Ukraine, and Israel - Comparison of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) versus the Rank of International Trade Balance, Sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Section 3.6.2

  • Table 26. Involvement in Wars in 2024 - Russia, Iran, Ukraine, and Israel - Comparison of the Indicators (R1-R7) of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Section 3.6.2

  • Table I. International Trade Data Notes: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order, Section 5

List of Charts

  • Chart A. Global Top Export/Import Partner versus Top Export/Import Partner: Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank, Section 1.2

  • Chart B. Conceptual Research Model of ‘Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher’, Section 1.3

  • Chart C. Comparison of Russia vs Ukraine: International Trade Balance in USD for the Years 2020-2024, Section 1.3.3

  • Chart 1. Top 20: Positive International Trade Balance versus Negative International Trade Balance, Section 3.1

  • Chart 2. Top 20: Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank, Section 3.1

  • Chart 3. Top 20: Global Top 1 Import Partner versus Global Top 1 Export Partner, Section 3.1

  • Chart 4. Comparison of International Trade Balance in 2024 among Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances, Section 3.1

  • Chart 5. The Impact of the Region on Exports, Average of the Total Exports in 2024, Section 3.5.1

  • Chart 6. The Impact of the Sovereignty Status on International Trade, Section 3.5.3

  • Chart 7. Average of International Trade Balance in 2024 by the Vote (Favour/Against) of UN Resolution on New International Economic Order, Section 3.5.5

  • Chart 8. Average of International Trade Balance in 2024 by the Vote of UN Resolution on Decolonialism‍, Section 3.5.6

  • Chart 9. Average of International Trade Balance in 2024 by Colonialism‍ versus Decolonialism‍, Section 3.5.6

  • Chart 10. Average of International Trade Balance in 2024 by Foreign Military Presence, Section 3.5.8

  • Chart 11. International Trade Balance in 2024: Home Countries with Foreign Military Presence with above 7 Military Bases and Installations in Host Countries, Section 3.5.8

List of Maps

  • Map 1. Global Political Power - Top 1 Import Partner: China vs USA vs Germany, Section 3.1

  • Map 2. Global Market Size - Top 1 Export Partner: USA vs China vs Germany, Section 3.1

  • Map 3. Global Political Power - China as a Top Import Partner: Top 1, Top 2, Top 3, Section 3.1

  • Map 4. Global Political Power - USA as a Top Import Partner: Top 1, Top 2, Top 3, Section 3.1

  • Map 5. Global Political Power - Germany as a Top Import Partner: Top 1, Top 2, Top 3, Section 3.1

  • Map 6. Multiple Membership in Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances by Home Country, Section 3.5.7

List of Documents

  • Document I. Article 6 on Security From the USA-Jordan Defense Cooperation Agreement about the USA’s Foreign Military Presence in Jordan, Section 1.3.2

Section 1.

Why Do We Need Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank to Monitor International Trade?

Section 1.1 International Trade: Mercantilism versus Comparative Competitive Advantages

The Trade-War that erupted by Trump following his ‘Reciprocal Tariff’ policy (Cite 1 and Cite 2) has renewed the discussion about which Prescriptive Theory of International Trade gives the right way to increase the International Trade of a country, and in particular, the exports, because the exports of the country should be higher compared to the Imports to create a Positive International Trade Balance. In my research paper titled: "Are Multinational Enterprises’ (MNEs) Theories explained the reality of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade in the 21st Century?." (Cite 3), I presented and discussed all the important International Trade theories, but If we look at these theories from the current Trade-War perspective, then there are two opposite theories that are implemented by two superpowers: The 'Mercantilism Theory' by the USA versus the 'Comparative Competitive Advantages Theory' by China (Cite 4).

The Mercantilism Theory (Cite 3 and Cite 5) gives a "recipe" on how the country should increase its wealth by maximising the Exports along with minimising the Imports, namely "to sell more to foreigners during a year than we buy from them in terms of value" (Cite 5), resulting in a Positive International Trade Balance. Thus, the Mercantilism reflects a "zero-sum game" in which increasing the wealth of one country occurs at the expense of the wealth of a second country. According to Mercantilism, there are four main ways to create a Positive International Trade Balance, as follows (Cite 3 and Cite 5): i) Providing Government Subsidies to local companies to encourage Exports, with the aim of selling the products at lower prices in host markets compared to the higher prices without government subsidies. However, many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), including those under the WTO, do not allow subsidisation, so many governments bypass this restriction by providing 'Grants' to local firms, which are de-facto Government Subsidies. ii) Imposing Import Restrictions on imported products through taxes, tariffs and quotas to ensure that the prices of imported products are less competitive compared to the prices of local products, with the aim of providing an advantage to the consumption of local products over imported products, resulting in achieving minimal imports to create a Positive International Trade Balance. iii) Limiting consumption outside the country and encouraging local savings to prevent the outflow of funds from the home country to host countries, such as the 'Exit Tax' when a person stops being a tax-resident in a country or even the 'Exit Tourism Tax' when a person travels abroad (outgoing tourism) to prevent "unnecessary" spending of local money in foreign countries. Note, outgoing tourism is considered an import, while incoming tourism is considered an export. iv) Imperialism and Colonialism, which is done by the occupation of host territories to establish Colonies to obtain cheap natural resources and low-cost production. Thereby, the sovereign state maximises the Positive International Trade Balance through colonialism by imposing the following regulations: First, Production Restrictions to gain control over the colony's production for the exclusive benefit of the home country. Second, Trade Restrictions to prevent the colonies from trading with other colonies or other countries without the involvement of the sovereign state. Third, Price Restrictions to achieve lower prices for exports when the sovereign state buys from the Colony, while higher prices for imports when the colony buys from the sovereign state. In other words, the sovereign state purchased products and raw materials from the colonies at lower prices than the real value of the products and raw materials, while the colonies purchased products and raw materials from the sovereign state at exorbitant prices, namely at higher prices than the real value of the products and raw materials. Considering that, Trump's policy of "America First" is based on the principles of the Mercantilism Theory, namely the USA tries to force UN Members or Non-UN Members via economic pressure (e.g., Canada (Cite 6) or even by military means and blockade (e.g., Greenland (Cite 7), Venezuela (Cite 8), Iran (Cite 9), Cuba (Cite 10) to become, formally or informally, colonies of the USA in order to takeover on their natural resources, mainly oil and gas. If we look at the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) (Cite 11) that the USA has with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, then these UN Members are de-facto run like Colonies of the USA, so the model of COFA represents a New-Colonialism, namely UN Members that are de-facto under the control of another sovereign state. Regardless of the New-Colonialism, the USA still has far-distance Colonies (Cite 12 and Cite 13) (e.g., Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands) that some of them even became Non-Contiguous States of the USA (e.g., Alaska (Cite 14 and Hawaii (Cite 15), with a prospect for others (e.g., Puerto Rico (Cite 16), but despite that, there are Colonies among them with an aspiration for Independence (e.g., Hawaii (Cite 15). Importantly, even the Foreign Military Presence in host countries reflects Military Imperialism and even New-Military-Colonialism. The USA has 853 Military Bases and Installations around the globe, and in some UN Member countries, the USA has countless Military Bases and Installations, such as 101 Military Bases and Installations in Japan and 75 in South Korea, which is even more than in the Colony of the USA, Guam, that has 52 Military Bases and Installations (Cite 17), so Japan and South Korea can be considered as Military-Colonies of the USA because the USA has full control over the military aspect of these UN members, including their arms trade.

However, the 'Comparative Competitive Advantages Theory' (Cite 3) is an opposite Prescriptive Theory, which is implemented by China. David Ricardo, in his book "On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" (Cite 18), argued that restrictions and barriers in relation to international trade should be removed to increase the output and efficiency at the global level. Hence, if each country creates expertise in a few fields but trades with other countries in its non-expertise fields, then it may increase the output and efficiency at the global level (Cite 3). That's based on the idea that countries differ from each other in their production efficiency and how they utilise their resources, so each country should produce a large number of products that they are able to produce more effectively, while each country should purchase products from other countries when it's less effective to produce these products locally (Cite 18). Importantly, each country should have expertise in fewer fields to create Comparative Competitive Advantages, which can be achieved by importing products from other countries even if the country can produce these products more effectively than other countries (Cite 3 and Cite 18). Hence, according to Ricardo, each country should prioritise its production by producing only products with a Comparative Competitive Advantage, which is supposed to contribute to professionalisation and specialisation. That's based on the rationale that when a country splits its resources across too many fields, it may undermine the country's expertise in some fields. In contrast, when a country focuses on only a few fields, it may increase its expertise in those fields. Hence, if we look at China, then China over the last two decades has implemented the 'Comparative Competitive Advantages Theory' of Ricardo by creating expertise in solutions of Infrastructure (e.g., Buildings, Ports, Bridges, and Transportation) and recently, China has started to create expertise in Humanoid-Robotics‍. Importantly, in contrast to the USA, China does not have any Colonies/New-Colonies nor any significant Foreign Military Presence (Only 2 bases around the globe) (Cite 17). Besides, China does not impose any restrictions on trade in the style of Trump nor sanctions against other countries or courts like the USA, such as the USA’s sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Cite 19 and Cite 20). Besides, China does not act in ‘Double-Standards’ like the USA (Cite 21) (e.g., the USA's complexity in the Israeli Genocide in Gaza (Cite 22)) nor as the ‘World Military Police’ like the USA (Cite 21), such as the recent USA-Israel attack against Iran due to peaceful nuclear (Cite 23), while the USA does not attack other countries despite that they have nuclear weapons (e.g., Pakistan, India, North Korea and more) (Cite 24 and Cite 25), and recently, Trump even decided to let Saudi Arabia, the neighbouring country of Iran, to have peaceful nuclear if Saudi Arabia agrees to recognise the State of Israel without demanding from Israel before the recognition to end the occupation of Palestine and the Genocide in Gaza and the ethnic cleansing in the West Bank (Cite 26).

Clearly, the USA and China have a dramatic gap in their foreign policies, which significantly affects their international trade. As I mentioned in my Comment from the Risks Timeline titled: " ’Democracy Police’ Under ´Double Standards’: Bad for Preserving USA Superpower" (07 October 2022, Cite 21), "China treats its allies like customers, so from the marketing perspective, China cares about the potential ´sale´ (FDI and export) to their allies and about their ability to ´pay´ (payments and loans). Russia, on the contrary to China, treats its allies like 'fathers and sons', so it is loyal relations in the long-run. However, the USA is a different story. The USA engaged actively in regime transformation into democracy while punishing regimes via sanctions if the regime stopped acting like a democracy, so from the marketing perspective, punishment never helps to preserve customers or to get new customers. Nevertheless, the USA less punishes Western strategic allies for democracy problems, like in the case of Israel, which is perceived as ´double standards, regardless of the democratic problems in the USA due to Trump's behaviour and policy, so paradoxically, the USA pushed many countries into the hands of its ´competitors´, Russia and China, thereby, for many countries, Russia and China are more attractive than the USA". This was reflected in the vote of the UN Resolution on the New International Economic Order (In Favour-123, Against-40, Abstain-1) (Cite 27), so this vote gives a clear indication that most of the countries worldwide (123 countries) would like to replace the economic dominance of the USA with other alternatives, while only 40 countries would like to preserve the economic dominance of the USA. Even the vote of the UN resolution on Decolonialism‍ reflected the split between the ‘Old Order-Mercantilism’ versus the ‘New Order-Decolonialism‍’ (Cite 28), namely 113 countries voted in-favour of Decolonialism‍, while 63 countries voted Abstain (Cite 29), but in this vote, the Abstain can be considered as a ‘Soft-Against’, because the Against may be seen as ‘not politically correct'. Keep in mind that worldwide there are still 55 Colonies under 11 sovereign states, including the USA (Cite 13).

Section 1.2 Top Export/Import Partner of a Country versus Global Top Export/Import Partner of Many Countries

In the light of the above, it is crucial to understand which policy – 'Mercantilism' by the USA or 'Comparative Competitive Advantages' by China – has more success in the real world. However, if we look at the current institutions that monitor the International Trade, then it is difficult to get an answer for this question, because all of them are looking at the following main indicators at the country level, such as the total annual Exports/Imports, the International Trade Balance, and the Top Partners of Export/Import that each country has. However, this kind of monitoring can not reveal which country is more powerful in International Trade compared to other countries because it did not take into account in how many countries the home country is the Top Partner compared to other countries, either in Export or in Import. In other words, as shown in Chart A, there is a significant difference between being a Top Export/Import Partner of a certain country versus being a Global Top Export/Import Partner of many countries. Today, all the institutions that are monitoring International trade (e.g., UNCTAD) are looking only at the Top Export/Import Partner of a certain country and not at who the Global Top export/import partners of many countries are.

Chart A. Global Top Export/Import Partner versus Top Export/Import Partner: Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank

Importantly, there is a big difference between being a Global Top Export Partner versus being a Global Top Import Partner, because it impacts differently the economic growth and the job creation (Cite 30 and Cite 31). Keep in mind that there is a correlation between the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade on the Labour Market, because many Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) relocated their production plants to low-cost countries, with the aim of exporting the products to third countries, yet the attractiveness of the 'Location Factors' of the Host Country determines the scope of the ‘FDI Inward with Export Target’ (Look for of the Eclectic Paradigm of Dunning in Cite 3). Importantly, paradoxically, from the Global Top Partner perspective, many institutions (e.g., UNCTAD) present in their reports only the Top Export Partners and not the Top Import Partners, despite that the Top Export Partners are less important compared to the Top Import Partners, because, as shown in Chart A, if a country is the Top Export Partner of many countries, then it means that the country imports a lot of goods to many countries, while if a country is the Top Import Partner of many countries, then it means that the country exports a lot of goods to many countries. Thus, if we would like to know which country exports goods to the maximum number of countries as their Top Partner, then we should look at the Top Import Partner, rather than at the Top Export Partner. However, keep in mind that there is a difference between a country that has the biggest amount of exports in a certain year but exports only to a few countries versus a country that exports its goods to the maximum number of countries as their Top Import Partner. Nevertheless, if we look at the real data, then usually, there is a correlation between a country that has the biggest Export/Import annual amount and being a Global Top Import/Export Partner, as shown in Table A that presents the cases of China, the USA, and Germany regarding the Volume of Exports/Imports in 2024 relative to the Global Top Export/Import Partners in 2024.

Table A. Total of Exports/Imports in 2024 relative to Global Top Export/Import Partners in 2024: China, USA, and Germany

Section 1.3 Conceptual Research Model of ‘Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher’

In light of the outlined above, I developed two new ranks – Global Market Size Rank versus Global Political Power Rank – to fill the gaps that were presented in the previous section, as shown in Chart B that presented the Conceptual Research Model of ‘Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher’, as discussed below.

Chart B. Conceptual Research Model of ‘Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher’

Section 1.3.1 Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank

The Market size can be assessed by two crucial indicators: Population Size versus GDP per Capita, as illustrated in Table B that presents the Population versus GDP per Capita relative to the International Trade Balance in the cases of China vs India (Big population with a Mid-GDP per Capita), Germany vs USA (Big population with a High GDP per capita), Liechtenstein vs San Marino (Very Small population with a High GDP per Capita), and Eritrea vs Central African Republic (Small Population with a very Low GDP per Capita). The Population Size signals about the market in terms of quantity, namely if the country is a big one (e.g., China and India are around 1.5 Trillion People) or a small one (e.g., Liechtenstein and San Marino are around 30-40K People), namely if the country has a lot of potential customers and a lot of workers, or vice versa, if the country has limited potential customers and limited workers. However, the GDP per Capita signals about the market in terms of quality, namely if the country has rich customers (e.g., Liechtenstein: 179,400 USD) or, vice versa, poor customers (e.g., Central African Republic: 1,263 USD). Nevertheless, the GDP per Capita also reflects the 'Labour Cost', so countries with a 'Low Labor Cost' usually attract ‘Exported International Production’, namely establishment of Production Sites in the country to export the products to third countries (e.g., China), which positively impacts the ‘Labour Market’ and the Exports, while a 'High Labor Cost' usually leads to the Relocation of Production Sites to Low-Cost Countries, which negatively impacts the 'Labour Market' and the Exports (see Cite 30). Nevertheless, the 'Comparative Competitive Advantages of the country' allow maintaining a high volume of exports even if the country has a 'High Labour Cost' (e.g., Germany), while a 'Low Labour Cost' without sufficient Competitive Advantages unlikely leads to a high volume of Exports (e.g., India). On the contrary, a high GDP per Capita attracts a high volume of Imports, but without sufficient Competitive Advantages for promoting exports, it will lead to a Negative International Trade Balance (e.g., USA), while even a very low GDP per Capita does not promise a Positive International Trade Balance (e.g., Central African Republic) unless the country has sufficient Competitive Advantages (e.g., Eritrea). To summarise, the Comparative Competitive Advantages of the country indicate if the country has the ability to create a Positive International Trade Balance, such as China vs India that both of them have a Big population with Mid-GDP per Capita, but despite it, China has a positive trade, while India has a negative trade. Or Germany vs the USA that both of them have a Big population with a High GDP per Capita, but despite it, Germany has a positive trade, while the USA has a negative trade. Or Liechtenstein vs San Marino that both of them have a Very Small population with a High GDP per Capita, but despite it, Liechtenstein has a positive trade, while San Marino has a negative trade. Or Eritrea vs the Central African Republic that both of them have a Small Population with a very Low GDP per Capita, but despite it, Eritrea has a positive trade, while the Central African Republic has a negative trade.

Table B. Population versus GDP per capita relative to International Trade Balance: The cases of China vs India, Germany vs USA, Liechtenstein vs San Marino, and Eritrea vs Central African Republic

Considering the above, the Global Political Power Rank indicates which countries have the most Comparative Competitive Advantages at the global level, namely which countries are the Global Top Import Partners, while the Global Market Size Rank indicates which countries have the biggest market size in terms of Population and/or GDP per Capita. Therefore, the Global Political Power Rank looks at how many countries the home country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, while the Global Market Size Rank looks at how many countries the home country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner. However, each rank takes into account that being the Top 1 Export/Import Partner is more important than being the Top 2 Export/Import Partner, while being the Top 2 Export/Import Partner is more important than being the Top 3 Export/Import Partner, so each rank is based on a Weight Average that gives 50% for Top 1 Export/Import Partner, 35% for the Top 2 Export/Import Partner, and 15% for the Top 3 Export/Import Partner.

Section 1.3.2 Geopolitical Factors:

Region, Religion, Sovereignty Status, Limited International Recognition, New International Economic Order, Decolonialism‍, Multilateral Alliances, Foreign Military Presence, Sanctions, Involvement in Wars

As shown in Chart B, the Conceptual Research Model includes ten Geopolitical Factors that each of them can impact the international trade of the country, either in a positive way or in a negative way. In other words, regardless of the Market Size and the Comparative Competitive Advantages of a country, the Conceptual Research Model assumes that each Geopolitical Factor can impact the direction of the International Trade Balance, namely each Geopolitical Factor can lead to a Positive International Trade Balance or, vice versa, to a Negative International Trade Balance. It also assumes that each Geopolitical Factor can determine whether the country will be a Global Top Partner or not. Hence, this section discusses how each Geopolitical Factor impacts the International Trade, as follows:

  • Region. The region can affect international trade, especially in cases where the country/colony is located in remote areas, and, in particular, when the country/colony is located on isolated islands, mainly because of the transportation costs, regardless of the high risk of reaching isolated islands when a war erupts, which makes the sea routes unsafe. For example, the region of Oceania (Cite 32) may attract less International Trade compared to Europe due to thetransportation costs, while a problematic region, such as the Middle East (Cite 33), may affect negatively the International trade due to the repeated wars in the region, especially during long wars that hinder the exports of goods, oil, and gas.

  • Religion. The Main Religion (e.g., Christianity vs. Islam) affects how the country runs (Look for Religious Regime in Cite 40), who the allies of the country are, and to which alliances, blocs, and coalitions the country belongs, which affects the International Trade. Importantly, the Main Religious Denomination (e.g., Catholic vs. Protestant or Sunni vs. Shia) plays an important role in the national culture, which impacts the country at the economic and political levels, including the attitude towards trade and conflicts. For example, Protestantism encourages 'Hard-work' and Capitalism (Cite 34), which may positively affect International Trade, while Hinduism encourages spirituality over materialism (Cite 35), which may negatively affect International Trade. However, the ‘Religion Distance’ (Cite 41) also affects the International Trade, especially when there exists a significant gap in the values and in the ways of life, such as the gap in the lifestyle between Christianity and Islam.

  • Sovereignty Status. The Sovereignty Status affects significantly the International Trade because of the big difference between a UN member versus a Colony regarding their ability to conduct Exports/Imports freely, namely a Colony acts under the regulations of its sovereign state when it conducts international trade, while a UN member has no such limitation like a Colony. Even a Disputed Country that runs under diplomatic disputes (e.g., Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cite 66) or, worse, under military conflicts (e.g., North Yemen (Sanaa) Cite 36) has limitations in conducting International Trade.

  • Limited International Recognition. Limited International Recognition refers to the situation when UN members or UN Observer States do not have recognition from all the UN members due to ongoing conflicts (Cite 63). However, it also refers to the International Recognition of Disputed Countries (Cite 64) in terms of how many UN members or Non-UN members already formally recognised the Self-Declaration of Independence that was made by the Disputed Country (Cite 65), which signals if the Disputed Country has the prospect of becoming an independent country by getting the status of UN Membership or, vice versa, if the dispute between the Disputed country and the sovereign state that claims sovereignty over the territory is going to drag on for a long period. Considering the above, limited International Recognition negatively affects International Trade because it reduces the opportunities for Exports and Imports because those countries that do not recognise a country usually ban the International Trade with the unrecognised country.

  • Attitude towards the New International Economic Order. The UN Resolution on the New International Economic Order that was brought to a vote by Russia on 14 December 2022 splits the world into two camps: those countries that would like to preserve the economic dominance of the USA or, vice versa, those countries that would like to replace the economic dominance of the USA with other alternatives (Cite 27), which particularly affects the International Trade of the Superpowers: China, the USA, and Russia, and even their big Allies, such as the UK, either positively or negatively.

  • Attitude towards Decolonialism. The UN Resolution on Decolonialism by granting Independence to Colonies also splits the world into two camps: those countries that would like to preserve the Colonies or, vice versa, those countries that would like to abolish the colonies by granting Independence to the remaining Colonies (Cite 2). This split reflects the transformation from the old era of Colonialism/New Colonialism into the new global order that opposes Colonialism, which impacts significantly the International Trade, such as the transformation in Africa that led, for example, to the ending of the French Military Presence in several African countries (Cite 38) and even to cutting the diplomatic relations with France as recently done by Burkina Faso (Cite 39).

  • Multilateral Trade Alliances (Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)) and Multilateral Military Alliances. Traditionally, Multilateral Alliances include dedicated types of alliances, such as Military alliances (e.g., NATO), Trade Alliances (FTAs) (e.g., Mercosur), and Political Alliances (e.g., OIC) (Cite 42). However, over the years, the Multilateral alliances have evolved into complex alliances that combine multiple activities, such as Trade, Politics, and Economics and even Military aspects, such as the GCC and the African Union (AU). Importantly, in the last two decades, too many Trade alliances based on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (Cite 43) were established, so too many countries became members of several Trade alliances in parallel, such as Russia that is a member in a few Multilateral Trade Alliances, such as SCO, BRICS, CIS, OPEC+, and EAEU. Hence, Membership in Multilateral Trade Alliances (Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)) is supposed to affect positively and in a significant way the International Trade of the country because FTAs are supposed to eliminate the import tariffs or to reduce them significantly, which gives advantages to countries that are members in certain FTAs over countries that are not members in these FTAs (Cite 43). Even membership in Multilateral Military Alliances (e.g., NATO and CSTO) is supposed to contribute to International Trade, but mainly in relation to the export of Arms.

  • Foreign Military Presence in Host Countries. Foreign Military Presence has advantages and disadvantages from the military perspective (Cite 44), but from the international trade perspective, it may lead to more risks, especially if the host country is involved in an unintentional war, as happened to the GCC countries when the USA attacked Iran from their territories, which paralysed their airports and ports during the war (Cite 45), resulting in heavy losses in terms of exports and tourism (Cite 46), regardless of the civil damages to the GCC countries due to the counter-missile attacks from Iran alongside the self-damages from the intercepts (Cite 47). Importantly, Foreign Military Presence does not promise any commitment to defend in the case of an attack like what exists in a Military Defence Treaty (Cite 44). Thereby, the agreement between the USA and Jordan about the USA’s bases in Jordan is a good example of this, namely not only that the USA have no commitment to defend Jordan in the case of an attack, but the opposite, Jordan should defend the USA’s personnel and installations in Jordan (Clause 1 in Document I below), and Jordan is even primarily responsible for the security in Jordan outside the USA’s facilities (Clause 4 in Document I below), so paradoxically, the USA has no any commitment to defend Jordan in the case of an attack against Jordan or even in the case of a counter-attack against Jordan following the USA’s attack against a third country from the USA's bases and installations in Jordan, as happened recently when Iran conducted counter-attacks against the USA's bases and installations in Jordan that the USA used them to carry out attacks against Iran, such as the Iranian counter-attack against the USA’s bases in Jordan (Cite 48) or even the Iranian counter-attack against Aqaba airport in Jordan that was used by the USA to carry out attacks against Iran (Cite 49). Considering the above, Foreign Military Presence may impact negatively the International Trade of the Host Country, especially if the military bases were used in wars in the past or even in cases where there is a risk for using the military bases in a war in the near future (Cite 50). However, even ‘Military Imperialism’ that used for military interventions may impact negatively the International Trade of the Home Country, because it lead to Enmity and Antagonism, especially if it comes with ‘Double-Standards’, as in the case of the USA (Cite 21 and Cite 22). Keep in mind that at the end of the day, every person around the world makes the decision about which imported product to buy and not their government, so wars, especially those based on double standards, can negatively impact personal decision-making. In other words, the buying decision of any individual worldwide may be influenced by acts of War Crimes, which may result in choosing imported products from countries that do not conduct War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing, and Genocide, or even have complicity with them.

Document I. Article 6 on Security From the USA-Jordan Defense Cooperation Agreement about the USA’s Foreign Military Presence in Jordan

  • Sanctions. Sanctions serve as a tool to punish countries that violate International Law and the UN Charter, yet unclear its effectiveness (Cite 51), especially due to the Global Mechanism of Middle Trade Brokers (Cite 52). However, over the last two decades, it has been used as a political tool against non-allies (e.g., Against Russia (Cite 53), especially by the USA Coalition (Cite 54), while the USA Coalition has refrained from imposing sanctions against allies, as in the case of Israel, despite that Israel clearly has violated the International Law and the UN Charter, which has been perceived as Double-Standards (Cite 55). Worse, the USA even forces other countries to join the sanctions against other countries under a threat of 'Trade Punishment with the USA' if the country won't join the sanctions, which has led to the creation of a mechanism of 'Bypassing sanctions', including refraining from doing International Trade with the USA by many MNEs, especially from non-USA allied countries, with the aim of continuing to do trade with countries under sanctions (Cite 56). Much worse, over the last decade, the Sanctions tool has become a farce. First, the over-using of the Sanctions tool by the USA (Cite 57) makes it ineffective, especially when the USA has started to use it as a symbolic tool. Second, the USA has started to impose sanctions to obstruct justice (Cite 58), such as the USA's sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to the arrest warrant against Netanyahu (Cite 59) or the USA's sanctions against UN employees, such as the sanctions against the UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese because she wrote unfavourable reports about the Israeli Genocide in Gaza (Cite 60). Third, the recent farce of the 'Retired Syrian Terrorists' makes the USA's sanctions irrelevant because the USA removed the 'Retired Syrian Terrorists' from the list of sanctions and from the list of Terrorists only because they became allies of the USA (Cite 61 and Cite 62), while recently, the USA started to add to the list of sanctions/terrorists 'everyone' that are not allies of the USA, despite that they are not Terrorists, as in the case of the Palestinians that are fighting against Israeli occupation and the Israeli Genocide, like the Ukrainians that are fighting against the Russian occupation yet not suffering from Genocide, but despite it, for the USA, the Palestinians are Terrorists and the Ukrainians are not, which has been perceived as Double-Standards (Cite 55). Considering the above, sanctions are supposed to impact negatively the International Trade of the country, but paradoxically, the sanctions not only may disrupt the international Trade among countries that sanctions are imposed against them, but the sanctions also may disrupt the international Trade among the countries that imposed sanctions against others. Therefore, it can be argued that if a country is involved in sanctions, then the sanctions may negatively affect the International Trade of the country, either if the sanctions are imposed against the country or if the sanctions are imposed by the country against other countries, still, the negative effect will be strong if the sanctions are perceived as Double-Standards.

  • Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts. The most crucial Geopolitical factor is 'Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts', because it has the most significant negative impact on international trade. Countries, institutions, and MNEs consider countries that are involved in wars as unstable places for doing business, but it even negatively influences the decision-making of individuals when they choose a product to buy, especially if the country is involved in Occupations, War-crimes, Ethnic cleansing, Crimes against Humanity, Starvation, and Genocide, which reduce significantly the export of the country due to the avoidance of imports from the warmonger country by governments, institutions, MNEs, and individuals worldwide, either formally via sanctions, embargo, and ban or informally. Importantly, the negative attitude towards warmonger countries may stay even several years after the end of the war, which may impact International Trade in the long-run. Even long occupations and annexations that violate International Law and the UN charter can deteriorate the International Trade of the country, especially if it is involved with war crimes and Genocide, as happened to Israel due to the occupation of Palestine when many countries and organisations worldwide have banned the trading with Israel, formally and informally (Cite 37 and Cite 67).

Section 1.3.3 Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

As shown in Chart B, the Conceptual Research Model includes the Global Survival Rank (GSR) (Cite 68) that can influence the direction of how the two Geopolitical factors – Sanctions and Involvement in wars – may affect International Trade, either positively or negatively. In other words, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) can serve as a moderator for the impact of the Sanctions and Involvement in wars on International Trade, namely a low rank of GSR (Cite 69) can reduce the negative impact of sanctions and Involvement in wars on the International Trade Balance, as discussed below.

  • Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator for Sanctions. The Global Survival Rank (GSR) can give an additional layer about the ability of the country to maintain a Positive International Trade Balance under Sanctions (Cites 51-54). In other words, strong countries with a Low rank of GSR may have the ability to deal with sanctions while maintaining a Positive International Trade Balance, while weaker countries may experience a Negative International Trade Balance due to sanctions. However, paradoxically, sanctions can lead not only to a Negative International Trade Balance among countries that sanctions imposed against them but also among countries that imposed sanctions against other countries, especially if they were previously dependent on trade with the countries that were sanctioned.

  • Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator for 'Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts'. The Global Survival Rank (GSR) provides important information about the country's ability to function during wars at all levels (Cite 63), including at the economic Level (Cite 70), which covers the International Trade level. Therefore, strong countries with a Low rank of GSR have the ability to function economically under wars without getting into a Negative International Trade Balance, while less powerful countries may fall into the trap of a Negative International Trade Balance because of wars, such as in the case of Russia vs Ukraine, as shown in Table C. that presents the Indicators (R1-R7) of Global Survival Rank (GSR) of Russia vs Ukraine during the years 2023-2025 (Cite 70), namely paradoxically, Russia’s GDP increased from 1,779 Billion in 2023 to 2,021 Billion in 2025, despite that Russia was at war under unprecedented sanctions (Cite 54), while Ukraine’s GDP reduced from 200 Billion in 2023 to 179 Billion in 2025, despite the unprecedented military Aid and Civil Aid that Ukraine got from the USA Coalition (€309 billion from at least 41 countries, updated August 2025, Cite 71), which can be explained by Russia’s High rank of GSR (3) versus the Ukraine’s lower rank of GSR compared to Russia that even negatively changed from 31 in 2023 to 33 in 2025. Therefore, the Global Survival Rank (GSR) gives an important indication about the ability of the country to carry out International Trade during Wars and even to stay in a Positive International Trade Balance if the country has a low rank of GSR, such as in the case of Russia vs Ukraine as shown in Chart C. that compares Russia vs Ukraine regarding their International Trade Balance for the Years 2020-2024. Chart C not only confirms the assumption that Russia will succeed in keeping a Positive International Trade Balance during wars due to the low rank of GSR, but it also shows that despite the unprecedented sanctions, Russia even succeeds in increasing its trade balance from 2023 to 2024 during the long war with Ukraine, while Ukraine, despite the unprecedented Aid, its Negative International Trade Balance increased significantly after the start of the war, namely from -4.8 Billion in 2021 to 11.2 Billion in 2022, 27.5 Billion in 2023, and 30.1 Billion in 2024, so in 2024, Ukraine even gets into the Top 20 of the countries with a Negative International Trade Balance ‍(see Chart 1 in the Result Section). ‍

Table C. Comparison of Russia vs Ukraine: Indicators (R1-R7) of Global Survival Rank (GSR), GSR 2023 - GSR 2025

Chart C. Comparison of Russia vs Ukraine: International Trade Balance in USD for the Years 2020-2024

Section 2. Methodology

Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher for the Year 2024 includes four sets of Variables: Home Country Characteristics as Independent Variables (Section 2.1), International Trade as Dependent Variables (Section 2.2), Geopolitical Factors as Moderating Variables (Section 2.3), and the Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderating variable for two Geopolitical factors: Sanctions and Involvement in Wars (Section 2.4). Thereby, Table D presents all the indicators included in the Monitoring International Trade for the Year 2024 by each table included in the Results section, which makes it possible to know which indicators are included in each Result Table.

Table D. All indicators included in the Results Tables 1-26: Each Indicator by Each Table

Section 2.1 Home Country Characteristics as Independent Variables

  • Home Country: UN Members and Non-UN Members. The Monitoring International Trade for the Year 2024 includes all UN Members and all Non-UN Members included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) (Cite 72), so the Home Country indicator refers to either a UN Member or a Non-UN Member. More specifically, the Home Country refers to all the types of Sovereignty Status namely, UN Members, UN Observer States, Disputed Countries, Colonies, and Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of China (Cite 73). However, in the case of a Colony, the name of the Colony also includes the name of the Sovereign State, such as Gibraltar, UK. It is important to note that certain Sovereign States maintain distinct data for their colonies, while others incorporate the colonies into their overall data, so in cases of integrated data, the data on the Colony is often classified as 'Missing Data'. Therefore, please look at Section 5. Methodology Notes to get full details about the data of each UN member and Non-UN Member.

  • GSR Serial Number of Global Survival Rank (GSR) for GSR Indicators for the Years 2023-2025: Population, GDP, Technology Level, Energy Security (Oil and Gas Reserves), and Food Security. All the results tables that were included in the Monitoring International Trade include the GSR Serial Number in order to look for more Home Country Characteristics in the Global Survival Rank (GSR). More specifically, each country or colony included in the Global Survival Rank (GSR) by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher is assigned with a GSR serial number that remains the same in all subsequent years, so any particular country can be tracked by using its GSR serial number across different years of the Global Survival Rank (GSR) (Cite 76). Thereby, the GSR Serial Number allows ‍finding any Country/Colony/Territory in the Global Survival Rank (GSR) to see the Indicators (R1-R7) of Global Survival Rank (Cite 68, Cite 74, and Cite 75), as follows: Area Size (R1), Population and Army Size (R2), Domestic Economic Activity (GDP) and Ability of Military Expenditure in Long Wars (R3), Technology Level (R4a), Natural Gas-Proved Reserves (R5), Oil-Proved Reserves (R6), and Food Security (R7).

  • Total Population in 2024. The Population was tested via the World Bank's Indicator of Total Population in 2024 or the latest available. The Total Population refers to all residents in a country, regardless of legal status or citizenship, and it is based on midyear estimates. However, the database of CityPopulation was used for Colonies and Disputed Countries that are not included in the database of the World Bank, which was retrieved in March-April 2026.

  • GDP per Capita in 2024. The GDP per Capita was tested via the World Bank's Indicator of GDP per Capita (current international $US) in 2024 or the latest available, while missing data in the World Bank was retrieved from TerraVisor.Com for the year 2024; All sources were retrieved in March-April 2026.

  • Colonies: Distance from Colony to Sovereign State. Long distance from a colony to its Sovereign State poses a High Risk during wars, but it also poses challenges regarding International Trade because most of the Colonies today are located on isolated islands, so taking care even of their Food and Energy involves high costs and can be a risky task when the Sea Routes are blocked or not safe (Cite 77 and Cite 78), such as what happened during the recent USA-Israel War against Iran. The Distance Risk from a Colony to its Sovereign State is tested via the indicator of the 'Straight Line Distance on the Global Map' from capital to capital in Km.

Section 2.2 International Trade as Dependent Variables

The data on International Trade refers to the year 2024. Notably, there is always a gap between the published year and the most recent year of data provided by international bodies, so, for example, so, for example, in 2026, the World Bank and the UNCTAD published data on International Trade that refer to the year 2024.

Export Indicators

  • Total Exports in 2024 by Home Country. This indicator was tested using the World Bank's Indicator for the Total of Export of Goods in current US$ for the year 2024. A Methodology Note was given in Table I where data were based on additional sources, while N/A was indicated in case of Missing Data. All sources were retrieved in June 2026.

  • Top 1 Export Partner of the Home Country in 2024. Each home country has many Export Partners, but this indicator refers to the Top 1 Export Partner of the Home Country in 2024. This Indicator was retrieved from the database of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). A Methodology Note was given in Table I where data were based on additional sources, while N/A was indicated in case of Missing Data. All sources were retrieved in June 2026.

  • Top 2 Export Partner of the Home Country in 2024. Each home country has many Export Partners, but this indicator refers to the Top 2 Export Partner of the Home Country in 2024. This Indicator was retrieved from the database of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). A Methodology Note was given in Table I where data were based on additional sources, while N/A was indicated in case of Missing Data. All sources were retrieved in June 2026.

  • Top 3 Export Partner of the Home Country in 2024. Each home country has many Export Partners, but this indicator refers to the Top 3 Export Partner of the Home Country in 2024. This Indicator was retrieved from the database of UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). A Methodology Note was given in Table I where data were based on additional sources, while N/A was indicated in case of Missing Data. All sources were retrieved in June 2026.

  • Global Top 1 Export Partner among Host Countries in 2024. This indicator is based on the calculation of the total number of the Host Countries where the Home Country is the Top 1 Export Partner in 2024. In other words, this indicator looks at how many countries the home country is the Top 1 Export Partner in 2024, as shown in Table 9.

  • Global Top 2 Export Partner among Host Countries in 2024. This indicator is based on the calculation of the total number of the Host Countries where the Home Country is the Top 2 Export Partner in 2024. In other words, this indicator looks at how many countries the home country is the Top 2 Export Partner in 2024, as shown in Table 9.

  • Global Top 3 Export Partner among Host Countries in 2024. This indicator is based on the calculation of the total number of the Host Countries where the Home Country is the Top 3 Export Partner in 2024. In other words, this indicator looks at how many countries the home country is the Top 3 Export Partner in 2024, as shown in Table 9.

  • Total Number of Global Top 1 & Top 2 & Top 3 Export Partners among Host Countries in 2024. This indicator is based on the calculation of the total number of the Host Countries where the Home Country is the Top 1 Export Partner or Top 2 Export Partner or Top 3 Export Partner. In other words, this indicator looks at how many countries in total the home country is the Top 1 Export Partner or Top 2 Export Partner or Top 3 Export Partner.

  • Global Market Size Rank in 2024 - Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Exports in 2024: Top 1*50%+Top 2*35%+Top 3*15%. The indicator of the ‘Total Number of Global Top 1 & Top 2 & Top 3 Export Partners’ (see above) does not take into account the difference between being the Global Top 1 Export Partner versus being the Global Top 2 Export Partner versus being the Global Top 3 Export Partner, but it simply calculated the total of all of them. Considering that, the Global Political Power Rank takes into account that there is a difference between being a Global Top 1 and being a Global Top 2 and being a Global Top 3, so based on that, this indicator refers to the ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Exports’ based on the following equation: Top 1*50%+Top 2*35%+Top 3*15%.

  • Global Market Size Rank in 2024. The Global Market Size Rank is based on the ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Exports’ (see above) in a way that a lower rank indicates a country with the highest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Exports’, while a higher rank indicates a country with the lowest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Exports’. For example, the USA has the highest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’ in 2024 = 35.10, so its Global Political Power Rank in 2024 = 1, while Albania is among the countries that have a ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’ in 2024 = 0.00, so its Global Market Size Rank in 2024 = 41, the lowest rank in 2024. ‍

Import Indicators

  • Total Imports in 2024 by Home Country. This indicator was tested using the World Bank's Indicator for the Total of Import of Goods in current US$ for the year 2024. A Methodology Note was given in Table I where data were based on additional sources, while N/A was indicated in case of Missing Data. All sources were retrieved in June 2026.

  • Top 1 Import Partner of the Home Country in 2024. Each home country has many Import Partners, but this indicator refers to the Top 1 Import Partner of the Home Country in 2024. This Indicator was retrieved from the database of UN Comtrade, either when the Home Country is the Reporter or based on the Partners' Reports. A Methodology Note was given in Table I where data were based on additional sources, while N/A was indicated in case of Missing Data. All sources were retrieved in June 2026.

  • Top 2 Import Partner of the Home Country in 2024. Each home country has many Import Partners, but this indicator refers to the Top 2 Import Partner of the Home Country in 2024. This Indicator was retrieved from the database of UN Comtrade, either when the Home Country is the Reporter or based on the Partners' Reports. A Methodology Note was given in Table I where data were based on additional sources, while N/A was indicated in case of Missing Data. All sources were retrieved in June 2026.

  • Top 3 Import Partner of the Home Country in 2024. Each home country has many Import Partners, but this indicator refers to the Top 3 Import Partner of the Home Country in 2024. This Indicator was retrieved from the database of UN Comtrade, either when the Home Country is the Reporter or based on the Partners' Reports. A Methodology Note was given in Table I where data were based on additional sources, while N/A was indicated in case of Missing Data. All sources were retrieved in June 2026.

  • Global Top 1 Import Partner among Host Countries in 2024. This indicator is based on the calculation of the total number of the Host Countries where the Home Country is the Top 1 Import Partner in 2024. In other words, this indicator looks at how many countries the home country is the Top 1 Import Partner in 2024, as shown in Table 7.

  • Global Top 2 Import Partner among Host Countries in 2024. This indicator is based on the calculation of the total number of the Host Countries where the Home Country is the Top 2 Import Partner in 2024. In other words, this indicator looks at how many countries the home country is the Top 2 Import Partner in 2024, as shown in Table 7.

  • Global Top 3 Import Partner among Host Countries in 2024. This indicator is based on the calculation of the total number of the Host Countries where the Home Country is the Top 3 Import Partner in 2024. In other words, this indicator looks at how many countries the home country is the Top 3 Import Partner in 2024, as shown in Table 7.

  • Total Number of Global Top 1 & Top 2 & Top 3 Import Partners among Host Countries in 2024. This indicator is based on the calculation of the total number of the Host Countries where the Home Country is the Top 1 Import Partner or Top 2 Import Partner or Top 3 Import Partner. In other words, this indicator looks at how many countries in total the home country is the Top 1 Import Partner or Top 2 Import Partner or Top 3 Import Partner.

  • Global Political Power Rank in 2024 - Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports in 2024: Top 1*50%+Top 2*35%+Top 3*15%. The indicator of the ‘Total Number of Global Top 1 & Top 2 & Top 3 Import Partners’ (see above) does not take into account the difference between the Global Top 1 Import Partner versus the Global Top 2 Import Partner versus the Global Top 3 Import Partner, but it simply calculated the total of all of them. Considering that, the Global Political Power Rank takes into account that there is a difference between being a Global Top 1 and being a Global Top 2 or being a Global Top 3, so based on that, this indicator refers to the ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’ based on the following equation: Top 1*50%+Top 2*35%+Top 3*15%.

  • Global Political Power Rank in 2024. The Global Political Power Rank is based on the ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’ (see above) in a way that a lower rank indicates a country with the highest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’, while a higher rank indicates a country with the lowest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’. For example, China has the highest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’ in 2024 = 66.60, so its Global Political Power Rank in 2024 = 1, while Nepal is among the countries that have a ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’ in 2024 = 0.00, so its Global Political Power Rank in 2024 = 36, the lowest rank in 2024. ‍

  • Global Market Size Rank in 2024. The Global Market Size Rank is based on the ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Exports’ (see above) in a way that a lower rank indicates a country with the highest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Exports’, while a higher rank indicates a country with the lowest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Exports’. For example, the USA has the highest ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’ in 2024 = 35.10, so its Global Political Power Rank in 2024 = 1, while Albania is among the countries that have a ‘Weighted Average of Global Top Partners of Imports’ in 2024 = 0.00, so its Global Market Size Rank in 2024 = 41, the lowest rank in 2024. ‍

International Trade Balance Indicators

  • International Trade Balance in 2024 by the Home Country. The International Trade Balance is based on the rationale that the exports of the country should be higher compared to the Imports of the country, so this indicator is based on the calculation of the total Exports in 2024 minus the total Imports in 2024. Hence, a Positive International Trade Balance indicates that the country has healthy International Trade, while a Negative International Trade Balance indicates that the country has some problems with International Trade.

  • Global Rank of the International Trade Balance in 2024. The Global Rank of International Trade Balance in 2024 is based on the ‘International Trade Balance in 2024’ (see above) in a way that the highest rank indicates a country with the highest Positive International Trade Balance, while the lowest rank indicates a country with the highest Negative International Trade Balance, which allows comparing the International Trade Balance among all UN members and Non-UN members.

Section 2.3 Geopolitical Factors as Moderating Variables:

Region, Religion, Sovereignty Status, Limited International Recognition, New International Economic Order, Decolonialism‍, Multilateral Alliances, Foreign Military Presence, Sanctions, Involvement in Wars

  • Region. This indicator includes eight Sub-Regions that reflect the current geopolitics and global order, as follows (by a-b): Africa (excluding North Africa), East-South Asia, Europe-East Oriented and Central Asia, Europe-West Oriented, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle-East and North Africa, North America, and Oceania.

  • Religion. The religion was tested by two indicators, which both were retrieved in April 2025 from The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), as follows:

    • Main Religion. This indicator refers to the Main Religion (Relative Majority %) that exists in the country, such as Christianity versus Islam.

    • Main Religious Denomination. This indicator refers to the Main Religious Denomination of the Main Religion (Relative Majority %) that exists in the country, such as (Christianity-Catholic vs Christianity-Protestant or Islam-Sunni vs Islam-Shia). In other words, we first look at which religion is the main religion and, after that, which is the Main Religious Denomination among the main religion. For example, if Islam is the main religion in a country, then we look at which is the Main Religious Denomination in the country, namely, Islam-Sunni or Islam-Shia, while if Christianity is the main religion in a country, then we look at which is the Main Religious Denomination in the country, namely, Catholic vs Protestant vs Orthodox.

  • Sovereignty Status. This indicator includes four types of Sovereignty Status, which were retrieved from various sources in April 2026, as follows:

    • UN Members and UN Observer States. A UN Member refers to an Independent Country that has Full Membership in the United Nations (UN). Membership in the UN gives a clear indication that a country has Sovereignty over a certain territory at the Formal Level. However, a status of UN Observer State signals that the Disputed Country already has enough International Recognition to be in the process of becoming an Independent Country, such as in the case of Palestine that has the status of a UN Observer State because it already has International Recognition from around 150 UN Members and Non-UN members, while Kosovo still does not have the status of a UN Observer State like Palestine because only 111 UN Members and Non-UN members recognised the Self-Declaration of Independent Country (Cite 65).

    • Disputed Countries. A Disputed Country refers to a country that proclaims a Self-Declaration of Independent Country, including running its territory as an independent country. However, a Disputed Country lacks the status of a UN Member or UN Observer State, but has Limited International Recognition from other UN Members and Non-UN Members. Importantly, a Disputed Country has an ongoing conflict over sovereignty with the country that claims sovereignty for its territory.

    • Colonies. A Colony refers to a 'Non-Contiguous Territory' under the sovereignty of a distant State without that the territory declaring a 'Self-Declaration of an Independent Country'. Colonialism started in the 15th century as part of the Imperialism and Mercantilism Doctrine, but since then, most of the Colonies became Independent Countries, so currently, most of the remaining Colonies are small and vulnerable, yet most of them have aspirations for 'Self-Determination', especially following the UN resolution on Decolonialism (Granting Independence to Colonies) from 04 December 2024.

    • Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of China. China has two Special Administrative Regions (SARs): Hong Kong and Macau. Both of them are former Colonies that were handed over to their ‘Home Country’, China, yet after their handover, Hong Kong and Macau got the status of Special Administrative Region in China. Hong Kong was a Colony of the UK from 1841 until 1997 when it was handed over to China, while Macau was a Colony of Portugal from 1557 until 1999 when it was handed over to China.

  • Limited International Recognition. The International Recognition was assessed by counting the number of UN members and Non-UN members that have already formally recognised the UN Member or the Self-Declaration of Independence of the Disputed Country. This indicator is based on various sources that were retrieved in April 2025. Notably, there is a significant dynamic regarding the International Recognition of the State of Palestine, so for its latest data, please see International Recognition of the State of Palestine https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoringrisks/palestine-recognition . Therefore, this indicator includes four categories, as follows:

    • No International Recognition. 0 - Not recognised yet by any UN member or Non-UN Member.

    • Minor International Recognition. Recognition by 1-10 UN Members or Non-UN Members.

    • Significant Limited International Recognition. Recognition by 11-180 UN Members.

    • Almost Full International Recognition. Recognition by 180-192 UN Members.

  • Attitude towards the New International Economic Order. The UN Resolution on the New International Economic Order that was brought to a vote by Russia on 14 December 2022, gives a clear indication about which countries would like to preserve the economic dominance of the USA or, vice versa, which countries would like to replace the economic dominance of the USA with other alternatives. However, keep in mind that after the vote on the resolution, transformation in leadership took place in some countries, which changed the attitude towards the dominance of the USA in these countries, such as Argentina that has become a close ally of the USA since President Javier Milei assumed office in December 2023. Therefore, this indicator includes five options, as follows:

    • Against – Preserving the economic dominance of the USA.

    • In-Favour – Replacing the economic dominance of the USA with other alternatives.

    • Abstain – 'Sitting on the Fence' countries

    • Not Voted – Usually it serves as a tactical tool in UN Votes to avoid pressure from powerful countries, which is mainly implemented by small or weak countries (Cite 7).

    • Not Applicable (N/A) – refers to Non-UN members that have no right to participate in UN Votes.

  • Attitude towards Decolonialism. The UN Resolution on Decolonialism by Granting Independence to Colonies was brought to a vote on 04 December 2024, which gives a clear indication about which countries would like to preserve the Colonies or, vice versa, which countries would like to abolish the colonies by Granting Independence to the remaining Colonies. Therefore, this indicator includes five options, as follows:

    • In-Favour of Decolonialism

    • Abstain as 'Soft-Against'. No country was voted Against but rather 'Soft-Against' via Abstain, likely because it seems more 'politically correct' compared to Against, which is done mainly by Western countries that some of them still have Colonies.

    • Not Voted – Usually it serves as a tactical tool in UN Votes to avoid pressure from powerful countries, which is mainly implemented by small or weak countries (Cite 7).

    • Not Applicable (N/A) – refers to Non-UN members that have no right to participate in UN Votes.

  • Multilateral Trade Alliances (Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)) and Multilateral Military Alliances. The Multilateral Alliances includes two indicators, as follows:

    • Membership Status by the Home Country of Each Multilateral Alliance. The Monitoring International Trade for the Year 2024 includes all the Multilateral Alliances included in the 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) (Cite 72). Thereby, this indicator presents the home country's membership status in each Multilateral Alliance, with the aim of giving information about the scope of the FTAs that each Home Country has, namely multiple membership in several FTAs is supposed to have a more positive impact on International Trade compared to membership in a single FTA or not having them at all. Thereby, this indicator includes several types of Membership Status, as follows: Member – when only the name of the Alliance is mentioned, while adding abbreviations in the cases of Associated Member (AM), Partner State (PS), Candidate for Full Membership (C), Applicant for Full Membership (A), Suspended Member (S), Agreement (AG), Unilaterally (U). The data for Trade Alliances were retrieved from the WTO-Regional Trade Agreements Database. All sources were retrieved in April 2026. For full information about Each Multilateral Alliance, Please see Rozen-Bakher, Z. Monitoring Alliances by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher https://www.rozen-bakher.com/monitoring-alliances

    • Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances: Total of the International Trade in 2024 of Each Alliance. This indicator summarises the total of Exports/Imports/International Trade Balance in 2024 of each Multilateral Trade/Military Alliance to compare the International Trade among the Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances. However, keep in mind that there is a limitation with this indicator due to the multiple memberships. More specifically, in the last two decades, too many Multilateral Trade Alliances were formed, so too many countries became members of several FTAs in parallel, which limits the ability to determine which trade alliance contributes more to the country, especially if the export partners are also members in the same multiple trade alliances, such as Russia and China, which are both members in SCO and BRICS, or in the case of Russia and Kazakhstan, which are both members in SCO, BRICS, CIS, OPEC+, OIC, EAEU. Therefore, this indicator presents the comparison of International Trade in 2024 among the Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances, but keep in mind that most of the Home Countries belongs to more than one Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances, as shown in Map 6.

  • Foreign Military Presence in Host Countries. The data on Foreign Military Presence refer to a formal army that has Foreign Military Bases or Installations with Combat Forces (e.g., Land, Air, Navy) that carry out Military Operations or Exercises for operational readiness, including Logistics Bases, yet it does not include Training, Research, and Testing Bases. The data was retrieved from World BEYOND War in April 2026. The Foreign Military Presence includes three indicators, as follows:

    • Host Country with a Foreign Military Presence. It was tested via a dichotomous indicator, as follows: YES – Exists a Foreign Military Presence in the Host Country; NO – Not Exists a Foreign Military Presence in the Host Country.

    • Total Number of Foreign Military Bases and Installations in the Host Country. This indicator includes not only the total number of Military Bases or Installations in the Host Country with Combat Forces or with Logistics but also the total number of military bases and Installations with Training, Research, and Testing activities.

    • Total Number of Foreign Military Bases and Installations that the Home Country has in Host Countries. This indicator refers to the Military Bases and Installations that the Home Country has in Host Countries. It includes not only the total number of Military Bases or Installations in the Host Country with Combat Forces or with Logistics but also the total number of military bases and Installations with Training, Research, and Testing activities. In the cases of Sovereign State with Colonies, it also includes the total number of military bases and Installations that the Sovereign State has in its Colonies, but keep in mind that in some colonies, there is missing data about the exact number of the military bases and Installations that the Sovereign State has in the Colony.

  • Sanctions. Any sanction is supposed to impact negatively the International Trade of the country, but a Sanction-War at the regional or global levels can impact negatively the Internationl Trade of many countries, either if the sanctions are imposed against the country or if the sanctions are imposed by the country against other countries. Therefore, this indicator is tested by the Sanctions against Russia that cover many countries with significant impact not only on the global economy but also on the global order. More specifically, ‍the Sanctions Against Russia following the Russia-Ukraine War have affected significantly the International Trade at the global level because the Sanctions have led to a Shift in Trade, namely it splits the world into two camps: those countries that joined the Sanctions Against Russia and those countries that did not join the Sanctions Against Russia. Therefore, this variable was tested by a dichotomous indicator, as follows: YES – Joined the Sanctions against Russia; NO – Not Joined the Sanctions against Russia. The data were retrieved in April 2025 from Russia's list of Unfriendly Countries.

  • Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts in 2024. This variable was tested by a dichotomous indicator, as follows: YES – Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts; NO – No Involvement. This indicator refers to the year of 2024 because the data on International Trade also refer to this year, but keep in mind that ongoing conflicts may have a negative impact years after the end of the war. This indicator refers to the following types of conflicts: i) UN members that have been involved in Wars, either as the Aggressors or as the countries that were under attack, including UN Members that their territories have been used to carry out military attacks. ii) Military Resistance against Occupation/Annexation (e.g., the Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation or the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon). iii) Wars against Disputed Countries due to a Self-Declaration of Independence. iv) Civil Wars. v) Riots in Colonies that include curfew or State of Emergency, while handling them by military forces. Nevertheless, it excludes military combat against Terror Groups (e.g., Islamic State). The data was retrieved from various sources.

Section 2.4 Global Survival Rank (GSR):

Moderating Variable for Two Geopolitical Factors - Sanctions and Involvement in Wars

  • 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR). The Global Survival Rank (GSR) serves as a Moderating variable for two Geopolitical factors: Sanctions and Involvement in Wars. The Monitoring International Trade for the Year 2024 used the Global Survival Rank (GSR) in 2025, but it is also possible to look for other years via the GSR Serial Number (Cite 79).

    • Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator for Sanctions

      • Comparison of International Trade Balance in 2024 relative to Global Survival Rank (GSR) among Countries Under Sanctions: Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, and North Korea. his comparison includes five countries that were subject to significant sanctions in 2024, as follows: Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, and North Korea. The testing among these five countries includes two comparisons: i) Comparison of the International Trade Balance in 2024 relative to the Global Survival Rank (GSR). ii) Comparison of the Indicators (R1-R7) of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR).

    • Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator for 'Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts'

      • Comparison of Positive vs Negative International Trade Balance in 2024 relative to Global Survival Rank (GSR) among Countries that were involved in Wars in 2024. This indicator includes only Home countries that were involved in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts in 2024. This indicator is based on a comparison that includes two Categories, as follows: YES – Positive International Trade Balance in 2024; NO – Negative International Trade Balance in 2024.

      • Comparison of International Trade Balance in 2024 relative to Global Survival Rank (GSR) among Countries that were Involved in Wars in 2024: Russia, Iran, Ukraine, and Israel. This comparison includes four countries that were involved in wars in 2024, as follows: Russia, Iran, Ukraine, and Israel. The testing among these four countries includes two comparisons: i) Comparison of the International Trade Balance in 2024 relative to the Global Survival Rank (GSR). ii) Comparison of the Indicators (R1-R7) of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR). ‍

Section 3. Results

Section 3.1 Highlights

Chart 1. Top 20: Positive International Trade Balance versus Negative International Trade Balance

For full details, please see Tables 10-11 in Section 3.4.1

Chart 2. Top 20: Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank

For full details, please see Tables 1-3 in Section 3.3

Chart 3. Top 20: Global Top 1 Import Partner versus Global Top 1 Export Partner

For full details, please see Tables 1-3 in Section 3.3

Map 1. Global Political Power - Top 1 Import Partner: China vs USA vs Germany

For full details, please see Tables 4-6 in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.2

Map 2. Global Market Size - Top 1 Export Partner: USA vs China vs Germany

For full details, please see Tables 7-9 in Sections 3.3.3-3.3.4

Map 3. Global Political Power - China as a Top Import Partner: Top 1, Top 2, Top 3

For full details, please see Tables 4-6 in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.2

Map 4. Global Political Power - USA as a Top Import Partner: Top 1, Top 2, Top 3

For full details, please see Tables 4-6 in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.2

Map 5. Global Political Power - Germany as a Top Import Partner: Top 1, Top 2, Top 3

For full details, please see Tables 4-6 in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.2

Chart 4. Comparison of International Trade Balance in 2024 among Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances

For full details, please see Table 14 in Section 3.5 and Table XX in section 3.5.7

Section 3.2 Analysis of Global Top Partners of Exports and Imports in 2024 - Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 1. Global Top Partners of Exports and Imports: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Global Political Power Rank

Table 2. Global Top Partners of Exports and Imports: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Global Market Size Rank

Table 3. Global Top Partners of Exports and Imports: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order

Section 3.3 Analysis of Top Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Partners in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Section 3.3.1 Analysis of Top Import Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Import Partners

Table 4. Top Import Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Import Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Global Political Power Rank

Table 5. Top Import Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Import Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order

Section 3.3.2 Analysis of Top Export Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Export Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 6. Top Export Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Export Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Global Market Size Rank

Table 7. Top Export Partners of the Home Country versus Global Top Export Partners: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order

Section 3.3.3 In which Countries the Country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, sorted by Global Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, Higher to Lower: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 8. In which Countries the Country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, sorted by Global Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Import Partner, Higher to Lower

Section 3.3.4 In which Countries the Country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner, sorted by Global Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner, Higher to Lower: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 9. In which Countries the Country is the Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner, sorted by Global Top 1/Top 2/Top 3 Export Partner, Higher to Lower

Section 3.4. Analysis of International Trade Balance, Total Exports and Total Imports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members  

Section 3.4.1 Comparison of International Trade Balance in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members 

Table 10. International Trade Balance: All UN Members and Non-UN Members with a Positive International Trade Balance, sorted from Higher to Lower

Table 11. International Trade Balance: All UN Members and Non-UN Members with a Negative International Trade Balance, sorted from Higher to Lower

Section 3.4.2 Comparison of Total Imports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 12. Total Imports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted from Higher to Lower

Section 3.4.3 Comparison of Total Exports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members 

Table 13. Total Exports in 2024: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted from Higher to Lower

Section 3.5 The Impact of the Geopolitical Position Factors on International Trade

Table 14. Geopolitical Position Factors: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order

Section 3.5.1 The Impact of Region on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 15. Average of International Trade in 2024 by Region, sorted by the Average of International Trade Balance in 2024

Notes: For the Region of Each Home Country, Please see Table 14. The Number of Home Countries per Region includes Home Countries with some missing data on International Trade.

Chart 5. The Impact of the Region on Exports, Average of the Total Exports in 2024

Section 3.5.2 The Impact of Religion on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 16. Average of International Trade in 2024 by Main Religion, sorted by the Average of International Trade Balance in 2024

Notes: For the Religion of Each Home Country, Please see Table 14. The Number of Home Countries per Main Religion includes Home Countries with some missing data on International Trade.

Table 17. Average of International Trade in 2024 by Main Religious Denomination, sorted by the Average of International Trade Balance in 2024

Notes: For the Religion of Each Home Country, Please see Table 14. The Number of Home Countries per Main Religious Denomination includes Home Countries with some missing data on International Trade.

Section 3.5.3 The Impact of Sovereignty Status on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Chart 6. The Impact of the Sovereignty Status on International Trade

Notes: For the Sovereignty Status of Each Home Country, Please see Table 14. The Number of Home Countries per Sovereignty Status includes Home Countries with some missing data on International Trade.

Section 3.5.4 The Impact of Limited International Recognition on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 18. Average of International Trade in 2024 by the Categories of Limited International Recognition, sorted by the Average of International Trade Balance in 2024

Notes: For the International Recognition of Each Home Country, Please see Table 14. The Number of Home Countries per each category includes Home Countries with some missing data on International Trade.

Section 3.5.5 The Impact of the Attitude towards the New International Economic Order on International Trade: Countries with UN Vote Right

Chart 7. Average of International Trade Balance in 2024 by the Vote (Favour/Against) of UN Resolution on New International Economic Order

Note: For the Vote by Each Country, Please see Table 14.

Section 3.5.6 The Impact of Decolonialism‍ on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Chart 8. Average of International Trade Balance in 2024 by the Vote of UN Resolution on Decolonialism‍

Note: For the Vote by Each Country, Please see Table 14.

Chart 9. Average of International Trade Balance in 2024 by Colonialism‍ versus Decolonialism‍

Section 3.5.7 The Impact of Multilateral Trade Alliances (Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)) and Multilateral Military Alliances on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 19. The Impact of Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances on International Trade, sorted by the Total of International Trade Balance in 2024

Note, For the Membership in Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances of Each Home Country, Please see Table 14, but keep in mind that Table 14 presents not only Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances, but also other types of Alliances, such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) that acts only as a Political Alliance without aspects of FTA or Defence Pact.

Map 6. Multiple Membership in Multilateral Trade/Military Alliances by Home Country

Section 3.5.8 The Impact of Foreign Military Presence on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Chart 10. Average of International Trade Balance in 2024 by Foreign Military Presence

Note: For the Foreign Military Presence of Each Country, Please see Table 14

Chart 11. International Trade Balance in 2024: Home Countries with Foreign Military Presence with above 7 Military Bases and Installations in Host Countries

Section 3.5.9 The Impact of Sanctions on International Trade:  All UN Members and Non-UN Members  

Table 20. The Impact of the Sanctions against Russia on International Trade: Comparison between Home Countries that Imposed Sanctions on Russia versus Home Countries that did not impose sanctions on Russia, Sorted by International Trade Balance

Section 3.5.10. The Impact of Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts on International Trade: All UN Members and Non-UN Members

Table 21. The Impact of Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts in 2024 on the International Trade, sorted by International Trade Balance in 2024

Section 3.6. Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator for Two Geopolitical Factors: Sanctions and Involvement in Wars

Section 3.6.1 The Impact of Sanctions on International Trade: Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator

Table 22. Countries Under Sanctions - Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, and North Korea - Comparison of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) versus the Rank of International Trade Balance, Sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)

Table 23. Countries Under Sanctions - Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Cuba, and North Korea - Comparison of the Indicators (R1-R7) of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)

Section 3.6.2 The Impact of Involvement in Wars, Occupations, and Military Conflicts on International Trade: Global Survival Rank (GSR) as a Moderator

Table 24. Involvement in Wars in 2024 - All UN Members and Non-UN Members: Positive International Trade Balance vs Negative International Trade Balance in 2024, sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)

Table 25. Involvement in Wars in 2024 - Russia, Iran, Ukraine, and Israel - Comparison of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR) versus the Rank of International Trade Balance, Sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)

Table 26. Involvement in Wars in 2024 - Russia, Iran, Ukraine, and Israel - Comparison of the Indicators (R1-R7) of 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR), Sorted by 2025 Global Survival Rank (GSR)

Section 4. Analysis of the Results and Policy Recommendations

The 'Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher' brings to light the originality and novelty of its Conceptual Research Model (see Chart B), which confirms the necessity of developing the Global Political Power Rank versus Global Market Size Rank by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, with the aim of revealing which country is more powerful in International Trade compared to other countries, because the current monitoring International Trade by various institutions does not provide such insight. On the contrary, many institutions focusing on the Top Export Partners of the countries (e.g., UNCTAD) that reflects the Imports of the Home Country, rather than focusing on the Top Import Country that reflects the Exports of the Home Country, yet neither institution provides an understanding of the total number of countries where Home Country was a Top Import Partner or a Top Export Partner in a given year. Importantly, most current institutions that monitoring International Trade do not provide any data on the most important indicator, namely the International Trade Balance in a given year, while none of them provide insight into the Global Rank of the International Trade Balance to compare the trade balance among all countries. Hence, the 'Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher' fills these gaps by providing comprehensive understanding of the International Trade situation in a given year for each UN member and Non-UN member, in terms of its position in the Global Political Power Rank (Global Top Import Partner) versus the Global Market Size Rank (Global Top Export Partner), including its position in the Global Rank of the International Trade Balance. However, 'Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher' provides insights not only at the Country Level but also at the Multilateral Trade Alliances Level, namely which Multilateral Trade Alliance is more powerful compared to other Multilateral Trade Alliances in terms of Exports, Imports, International Trade Balance, and their Global Ranks, as well as in terms of their position in the Global Political Power Rank (Global Top Import Partner) vs the Global Market Size Rank (Global Top Export Partner).   

The analysis of the results for the year 2024 shows that there is a substantial difference between being a Global Top Import Partner and being a Global Top Export Partner, as shown in Chart D. that presents the three leading Global Top Partner of Export vs Import for the Year 2024. The results show that China is the Global Top 1 Import Partner for 85 Home Countries, while respectively the USA for 33 Home Countries and Germany for 20 Home Countries, which indicates that China not only has the biggest export compared to others (see Table 13), but also China conducts exports to the larger number of home countries as their Top 1 Export Partner. In contrast, the USA is the Global Top 1 Export Partner for 87 Home Countries, while respectively China for 79 Home Countries and Germany for 44 Home Countries, which indicates that the USA not only has the biggest import compared to others, but also the USA conducts imports to the larger number of home countries as their Top 1 Import Partner (see Table 12).

Chart D. Top Export Global Partners vs Top Import Global Partners for 2024: China, United States, and Germany‍ ‍

However, these results are good news for China, but bad news for the USA, because it means that China is strong in Export, while the USA is strong in Import, which significantly affects the International Trade Balance. As shown in Table E that presents the International Trade data of the three leading Global Top Partners for 2024, China has the best Global Rank of International Trade Balance (Rank=1), while the USA has the worst Global Rank of International Trade Balance (Rank=239). Still, the BIG question is Why the USA as a Superpower got into this trouble.   

Table E. Top Export Global Partners vs Top Import Global Partners: China, United States, and Germany‍, sorted by the Global Rank of International Trade Balance‍ ‍ ‍

Thereby, if we look at this from a historical perspective based on the data on International Trade Balance of China vs the USA vs Germany over the years 1960-2024, as shown in Chart E, then we might think that Trump is right about his Trade-war through the Reciprocal Tariffs (Cite 80), regardless of the fact that the Reciprocal Tariffs violate the USA’s FTAs (Cite 81). More specifically, the historical data shows that 1968 was the first year when the USA ran into a Negative International Trade Balance (-1.3 Billion USD), and in most subsequent years as well, but from 1976 until 2024, the USA remained in a Negative International Trade Balance throughout those years, yet the Negative Balance grew significantly from -15,7 Billion USD in 1976 to -1,294 Billion USD in 2024.

Chart E. Historical Data on International Trade Balance, 1960-2024: China vs the USA vs Germany

Nevertheless, if we look at that from the perspective of how a country loses its Comparative Competitive Advantages in the long-run, then we should look at Chart F. that presents the 'Domino Effect' of 'Nationalism-Mercantilism' on Falling into the Trap of a Negative International Trade Balance. As shown in Chart F, a policy of 'Nationalism-Mercantilism' (Cite 4) in the style of Trump's 'America First' will lead paradoxically to the opposite results, namely preventing the relocation of jobs to low-cost countries alongside imposing higher import tariffs, will lead to the loss of the Comparative Competitive Advantages of the Country in the long-run, including harming the national labour market.

Chart F. The 'Domino Effect' of 'Nationalism-Mercantilism' on Falling into the Trap of a Negative International Trade Balance

The fall of the Automotive Industry in Detroit (Cite 82) illustrates in a clear way how the 'Domino Effect' due to the policy of 'Nationalism-Mercantilism' leads to the loss of Comparative Competitive Advantages of the Country in the long-run, as shown in Chart G. that presents the Global Market of the Automotive Industry, namely the USA had 75.7% of the global market share in 1950 until it had only 11.3% in 2023. Therefore, the long policy of the USA to keep production jobs of the Automotive Industry in the USA has led paradoxically, to the opposite result, namely to the closing of Automotive firms, and even to Bankruptcy de-facto of Chrysler, one of the 'Big Three', that twice was saved by the USA government, and yet, despite all the 'money' to keep the Automotive jobs in the USA, the population of Detroit, including its jobs, was shrinked from 1.8 million in 1950 to 600K in 2020, as shown in Chart H that present the Population of Detroit over the years 1925-2020. Hence, paradoxically, if in the 1950s-1960s, the vehicle production of the USA was relocated to low-cost countries by the 'Big Three' and others, then likely, that the USA's share of Vehicle Production might be much higher now than it currently today, and Detroit and its labour market might be in much better place than today, because of the higher profits that may allow to create Strategic-Assets Jobs. Thereby, the 'Domino Effect' in Chart F indicates that it is better to relocate production jobs to save the future of the firm rather than to keep High-Cost of production jobs that will lead in the long-run to the significant lose of the global market and even to the bankruptcy of the firm, as what happened to Chrysler. The case of Detroit may indicate that 'America First' should be keeping the profits and the global market share of the USAs MNEs to maintain a Positive International Trade Balance over keeping production jobs in the USA at high-cost, yet without success in terms of profits and global market share, resulting in a Negative International Trade Balance.

Chart G. Global Vehicle Production, Market Share by Leading Countries, 1950-2023

Chart H. Detroit Population, 1925-2020

There are several policy recommendations regarding the data. First, the current institutions that collect data on International Trade should try to bring data not only about the Top Export Partner/Top Import Partner of a country, but also about the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), namely about the Top FDI Inward Partner vs the Top FDI Outward Partner of each country, which this kind of data currently do not exist at any institution. Therefore, this kind of data will allow to analyse the relations between International Trade and FDI at the country level, mainly due to the ‘Exported FDI’, namely when a country conducting FDI for propose of Export to third countries, such as when MNE relocated its production to Low-Cost countries to reduce costs, and then to export the products to third countries. Second, the current data on Multilateral Trade Alliances that based on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) (e.g., WTO – Regional Trade Agreement Database) gives only information about the membership of each FTA, but without any data about the scope of the International Trade that each FTA conducts in terms of Yearly Export and Yearly Import. This kind of data will allow to analyse in more accurate way which alliance is more powerful in International Trade compared to others due to the multiple membership that many countries have in Multilateral Trade Alliances. In other words, in the last decades, as shown in Map 6, too many countries became members of several FTAs in parallel, which limits the ability to determine what is the contribution of each country to each Multilateral Trade Alliances/FTA, especially if the export partners are also members in the same Multilateral Trade Alliance, such as Russia and China that are members in the same Multilateral Trade Alliances like SCO and BRICS. Third, some institutions used the data of UN Comtrade based on the Partners Reports to present the total of Export/Import per year, including the Top Partners. However, there is a limitation in using the partner data from UN Comtrade because it does not include all partners because some partners do not submit reports at all or for recent years, so it is not allowed to get accurate amount of the total of exports/Imports per year based on the calculation of the partners reports. Even using it for determining which the Top Partners are should be done carefully, because if, for example, a top partner in 2023 did not submit a report in 2024, then it will lead to the disappearance of this Top Partner in 2024, as happened in the case of the United Arab Emirates because its last report was in 2023, so in 2024, United Arab Emirates disappeared from the data as a Top Partner, and instead other countries were determined as Top Partners by some institutions, despite that they are not. Therefore, in these cases, it may be better to determine the Top Partner as a Missing Data (N/A) to avoid bias as done with the data of 'Monitoring International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher' when a Top Partner in 2023 disappeared from the data of UN Comtrade in 2024 based on the partners reports (see Section 5. Methodological Notes).

Section 5. Methodological Notes

Table I. International Trade Data Notes: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order

List of Methodological Notes, sorted by the Number of the Methodology Note that Mentioned in Table I

  • Data Note, 1, Abkhazia, Abkhazia has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from abkhazia.news-pravda.com, yet the total of Exports and Imports in rubles was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024.

  • Data Note, 2, Afghanistan, Afghanistan has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the data for Imports were treated as missing data (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 3, Alaska, Non-Contiguous State of USA, Alaska has no data in World Bank, so the total of imports and exports were retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

  • Data Note, 4, American Samoa, USA, American Samoa has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from the American Samoa Ministry of Customs and Revenue, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Samoan tala was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024 

  • Data Note, 5, Anguilla, UK, Anguilla has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 6, Belarus, Belarus has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the data for Imports were treated as missing data (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 7, Bonaire, Netherlands, Bonaire has no data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD, yet the data in UNCTAD includes not only Bonaire, but also Sint Eustatius and Saba

  • Data Note, 8, British Indian Ocean Territory, UK, British Indian Ocean Territory has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD, so the data for exports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners reports.   

  • Data Note, 9, Burundi, Burundi has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the data for Imports were treated as missing data (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 10, Canary Islands, Spain, Canary Islands has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from the Instituto Canario de Estadística (ISTAC), yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024.

  • Data Note, 11, Chad, Chad has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 12, Christmas Island, Australia, Christmas Island has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD, so the data for exports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners reports.   

  • Data Note, 13, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Australia, Cocos (Keeling) Islands has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD, so the data for exports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners reports.   

  • Data Note, 14, Comoros, Comoros has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 15, Congo, Democratic Republic, Congo DR has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 16, Djibouti, Djibouti has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 17, Eritrea, Eritrea has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 18, Finland, The total of Imports/Exports of Finland includes the Colony of Finland: Svalbard.

  • Data Note, 19, France, The total of Imports/Exports of France includes the Colonies of France that define as Overseas Departments of France, as follows: French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, and Réunion.

  • Data Note, 20, French Guiana, France, French Guiana has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from the Le chiffre du commerce extérieur, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024

  • Data Note, 21, Gibraltar, UK, Gibraltar has no data in World Bank for the year 2024, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD

  • Data Note, 22, Guadeloupe, France, Guadeloupe has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from the Le chiffre du commerce extérieur, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024.

  • Data Note, 23, Hawaii, Non-Contiguous State of USA, Hawaii has no data in World Bank, so the total of imports and exports were retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

  • Data Note, 24, Iran, Iran has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 25, Iraq, Iraq has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the data for Imports were treated as missing data (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 26, Kosovo, Kosovo has no data on Trade in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or UNComtrade, so the total of imports and exports were retrieved from Trading Economics based on Kosovo Agency of Statistics, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024

  • Data Note, 27, Liechtenstein, Liechtenstein has no data on Trade in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or UNComtrade, so the data were retrieved from the Economic and financial data on Liechtenstein (June 2025) that published by the Government of the Principality
    of Liechtenstein, yet the total of Exports and Imports in CHF was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024

  • Data Note, 28, Madeira, Portugal, Madeira has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrade, so the total of Exports and Imports were retrieved from the Regional Directorate of Statistics of Madeira (DREM), yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024.

  • Data Note, 29, Martinique, France, Martinique has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from the Le chiffre du commerce extérieur, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024.

  • Data Note, 30, Mayotte, France, Mayotte has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from the Le chiffre du commerce extérieur, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024.

  • Data Note, 31, Monaco, Monaco has no data on Trade in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or UNComtrade, so the total of imports and exports were retrieved from Trading Economics based on Monaco Statistics, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024

  • Data Note, 32, Mongolia, Mongolia has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 33, Montserrat, UK, Montserrat has no data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD

  • Data Note, 34, Nepal, Nepal has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 35, Niue, New Zealand, Niue has no data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD.

  • Data Note, 36, Norfolk Island, Australia, Norfolk Island has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD, so the data for exports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners reports.   

  • Data Note, 37, North Korea, North Korea has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 38, Norway, The total of Imports/Exports of Norway includes the Colony of Norway: Åland Islands

  • Data Note, 39, Palestine, The State of Palestine has no data on Trade in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD.

  • Data Note, 40, Pitcairn Islands, UK, Pitcairn Island has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD, so the data for exports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners reports.   

  • Data Note, 41, Portugal, The total of Imports/Exports of Portugal includes the Colonies of Portugal: Azores Islands and Madeira

  • Data Note, 42, Puerto Rico, USA, Puerto Rico has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrade, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

  • Data Note, 43, Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrad, so the available data were retrieved from Ministry of Finance of Republika Srpska, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024.

  • Data Note, 44, Réunion, France, Réunion has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or in UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from the Le chiffre du commerce extérieur, yet the total of Exports and Imports in Euro was converted to US$ based the exchange rate on 31 December 2024.

  • Data Note, 45, Saba, Netherlands, Saba has no data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD, yet the data in UNCTAD includes not only Saba, but also Bonaire and Sint Eustatius.

  • Data Note, 46, Saint Barthélemy, France, Saint Barthélemy has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD, so the data for exports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners reports.   

  • Data Note, 47, Saint Helena, Ascension & Cunha, UK, Saint Helena, Ascension & Cunha have no Trade data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD, but the data refers only to Saint Helena (Population 4,233), excluding Ascension (Pop. 894) and Tristan da Cunha (Pop. 264), which also applies to the Partners Data.

  • Data Note, 48, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, France, Saint Pierre and Miquelon has no data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD

  • Data Note, 49, San Marino, San Marino has no data on Trade in World Bank nor in UNCTAD, so the total of imports and exports and the Partners data for Exports were retrieved from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC)

  • Data Note, 50, Sint Eustatius, Netherlands, Sint Eustatius has no data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD, yet the data in UNCTAD includes not only Sint Eustatius, but also Bonaire and Saba

  • Data Note, 51, Somalia, Somalia has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the data for Imports were treated as missing data (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 52, Somaliland, Somaliland has no data in World Bank nor in UNCTAD or UNComtrade, so the total of exports and imports were retrieved from the Somaliland Ministry of Planning and National Development

  • Data Note, 53, South Sudan, South Sudan has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 54, Spain, The total of Imports/Exports of Spain includes the Colonies of Spain: Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla

  • Data Note, 55, Syria, Syria has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the available data for Imports were retrieved from UNComtrade based on the Partners' Reports (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 56, Taiwan, Taiwan has no data on Trade in World Bank nor in UNComtrade, so the available data were retrieved from UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

  • Data Note, 57, Tajikistan, Tajikistan has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the data for Imports were treated as missing data (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 58, Tokelau, New Zealand, Tokelau has no data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD

  • Data Note, 59, Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan has no data for the year 2024 as a Reporter in UNComtrade, and there is also missing data for Imports based on partners' Reports in UN Comtrade, so the data for Imports were treated as missing data (see General Note II).

  • Data Note, 60, Tuvalu, Tuvalu has no data on Trade in World Bank for the Year 2024, so the total of Exports and Imports were retrieved from UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

  • Data Note, 61, United States, The total of ImportsExports of the USA includes the Colonies/States of USA: American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,
    US Virgin Islands, Johnston Atoll, Hawaii (Non-Contiguous State of USA), and Alaska (Non-Contiguous State of USA).

  • Data Note, 62, US Virgin Islands, USA, US Virgin Islands has no data in World Bank, so the total of imports and exports were retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

  • Data Note, 63, Wallis and Futuna Islands, France, Wallis and Futuna Islands has no data in World Bank, so the total of Exports/Imports were retrieved from UNCTAD

  • Data Note, 64, Yemen (see Appendix I in 2025 GSR), See Appendix I in 2025 GSR

Section 6.

Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher: All UN Members and Non-UN Members, sorted by Alphabetical Order

A

  • Abkhazia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/26022025/abkhazia

  • Afghanistan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 03 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/03/afghanistan

  • Akrotiri and Dhekelia, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 03 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/03032025/akrotiri-and-dhekelia

  • Åland Islands, Finland, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/26022025/aland-islands

  • Alaska, Non-Contiguous State of USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 17 June 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/17062025/alaska

  • Albania, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 10 December 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/12/10/albania

  • Algeria, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/24032025/algeria

  • American Samoa, USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/21022025/american-samoa

  • Andorra, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/02/15/andorra

  • Angola, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 September 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/09/27/angola

  • Anguilla, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 17 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/17032025/anguilla

  • Antigua and Barbuda, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/02/27/antigua-and-barbuda

  • Argentina, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/20/argentina

  • Armenia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 July 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/30072023/armenia

  • Aruba, Netherlands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/27/aruba

  • Australia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 04 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/04/australia

  • Austria, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 June 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/06/23/austria

  • Azerbaijan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/25/azerbaijan

  • Azores Islands, Portugal, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/18072024/azores

B

  • Bahamas, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 March 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/03/18/bahamas

  • Bahrain, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 05 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/02/05/bahrain

  • Bangladesh, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/19/bangladesh

  • Barbados, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 May 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/05/25/barbados

  • Belarus, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 May 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/05/19/belarus

  • Belgium, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 17 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/17/belgium

  • Belize, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 10 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/10/belize

  • Benin, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 12 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/12/benin

  • Bermuda, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 13 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/13082024/bermuda

  • Bhutan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 December 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/12/11/bhutan

  • Bolivia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 14 November 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/11/14/bolivia

  • Bonaire, Netherlands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/27022025/bonaire

  • Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 October 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/10/26/bosnia-and-herzegovina

  • Botswana, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 14 October 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/10/14/botswana

  • Brazil, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 September 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/09/30/brazil

  • British Indian Ocean Territory, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/25032025/british-indian-ocean-territory

  • British Virgin Islands, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/24022025/british-virgin-islands

  • Brunei, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 13 February 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/13022024/brunei

  • Bulgaria, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/21/bulgaria

  • Burkina Faso, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/24/burkina-faso

  • Burundi, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 March 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/03/20/burundi

C

  • Cabo Verde, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 01 August 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/01082023/cabo-verde

  • Cambodia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 July 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/07/28/cambodia

  • Cameroon, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 March 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/03/30/cameroon

  • Canada, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/24/canada

  • Canary Islands, Spain, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 December 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/15122023/canary-islands

  • Cayman Islands, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/11082024/caymanislands

  • Central African Republic, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/19/central-african-republic

  • Ceuta, Spain, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 August 2024,  https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/06082024/ceuta

  • Chad, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 November 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/11/02/chad

  • Channel Islands (Bailiwicks of Guernsey and Jersey), UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 31 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/31072024/channel-islands

  • Chile, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 May 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/05/24/chile

  • China, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 May 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/05/06/china

  • Christmas Island, Australia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/30032025/christmas-island

  • Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Australia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/02042025/cocos-islands

  • Colombia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/06042025/colombia

  • Comoros, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 December 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/23122023/comoros

  • Congo, Republic, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/15072024/congo-republic

  • Congo, Democratic Republic, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 01 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/01/dr-congo

  • Cook Islands, New Zealand, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 16 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/16032025/cook-islands

  • Costa Rica, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/26072024/costarica

  • Côte d'Ivoire, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/28/ivory-coast

  • Croatia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 08 September 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/09/8/croatia

  • Cuba, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/23/cuba

  • Curaçao, Netherlands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/27/curacao

  • Cyprus, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 08 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/08/cyprus

  • Czech Republic, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 February 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/02/26/czech-republic

D

  • Denmark, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 July 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/07/30/denmark

  • Djibouti, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 May 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/05/20/djibouti

  • Dominica, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 04 June 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/04062024/dominica

  • Dominican Republic, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/21/dominican-republic

E

  • Ecuador, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/02/02/ecuador

  • Egypt, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 22 November 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/11/22/egypt

  • El Salvador, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/15/el-salvador

  • Equatorial Guinea, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 17 May 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/05/17/equatorial-guinea

  • Eritrea, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/11/eritrea

  • Estonia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 04 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/04/estonia

  • Eswatini, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 January 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/1/6/eswatini

  • Ethiopia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 03 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/03042025/ethiopia

F

  • Falkland Islands, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 22 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/22032025/falkland-islands

  • Faroe Islands, Denmark, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/18082024/faroe-islands

  • Fiji, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 09 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/09082024/fiji

  • Finland, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 October 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/10/02/finland

  • France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 16 September 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/09/16/france

  • French Guiana, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 29 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/29072024/french-guiana

  • French Polynesia, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/27072024/french-polynesia

G

  • Gabon, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 December 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/18122023/gabon

  • Gambia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/25/gambia

  • Georgia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 09 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/09/georgia

  • Germany, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 04 March 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/03/04/germany

  • Ghana, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/02/ghana

  • Gibraltar, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 22 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/22022025/gibraltar

  • Greece, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 10 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/02/10/greece

  • Greenland, Denmark, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 31 July 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/07/31/greenland

  • Grenada, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 09 June 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/09062024/grenada

  • Guadeloupe, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 22 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/22072024/guadeloupe

  • Guam, USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/11042025/guam

  • Guatemala, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/18/guatemala

  • Guinea, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/20/guinea

  • Guinea-Bissau, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 13 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/13/guinea-bissau

  • Guyana, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 January 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/01/11/guyana

H

  • Haiti, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 03 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/03/haiti

  • Hawaii, Non-Contiguous State of USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 16 June 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/16062025/hawaii

  • Honduras, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 November 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/11/30/honduras

  • Hong Kong, SAR China, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 09 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/09/hong-kong-sar-china

  • Hungary, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/30/hungary

I

  • Iceland, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 31 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/31072024/iceland

  • India, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 September 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/09/23/india

  • Indonesia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 05 June 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/05062024/indonesia

  • Iran, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/27/iran

  • Iraq, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/26/iraq

  • Ireland, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 March 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/03/25/ireland

  • Isle of Man, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 07 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/07082024/isleofman

  • Israel, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 10 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/10/israel

  • Italy, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/28/italy

J

  • Jamaica, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 14 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/02/14/jamaica

  • Japan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 22 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/22/japan

  • Johnston Atoll, USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 12 June 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/12062025/johnston-atoll

  • Jordan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 December 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/12/15/jordan

K

  • Kazakhstan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 August 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/08/26/kazakhstan

  • Kenya, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 May 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/05/18/kenya

  • Kiribati, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/19072024/kiribati

  • Kosovo, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 December 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/12/25/kosovo

  • Kuwait, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/27032025/kuwait

  • Kyrgyzstan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/24022025/kyrgyzstan

L

  • Laos, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 16 October 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/10/16/laos

  • Latvia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 01 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/01082024/latvia

  • Lebanon, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 17 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/17072024/lebanon

  • Lesotho, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 June 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/06062024/lesotho

  • Liberia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/24/liberia

  • Libya, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 August 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/06082023/libya

  • Liechtenstein, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/24072024/liechtenstein

  • Lithuania, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 March 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/03/15/lithuania

  • Luxembourg, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/23/luxembourg

M

  • Macao, SAR China, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 July 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/07/24/macao

  • Madagascar, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/02/26/madagascar

  • Madeira, Portugal, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 17 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/17072024/madeira

  • Malawi, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/23/malawi

  • Malaysia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/20/malaysia

  • Maldives, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 17 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/17/maldives

  • Mali, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 16 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/16/mali

  • Malta, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 13 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/13/malta

  • Marshall Islands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/19022025/marshall-islands

  • Martinique, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/23072024/martinique

  • Mauritania, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 14 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/14/mauritania

  • Mauritius, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 09 February 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/02/09/mauritius

  • Mayotte, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/25072024/mayotte

  • Melilla, Spain, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 05 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/05082024/melilla

  • Mexico, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 December 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/12/27/mexico

  • Micronesia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/21022025/micronesia

  • Moldova, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 November 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/11/02/moldova

  • Monaco, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/19032025/monaco

  • Mongolia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/06082024/mongolia

  • Montenegro, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/21072024/montenegro

  • Montserrat, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/21032025/montserrat

  • Morocco, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 29 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/29/morocco

  • Mozambique, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 16 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/16/mozambique

  • Myanmar, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 March 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/03/26/myanmar

N

  • Namibia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 05 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/05/namibia

  • Nauru, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 12 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/12042025/nauru

  • Nepal, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 22 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/22/nepal

  • Netherlands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/27/kingdom-of-the-netherlands

  • New Caledonia, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/30072024/new-caledonia

  • New Zealand, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/21/new-zealand

  • Nicaragua, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/18/nicaragua

  • Niger, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 29 September 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/09/29/niger

  • Nigeria, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 14 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/14/nigeria

  • Niue, New Zealand, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 31 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/31032025/niue

  • Norfolk Island, Australia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/28032025/norfolk-island

  • North Korea, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/11/north-korea

  • North Macedonia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 February 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/02/15/north-macedonia

  • North Yemen (Sanaa), Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 08 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/08042025/north-yemen-sanaa

  • Northern Cyprus, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 29 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/29032025/northern-cyprus

  • Northern Mariana Islands, USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 01 October 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/01102024/northern-mariana-islands

  • Norway, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 05 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/05082024/norway

O

  • Oman, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 10 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/10082024/oman

P

  • Pakistan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 13 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/13082024/pakistan

  • Palau, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 07 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/07082024/palau

  • Palestine, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/30/palestine

  • Panama, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 22 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/22072024/panama

  • Papua New Guinea, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 September 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/09/11/papua-new-guinea

  • Paraguay, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 12 January 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/12012024/paraguay

  • Peru, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 07 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/07/peru

  • Philippines, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 29 March 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/03/29/philippines

  • Pitcairn Islands, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 04 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/04042025/pitcairn-islands

  • Poland, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/06/poland

  • Portugal, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 29 March 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/29032021/portugal

  • Puerto Rico, USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 March 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/30032021/puerto-rico

  • Puntland, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 September 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/28092024/puntland

Q

  • Qatar, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 March 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/03/02/qatar

R

  • Republika Srpska, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 09 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/09042025/republika-srpska

  • Réunion, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/20072024/reunion

  • Romania, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 31 March 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/31032021/romania

  • Russia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 01 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/01042021/russia

  • Rwanda, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 05 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/05042021/rwanda

S

  • Saba, Netherlands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/28022025/saba

  • Saint Barthélemy, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/18032025/saint-barthelemy

  • Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/19032025/saint-helena-ascension-and-tristan-da-cunha

  • Saint Kitts and Nevis, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/23032025/saint-kitts-and-nevis

  • Saint Lucia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/26032025/saint-lucia

  • Saint Martin, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 23 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/23022025/saint-martin

  • Saint Pierre and Miquelon, France, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/20032025/saint-pierre-and-miquelon

  • Saint Vincent-Grenadines, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 04 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/04082024/saintvincent-grenadines

  • Samoa, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 08 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/08042021/samoa

  • San Marino, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 16 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/16042021/san-marino

  • Sao Tome and Principe, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/27022025/sao-tome-principe

  • Saudi Arabia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 12 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/12/saudi-arabia

  • Senegal, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 13 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/13/senegal

  • Serbia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 17 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/17042021/serbia

  • Seychelles, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/18042021/seychelles

  • Sierra Leone, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/02042025/sierra-leone

  • Singapore, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 03 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/03082024/singapore

  • Sint Eustatius, Netherlands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 24 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/24032025/sint-eustatius

  • Sint Maarten, Netherlands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/27/sint-maarten

  • Slovakia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/19042021/slovakia

  • Slovenia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 05 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/05042025/slovenia

  • Solomon Islands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 12 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/12082024/solomon-islands

  • Somalia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 29 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/29/somalia

  • Somaliland, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/25022025/somaliland

  • South Africa, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/20032025/south-africa

  • South Korea, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 January 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/01/28/south-korea

  • South Ossetia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 07 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/07042025/south-ossetia

  • South Sudan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 06 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/06/south-sudan

  • South Yemen (Aden), Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 09 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/09042025/south-yemen-aden

  • Spain, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/19022025/spain

  • Sri Lanka, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 16 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/16072024/sri-lanka

  • Sudan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 19 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/19/sudan

  • Suriname, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 03 September 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/09/3/suriname

  • Svalbard, Norway, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/27032025/svalbard

  • Sweden, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 12 December 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/13122023/sweden

  • Switzerland, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 13 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/13/switzerland

  • Syria, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 31 March 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/03/31/syria

T

  • Taiwan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/11/taiwan

  • Tajikistan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 12 August 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/08/12/tajikistan

  • Tanzania, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 25 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/25042021/tanzania

  • Thailand, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 13 March 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/03/13/thailand

  • Timor-Leste, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 07 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/07/timor-leste

  • Togo, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 08 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/08/togo

  • Tokelau, New Zealand, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 01 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/01042025/tokelau

  • Tonga, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 01 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/01042025/tonga

  • Transnistria, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/21032025/transnistria

  • Trinidad and Tobago, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 26 July 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/07/26/trinidad-and-tobago

  • Tunisia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 03 February 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/02/03/tunisia

  • Turkey, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 31 January 2023, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2023/01/31/turkey

  • Turkmenistan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 04 October 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/10/04/turkmenistan

  • Turks and Caicos Islands, UK, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 February 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/20022025/turks-and-caicos-islands

  • Tuvalu, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 30 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/30072024/tuvalu

U

  • Uganda, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 20 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/20/uganda

  • Ukraine, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/28042021/ukraine

  • United Arab Emirates, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 May 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/05/01/united-arab-emirates

  • United Kingdom, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/15/united-kingdom

  • United States, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 21 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/21042021/united-states

  • Uruguay, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 27 April 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/27042021/uruguay

  • Uzbekistan, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 June 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/06/02/uzbekistan

V

  • Vanuatu, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 28 July 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/28072024/vanuatu

  • Venezuela, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 01 November 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/11/01/venezuela

  • Vietnam, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 18 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/18032025/vietnam

  • Virgin Islands, USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 02 August 2024, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/02082024/virgin-islands

W

  • Wake Island, USA, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 11 June 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/11062025/wake-island

  • Wallis and Futuna Islands, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 05 March 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/05032025/wallis-and-futuna-islands

  • Western Sahara - Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 08 April 2025, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/20022025/western-sahara

Y

  • Yemen, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 31 May 2021, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2021/05/31/yemen

Z

  • Zambia, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 04 May 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/05/04/zambia

  • Zimbabwe, Rozen-Bakher, Z., Blog on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade by Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher, Cycle I, 15 April 2022, https://www.rozen-bakher.com/blog/2022/04/15/zimbabwe

Section 7. Relevant Items From the Research Projects of Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Section 8. Recommended Reading from the Scientific Literature

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher

Dr. Ziva Rozen-Bakher - A Researcher in International Relations with a Focus on Security, Political and Economic Risks for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Trade

https://www.rozen-bakher.com/